Testing in Altered States of Consciousness
In 1972, an article was published in Science [1] by a psychology professor at UC Davis, named Charles Tart. 44 years later, there is still no clear consensus reached regarding the ideas he presented.
In short, Tart proposes the development of a new scientific method, which he calls “state-specific sciences (SSS)” — empirical research carried out in altered states of consciousness (ASCs), which include anything and everything ranging from dreaming and meditative states to marijuana and LSD intoxication. Tart’s rationale is that scientists are fundamentally unable to study and understand these altered states without being personally familiar with the experience of being in the state, and that being in ASCs allows us to observe phenomena in the world that would otherwise be missed. To illustrate his point, he uses the example of marijuana use: conventional research tells us that marijuana causes a slight increase in heart rate, red eyes, and some memory and psychomotor difficulties. Yet if a young marijuana user hears a physician or scientist talk about the effects of marijuana in this manner, it would be “clear to him that the scientist has no real understanding of what marijuana intoxication is all about”; in other words, there’s something about marijuana intoxication besides the observable physiological and neuropsychological effects that draws users in, and it is impossible to truly understand this “something” unless one has experienced intoxication themselves.
The idea of conducting scientific observations and psychological tests in ASCs raises obvious psychometric and ethical issues, but also brings up some intriguing points. Of course, the entire basis of Tart’s proposal is to make these investigations more valid — to try to get a more accurate picture of altered states of consciousness, and to measure important aspects of ASCs beyond basic changes observed easily by an outsider. It makes intuitive sense: there seem to be ineffable aspects of altered states of consciousness that can’t be communicated in our ordinary state of consciousness (SoC). When a monk describes the clarity and peace that comes after years of meditating for eight hours a day, it’s impossible to imagine what that mental state might be like.
The counter-argument is that any researcher familiar with the states they are studying is inherently biased. For example, if a researcher is studying the effects of LSD and had an earth-shattering epiphany while tripping on acid once, that experience is going to colour the approach he takes to his research. Tart recognizes that if “one’s experience is that one is obviously and lucidly experiencing truth directly, without questions”, as is the case in many ASCs, “an immediate result of this may be an extinction of the desire for further questioning”. This clearly negates the requirement of rigorous and transparent testing and observation. A particularly “good” or “bad trip” will have effects on a researcher’s observation as well. A bad trip, in which “the person feels flooded with traumatic material that he cannot handle”, might impair functioning in that ASC in a way that makes the development of a standardized SSS impossible. On the other hand, “a [good] trip may produce experiences that are so rewarding that they interfere with the scientific activity of the investigator.”
While it does seem that access to ASCs allows observation of phenomena that are otherwise unrealizable, the assumption that valid and standardized testing can be carried out in ASCs is questionable at best. Tart does state that the researcher does not necessarily have to be his own subject, but this implies that often the researcher is in fact studying themselves while in an ASC. By definition, communication between ASCs is difficult or impossible — so how can one know that the observations they made while in an SoC are sound, once they’re back in they’re ordinary SoC? Tart suggests that communication between scientists about ASCs may only be possible while both researchers are in that ASC, but what about the process of publication and dissemination of information? It seems unreasonable to expect a panel of peer-reviewers to slip into various ASCs to survey the relevant literature, and for readers to do the same at home.
To address the issue of reliability, Tart acknowledges the fact that “only the trained observer can replicate many observations”. A layperson can’t walk into a nuclear physics laboratory and expect to be able to replicate that lab’s findings; similarly, a person untrained in a particular ASC can’t expect to replicate findings about that ASC unless they become familiar with the ASC themselves. To measure reliability of ASC phenomena, then, we need to only take into account observations by specially trained observers.
Psychometric issues aside, the idea of testing in ASCs has clear ethical implications, especially with regard to ASCs evoked by the use of substances. Some such substances are known to have dangerous physiological side effects, and if researchers are using subjects other than themselves, they are responsible for the effects of these substances on their participants. This could be an issue especially with illicit, uncontrolled substances. There is also the peril of a psychologically damaging bad trip on the behalf of the subject, which needs to be taken into account.
In sum, investigating ASCs by testing while actually in ASCs is a compelling possibility for gaining more accurate insight into various phenomena, but testing while in these states raises psychometric and ethical concerns. in 2016 we still don’t exactly have a burgeoning field of state-specific sciences, but perhaps as more researchers are encouraged to think about approaching these studies in a scientific and controlled way, we’ll see more growth and acceptance of the movement.
Reference
[1] Tart, Charles (1972) States of Consciousness and State-Specific Science. Science. 176: 1203–1210.
