China’s national party congress does not concern me

A few weeks ago, I sat in my teacher’s office at my Chinese university. She casually mentioned “a meeting” that was about to start in Beijing, to which I replied, “do you mean the National Party Congress?” After a quick pause she affirmed my question, but with immense confusion. How could a foreigner be up to speed on Chinese domestic politics when even most of the Chinese general population has no understanding of such topics?

The Chinese have quite a prevalent “mind your own business” mentality about day to day life. Politics aside, if you happen to see someone getting pick-pocketed in public, it is best to be a passive bystander. Interfering in the situation could prove exceptionally dangerous as the pickpocket’s aides may rush you, or the thief himself will likely deal a severe blow to you. Interfering in affairs that do not directly concern you is, therefore, a matter of taboo. But for foreigners raised in a western culture, the notion of not studying other states’ domestic affairs is a bit mind-boggling.

What is more confusing, though, is the fact that by-and-large, Chinese people are not up to speed on their country’s politics either. One main factor in this situation is the great firewall, which selects exactly which information is available for viewing and which ideas will remain hidden from the public. Yet more and more Chinese people use VPN technology to bypass this security feature, making the same information I read daily also accessible to them. So why would my Chinese friends not care to delve deep into research about the CCP, and the recently concluded National Party Congress (NPC) in particular?

For starters, the most available information in China all indicate that the current state of affairs is great. This is not entirely inaccurate. Under President Xi Jinping’s first five-year term, crackdowns on corruption, military inefficiency, and economic reforms all characterized the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) main goals. Successes from his first term actually led to the enshrinement of Xi’s political-economic ideology in the constitution. Not only does this signal progressive though within the CCP, but also demonstrates the extreme extent of Xi’s power, comparable to Mao Zedong himself.

Again, to the common western-minded person, perhaps still made uncomfortable by the word communism itself, this may also come across as strange. I believe it is important to note that Xi’s ideology is not communist, but rather socialist with some unique tweaks. Xinhua News, China’s predominant state-run reporting mechanism, writes that Xi favors opening China to greater economic opportunity rather than having the state completely manage economics. To say that Xi is ideologically similar to Mao is, therefore, erroneous. But to say Xi has elevated himself to a similar level of prestige as Mao is arguably accurate.

Perhaps the most unnerving aspect of the NPC, however, was the leadership reshuffle. Every five years, the top seven most powerful CCP members are designated. While the official regulations on this selection are scarce, unwritten rules abound. Most notably this year are rules pertaining to presidential term limits and potential successors. Traditionally, Chinese presidents serve just two five-year terms and do not start a new term if they are over 68 years old. At the start of their second term, however, they typically place a successor within the top 7. Notable absent from Xi’s lineup at this congress was such a person, since all members will “age out” before the next term starts.

The prevailing question on everyone’s mind, at least outside of the great firewall, is whether this is a sign Xi intends to remain in power after 2022. Naturally, conversation on this subject within the great firewall is mute, but those Chinese citizens with outside intel are not worried. In conversations with locals, the general consensus is that the Chinese are all too wary of the negatives presented when Mao retained power for too long, and are sure the CCP is also just as aware.

In the long run, however, not only are Xi’s intentions highly unclear, but also none of my business.

By Blake Garron

Edited by Maryam Elahi