Kurdish statehood struggles for foreign recognition
Current global politics have marked a relatively volatile and unstable period for the world. From the rise of illiberal democracies in central Europe to the continued breakdown of relations between North Korea and the U.S, the breakdown of key political institutions in various countries has resulted in widespread instability in international relations. In the background of the duel between Kim Jong-Un and Donald Trump and the widely-covered German elections, another country, Iraq, had been dealing with an equally-important and equally-personable issue: Iraqi Kurdistan’s recent choice to hold a referendum vote in the region for Kurdish independence. The counted votes showed a vast majority in favor of independence, with 92% of nearly three million voters responding in favour of the idea.
Independence has been a long held ambition for many Kurds since the late 19th century. The people who would later identify as Kurds responded to various instabilities within the Ottoman Caliphate by realizing a distinct ethnic and cultural identity for themselves. The area that was defined as Kurdistan largely ignores modern geographic borders, with it comprising an area of northern Iraq, southeastern Turkey, and parts of Syria.
The dream of Kurdish independence was strongly revived by the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the overthrowing of Saddam Hussein, notorious for his oppression of Kurdish-Iraqis. U.S. aid infrastructure and to the Peshmerga, the Kurdistan region’s military force. The Peshmerga have proved to be most effective in the fight against ISIS, largely performing the dirty work of retaking lost territory on behalf of America and Iraqi Security Forces. Although technically under the federal jurisdiction of the government in Baghdad, the capture of historically-important Kurdish cities such as Kirkuk and Mosul fanned the desire for Kurdish independence. Although the Kurds had already voted in an unofficial referendum largely in favor independence back in 2005, This most recent referendum has been cast in a different light due to the effectiveness of Peshmerga military action in the war against IS.
The referendum has been met with widespread rejection from various states. Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan said in an interview that “[Kurdistan] is trying to push the knife in.” The Turkish government, which has been historically been at (often violent) odds with the Turkish Kurd minority, views the recent referendum as a dangerous call to arms to Kurds living inside Turkey. The response from the Iraqi government was even worse, with authorities in Baghdad canceling all flights to the Kurdistan region and sending security forces out to secure Kurdish border crossings, which are currently controlled by Peshmerga forces. The Iraqi government primarily concerned with the unrest in Kirkuk, a city under heavy dispute, currently under the control of Kurdish Peshmerga. Huseyin Yazdanpena, the commander of Peshmerga units within Kirkuk, declared that “there isn’t such a force in the world,” that could take Kirkuk from Kurdish control. Oil is, unsurprisingly, a large factor in Kurdish zeal for their establish a territorially bound statehood. The area’s oil refinery processes roughly 40% of the oil in Iraq.
Although the White House has not released an official statement on the referendum, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said “The vote and the results lack legitimacy,” and stated that the U.S. in no uncertain terms stood with the Iraqi government.
Kurdistan also faced significant criticism from Shi’ite clerics in Iraq, most prominently the Ayatollah Sistani. Having been silent on political issues since February 2016 as an act of protest, Sistani’s recent criticism of Kurdish recession in sermon is especially notable. Expressing sympathy for the historically-oppressed Kurds, Sistani nonetheless argued that the referendum was ultimately illegitimate, and further attempts for greater autonomy should be held in constitutionally-approved discussions.
It is difficult to project how the stalemate between Kurdistan and its neighbors will work out. Revolutionary and rebellious nations often face serious criticism by more established states, and with a military force as well-trained and professional as the Peshmerga, Iraq’s troops will face heavy pushback as they try to wrestle back control of various territories in the north. In the past, however, the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) has been notoriously weak, relying on the U.S. extensively for aid and playing larger state-actors against each other. It remains to be seen if the KRG will be able to foster Kurdistan’s infrastructure and political institutions into a nascent independent country, but one thing is sure: angering the aligned interests of Iraq, Turkey, and America will result in serious repercussions for the region.
Edited by Ed McCombe.
