Beyond Panpsychism: Consciousness as Informational Autonomy in a Universe of Flux
Long before human minds contemplated their own existence, information was already flowing. Not as bits in silicon, but as a fundamental flux of differentials in the fabric of reality itself. The universe, at its most elemental level, may be understood not merely as matter and energy, but as a vast information-processing system — a perspective that opens new avenues for understanding the enigma of consciousness. The question that has bedeviled philosophers and scientists alike is not simply what consciousness is, but how it emerges, and whether it represents something unique in the cosmic landscape or is merely a sophisticated expression of processes inherent to reality itself.
Panpsychism — the view that consciousness is fundamental and ubiquitous throughout the universe — has experienced a renaissance in recent philosophical discourse. Yet despite its elegant simplicity, it leaves crucial questions unanswered, particularly regarding the mechanism by which consciousness manifests in systems of varying complexity. This essay proposes that consciousness can be more productively understood as an autonomous region of information processing within a general field of information, a perspective that synthesizes insights from systems theory, information dynamics, the science of living systems, and recent research on microtubular functions to transcend traditional panpsychist frameworks.
Information as Cosmic Substrate
To appreciate consciousness as an emergent property of information processing, we must first recognize information’s fundamental role in the universe. Wheeler’s famous dictum “it from bit” suggests that physical reality emerges from information (Wheeler, 1990). This perspective has been substantiated by advances in quantum information theory, which demonstrates that information is not merely about reality but constitutive of it. As Vedral (2010, p. 3) argues, “Quantum physics requires us to abandon the distinction between information and reality.” The quantum world reveals itself not as a collection of things but as potentialities and relationships — informational patterns that coalesce into what we perceive as physical reality.
Information theory, pioneered by Claude Shannon, defined information as reduction of uncertainty (Shannon, 1948). Yet in biological and cognitive contexts, information takes on richer dimensions — it becomes meaningful, contextual, and transformative. Bateson (1972, p. 453) famously defined information as “a difference that makes a difference,” highlighting the relational aspect of information that becomes crucial for understanding consciousness. Information in living systems is not passive but dynamic and transformative, serving as both medium and message in the development of life.
The Autonomous Systems of Life
Life represents a profound discontinuity in nature’s information processing landscape. Unlike inert matter, living systems actively distinguish themselves from their environment, establishing boundaries that define self and non-self. The lipid bilayers of cell membranes exemplify this principle, creating an asymmetric interface between internal processes and external conditions. As Harold (1986, p. 78) observed, “A living cell is not a bag of enzymes, but a spatially organized system in which catalytic proteins, substrates, and products are distributed in space according to a definite plan.”
This spatial organization becomes the foundation of biological autonomy. Maturana and Varela’s concept of autopoiesis captures this self-creating, self-maintaining quality of living systems:
“An autopoietic machine is a machine organized (defined as a unity) as a network of processes of production (transformation and destruction) of components which: (i) through their interactions and transformations continuously regenerate and realize the network of processes (relations) that produced them; and (ii) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete unity in space in which they (the components) exist by specifying the topological domain of its realization as such a network.” (Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 78)
This self-reference and self-production establishes the preconditions for what will eventually manifest as consciousness. Even the simplest organisms develop mechanisms to process information about their environment — a bacterium detecting chemical gradients, for example, is already engaged in a primitive form of cognition, interpreting its world through molecular signals that guide its behavior (Lyon, 2015).
Recent research by Levin and Dennett (2020) suggests that even primitive organisms possess a form of “minimal cognition” — information processing capacities that allow them to represent their environment and respond adaptively. This capacity is not consciousness as we experience it, but it establishes the foundations upon which more complex forms of awareness can build. As they note, “All living systems, from single cells to human societies, need to solve the same fundamental problems of sensing, memory, valence, decision-making, prediction, and behavior” (Levin & Dennett, 2020, p. 207).
Microtubules and the Cytoskeletal Origins of Information Processing
At the cellular level, the cytoskeleton — particularly microtubules — plays a crucial role in establishing the material conditions for information processing. As Filimowicz (2025) argues in his work on cytoskeletal epistemology, microtubules represent “proto-cognitive structures in unicellular organisms, mediating forms of biological knowing that predate neural systems by more than a billion years.” This perspective challenges purely neurocentric accounts of cognition while suggesting deep continuities between cellular organization and mental function.
Microtubules, composed of polymerized α- and β-tubulin heterodimers arranged in cylindrical protofilaments, emerged approximately 1.5–2 billion years ago and are conserved across eukaryotic life forms (Wickstead & Gull, 2011). Far from being mere structural components, these cytoskeletal elements perform sophisticated information-processing functions:
“Microtubules execute a diverse array of cellular operations, including intracellular transport logistics… spatiotemporal organization… mechanosensation and mechanotransduction… [and] cellular morphogenesis… What unifies these diverse functions is their fundamentally informational character. Microtubules do not merely execute predetermined operations; they integrate multiple signaling modalities, respond adaptively to environmental changes, and maintain homeostatic equilibria through dynamic instability — behaviors that constitute primitive forms of cellular ‘decision-making.’” (Filimowicz, 2025).
The behavioral capacities of unicellular organisms suggest that these microtubular networks function as distributed information-processing systems capable of receiving environmental signals, integrating multiple data streams, storing experiential traces, and generating adaptive behavioral outputs — all without neuron-like specialization. Studies of ciliated protists such as Paramecium reveal capacities for directed navigation, obstacle avoidance, learning-like habituation, and even rudimentary social behaviors (Carrara et al., 2019).
Systems Theory and the Self/Other Distinction
Niklas Luhmann, building on Maturana and Varela’s work, extended the concept of autopoiesis to social systems, emphasizing how systems distinguish themselves from their environment through operations of self-reference. For Luhmann, consciousness emerges as a specific type of autopoietic system — a system that reproduces itself through the recursive processing of its own elements.
“Consciousness exists only as the self-referential processing of this difference, that is, only insofar as ideas can be related to ideas, thoughts to thoughts, only insofar as a network of recursive processing can be closed… Consciousness is a completely closed system insofar as only consciousness can determine what consciousness is.” (Luhmann, 1995, p. 262)
This self-referential closure, however, does not imply isolation from the environment. Instead, it establishes the conditions for a particular kind of openness — what Luhmann calls “operational closure and informational openness.” The system is causally connected to its environment but processes environmental perturbations according to its own internal logic and structure.
In Luhmannian terms, consciousness operates by making distinctions — between self and environment, between this and that. Every distinction presupposes an unmarked space, a horizon of possibilities against which the marked space becomes meaningful. As Spencer-Brown (1969, p. 1) famously opened his Laws of Form: “Draw a distinction. Call it the first distinction.”
The Double Processing of Information
Here we arrive at the central thesis: consciousness emerges as a double processing of information — internal processing directed toward maintaining the system’s own being, and external processing directed toward representing the environment. This dual aspect of information processing creates what phenomenologists call intentionality — the aboutness of consciousness, its capacity to be directed toward objects both real and imagined.
The internal aspect involves self-modeling — what Metzinger (2003) calls the “phenomenal self-model” (PSM) — a representation of the system’s own state that appears transparent to the system itself. The external aspect involves world-modeling — representations of the environment that guide adaptive behavior. As Metzinger (2003, p. 1) argues, “Nobody has ever been or had a self. Humans are not born as selves, but as organisms that can develop a very specific kind of conscious self-model.” This self-model emerges from the recursive operation of information processing systems.
The key insight is that consciousness isn’t merely information — it’s information processing with a particular structure. Specifically, it involves recursive self-reference — information processing that models both the world and itself as an information processor in that world. This creates what Douglas Hofstadter calls a “strange loop”:
“The ‘I’ is a hallucination perceived by a hallucination, but this does not make the ‘I’ a complete chimera. Strange loops constituting selves come into being whenever a system has the capability of representing things to itself and when one of the things it represents is itself.” (Hofstadter, 2007, p. 363)
This recursive self-reference is evident even at the cellular level. Filimowicz (2025) describes how unicellular organisms like Paramecium exhibit “information integration” where “the cortical microtubular cytoskeleton integrates mechanical, chemical, and electrical signals to coordinate ciliary responses” producing “coherent, whole-organism behaviors.” This integration of multiple sensory modalities represents a primitive form of the double processing that characterizes more complex consciousness.
Tononi’s Integrated Information Theory provides mathematical formalism for understanding how information integration might give rise to consciousness. Tononi proposes that consciousness corresponds to a system’s capacity to integrate information, quantified as Φ (phi). “The quantity of consciousness corresponds to the amount of integrated information generated by a complex of elements… The quality of experience is specified by the set of informational relationships generated within that complex.” (Tononi, 2008, p. 216)
Beyond Panpsychism
Traditional panpsychism posits consciousness as a fundamental feature of reality, present in some form throughout the universe. This perspective struggles to explain why consciousness appears to vary dramatically across systems — from the rich phenomenology of human experience to the apparently non-conscious nature of rocks. It also lacks a clear mechanism for how consciousness scales with system complexity.
The information processing account transcends these limitations by identifying consciousness not with information per se, but with particular patterns of information processing — specifically, self-referential processing that creates boundaries between system and environment. Consciousness emerges when information folds back upon itself, creating a system that represents both its environment and itself as distinct from that environment.
This perspective explains why consciousness seems to scale with certain types of complexity. Simple systems may process information but lack the recursive structure needed for self-modeling. As systems develop more sophisticated capacities for internal representation — particularly representations of themselves as agents in an environment — consciousness emerges as a natural consequence of these information dynamics.
The cytoskeletal model proposed by Filimowicz (2025) provides a crucial missing link in this account. Microtubules instantiate “vegetative semiosis” — pre-reflective sign processes that occur below the threshold of neural awareness yet demonstrate systematic interpretive activity (Kull, 2009). These microtubular processes constitute primitive forms of knowing that predate and prefigure more complex cognitive operations:
“A cytoskeletal epistemology recognizes that knowing begins not with brains but with the embodied intelligence of cells — their capacity to sense, respond, and adapt to environmental conditions in ways that maintain autopoietic integrity. Microtubules, as dynamic, information-processing structures capable of integrating multiple sensory modalities and coordinating systemic responses, instantiate this cellular knowing in its most basic form.” (Filimowicz, 2025)
As Deacon (2011, p. 464) eloquently states, “We are not stuff that abides, but patterns that perpetuate themselves; we are not material, but process, through and through — processes that momentarily coalesce into familiar form before dissipating once again.”
Unlike panpsychism, which often struggles to connect with empirical science, this information-processing account provides testable predictions. Systems with greater capacity for integrated information processing and self-representation should exhibit more complex forms of consciousness. This aligns with our observations of consciousness across the biological spectrum and opens avenues for investigating consciousness in artificial systems.
The Emergent Nature of Consciousness
Consciousness, in this framework, is neither a fundamental property of all matter nor a mysterious ghost in the machine. It is instead an emergent property of certain information processing systems — those capable of creating and maintaining autonomous regions of processing within the broader field of information. These systems draw distinctions between self and environment, process information about both domains, and integrate this information into coherent models that guide behavior.
This emergence is non-mystical and follows naturally from the principles of complex systems. As Varela et al. (1991, p. 139) note, “By using the term embodied we mean to highlight two points: first, that cognition depends upon the kinds of experience that come from having a body with various sensorimotor capacities, and second, that these individual sensorimotor capacities are themselves embedded in a more encompassing biological, psychological, and cultural context.”
The phenomenological tradition, particularly Merleau-Ponty’s work, anticipated many of these insights. For Merleau-Ponty, consciousness is neither a thing nor a substance but a structure — a particular way of relating to the world that emerges from embodied existence. “The body is our general medium for having a world.” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2012, p. 147)
The cytoskeletal perspective adds vital granularity to this embodied approach by identifying the specific subcellular structures that mediate these body-world relationships. Microtubules participate in what Filimowicz (2025) calls “multiple semiotic processes within the cell,” including indexical signification through post-translational modifications, iconic representation through spatial organization, and “mediation of umwelt” by selectively responding to relevant perturbations while ignoring others.
Quantum Dimensions of Information Processing
The connection between information processing and quantum physics offers additional perspectives on the emergence of consciousness. The Orchestrated Objective Reduction (Orch OR) theory proposed by Hameroff and Penrose (1996, 2014) suggests that microtubules may support quantum coherent states that collapse in non-random, information-bearing patterns, potentially enabling forms of information processing beyond classical limitations.
Filimowicz (2025) notes several experimental findings that lend tentative support to quantum aspects of microtubular function:
“Tubulin proteins contain multiple aromatic amino acids (tryptophan, tyrosine, phenylalanine) capable of supporting quantum electron delocalization… Coherent energy transfer has been demonstrated in other biological systems at physiological temperatures… The hollow core of microtubules creates an electrostatic environment that may shield quantum states from decoherence… [and] Topological quantum effects in microtubules could potentially enable robust information processing resistant to thermal noise.”
While the role of quantum effects in consciousness remains controversial, their potential presence in microtubular structures suggests that these cellular components may possess information-processing capabilities far beyond what classical models would predict. This quantum perspective aligns with Wheeler’s “it from bit” hypothesis and further reinforces the view that information constitutes a fundamental substrate of reality from which consciousness emerges through specific organizational patterns.
Implications and Future Directions
This reconceptualization of consciousness as autonomous information processing has profound implications across multiple domains. In neuroscience, it suggests focusing not merely on neural correlates of consciousness but on how the brain constructs self-models and maintains informational boundaries. In artificial intelligence, it implies that conscious machines would require not just sophisticated information processing but recursive self-modeling and the capacity to draw meaningful self/world distinctions.
For philosophy of mind, it offers a middle path between panpsychism and eliminative materialism — recognizing consciousness as real and significant while grounding it in natural processes. It suggests that the “hard problem” (Chalmers, 1996) may be reframed as understanding how particular patterns of information processing give rise to phenomenal experience.
Most importantly, this framework connects consciousness to life itself. Both life and consciousness involve the creation and maintenance of autonomy through information processing. As systems theorist Stuart Kauffman (2019, p. 89) suggests, “Life is autonomous agents that can act on their own behalf and reproduce.” Consciousness extends this autonomy into the realm of representation and self-modeling.
Filimowicz’s (2025) cytoskeletal epistemology further enriches this perspective by identifying the specific biological structures that mediate this autonomy at the cellular level. By recognizing microtubules as “material-semiotic interfaces between organism and environment,” we gain insight into the evolutionary continuity between cellular and neural forms of information processing.
This continuity challenges strict demarcations between cognitive and non-cognitive biological processes. Instead, it suggests a scalar continuum of cognitive complexity in which microtubular information processing represents a basal form of knowing that persists alongside more elaborate neural architectures. As Filimowicz (2025) argues, “cognitive capacities exist on a continuum extending to unicellular systems,” implying that consciousness similarly admits of degrees rather than categorical presence or absence.
The universe may indeed be fundamentally informational, as quantum information theory suggests. Within this vast field of information, certain regions become autonomous through recursive self-reference and boundary-making. These regions — living systems with varying degrees of cognitive complexity — process information both about themselves and about their environment. From this dual processing emerges what we recognize as consciousness — not a mysterious substance or a universal property, but a particular way of organizing information that creates the subject/object distinction fundamental to experience.
As we contemplate the nature of mind in the information age, perhaps we are gaining not just new metaphors for consciousness but deeper insight into its fundamental nature. Consciousness, like life itself, may be understood as a process of creating meaning through the organization of information — a process that connects us to, rather than separates us from, the informational fabric of reality itself. In tracing consciousness to its cytoskeletal origins, we begin to glimpse the deep continuities that bind consciousness to its biological foundations and appreciate anew the knowing inherent in life itself.
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