Routledge Handbook of Air Power by John Andreas Olsen
Publisher: Routledge, 2018
ISBN: 978–1138632608, 426 pages
The Routledge Handbook of Air Power is a unique, comprehensive compendium of essays which address the evolution and characteristics of air power, the roles and functions of delivering air power, the integration of air power with other military structures, its political, social and economic environment and includes six national case studies.
To achieve his objective of promoting a greater depth of air power knowledge, rather than a compendium of eulogies, John Olsen has assembled an international galaxy of thirty two contributors, several with reputations as air power specialists established over many years, some drawing upon recent operational experience and others bringing a deep understanding of the broader context of international security. The scene is set by an authoritative tour d’horizon by General Dave Deptula in his Foreword, together with a reminder to the readers that air power’s potential could be limited only by their “vision and willingness to advance”.
It is invidious to single out any particular author because all contribute valuable insights, but some do stand out. Ben Lambeth’s perennial enthusiasm for and exposition of air power reinforce the clarity of his analysis, not just of its modern dominance but its stimulation of asymmetric responses, which are not only complicating its application but are among the factors changing the nature of war itself. Alan Stephens is the doyen of increasingly influential Australian air power scholars and he most appropriately adapts for contemporary high command, the famous dictum of General Hap Arnold “to keep doctrine ahead of equipment and vision far into the future”. The importance of “thinking” is a theme which ripples through several chapters: of particular relevance to armed forces generally which do not usually set out to recruit lateral thinkers.
Peter Gray’s concise historical survey identifies the increasingly dominant role of air power, providing a cross reference to several other chapters. In tracing the evolution of operations and theories he places the former in political context and the latter in the reality of unrealised expectations. His identification of the fundamental, enduring role of command of the air resonates in the later chapters which take the reader forward into the world of unmanned systems and back into contested airspace. Subsequently, Michael Clarke places recent operations into their political context, offering sober caution to those zealots who emphasise the impact of operational success but fail to identify the debilitating effects of associated strategic and political ambiguity.
From the Second World War onwards, there have been two kinds of air power: the dominant United States’ and the rest of the world. Naturally, this compilation reflects that differential. Richard Hallion for example concentrates in minute detail on the evolution of United States aircraft, engines and weapons. This however, leaves two large gaps in the examination of “Science and Technology”. First, no contributor analyses the massive impact of Radar in negating the early forecasts of the bomber exponents, nor its subsequent manifestations in all aspects of air power since the Battle of Britain in 1940. The dependence on Radar in the application of air power on “Beyond Visual Range” cannot be exaggerated.
The second technology gap is perhaps even more substantial. The unmanned aircraft, under its various appellations of UAV, RPV, RPAS or Drone has dramatically influenced surveillance, reconnaissance and attack and its unexplored potential is considerable. Several contributors refer to it peripherally but there is no article focusing solely on its antecedents, current operations, deployment potential, ethics, manning problems and implications for traditional aerospace industries.
Phil Meilinger even-handedly surveys the origins and evolution of air power theory, but refrains from critical analysis. The reader may therefore be unaware of the virtual absence of contemporary international awareness of Douhet’s ideas, of the direct influence of Trenchard on Mitchell and later, the modification of John Warden’s ideas in the application of air power in DESERT STORM. In the event, overwhelming western superiority in technology, leadership, quality and numbers suggest that any forecasts based on that campaign should be offered with caution. As Ben Lambeth suggests, potential opponents quickly learned how to muster asymmetric counter measures. Indeed, in Kosovo, the inherent inflexibility of Warden’s ‘Five Rings’ concept was incompatible with NATO’s political cohesion and sensitivity. As Phil Meilinger emphasises, flexible thinking is indispensable to the exploitation of flexible air power. Conversely, he might have added, if theory or doctrine is allowed to harden into dogma, the product will be intellectual thrombosis and failure.
Geoffrey Biller explores the subsequent contemporary legal and ethical constraints of target distinction and discrimination, collateral damage, proportionality and humanitarian factors which inhibit western air forces. In World War One the pilots did not need to be concerned with their ethical or legal position. Indeed the myth of chivalry did not exclude the advantages to be gained from surprise attack from the rear.
Philip Sabin explores the evolution of public perception of such themes, contrasting the image of the heroic fighter pilot of World War One with the current preoccupation of much of the media with human trauma suffered on the ground. He reflects on the expectations of casualty reduction from precision weapons and on media reporting of the comparative invulnerability of contemporary aircrew. His deep historical studies lead him to comment that all these perceptions have flowed from a period of complete western dominance in conflicts where western core interests were not at stake. The factors in the equation of military necessity and ethical constraints could well be re-evaluated in future conflicts.
The contributions to contemporary roles and functions are collectively strong. Dag Henriksen examines the elements of command of the air and cautions against Western neglect of it as a consequence of two decades of lack of opposition. Frans Osinga in his wide ranging survey of “Air Strike” or more accurately “Air Attack”, uniquely observes that the ability to achieve air superiority quickly is not an intrinsic attribute of air power but the result of an aggregate overwhelming superiority. Gjert Lage Dyndal examines airborne intelligence and reconnaissance in one of the most valuable and original contributions in the collection. His comments on the mixed blessing of national equipment programmes for international intelligence co-operation, are particularly thought provoking. Robert Owen brings a lifetime of operations and study to his succinct explanation of the practical considerations essential for air mobility planning in a challenging and wide ranging environment.
In another standout contribution, Christopher McInness examines perhaps the most contentious subject facing contemporary air power: the implications for command and control of world-wide near instantaneous acquisition and dissemination of information, not to mention the threat of cyber disruption. In his observations on the dangers of the “tactical general” he is careful to emphasise the enduring importance of personal relationships. He cautions against conclusions based on uncontested air operations: a consideration not apparently occurring to some of the other contributors. This article should be the starting point for any operator or scholar who wishes to examine the command and control of air power.
Richard Knighton cogently reminds the reader that the flexibility of air power is only as good as the logistic support which it enjoys. His explanation of underlying principles and the complex needs of today’s “expeditionary” deployments should prompt caution among those commanders responsible for giving strategic advice to their political masters. The analysis is however, based on operations in a benign environment. It would have been more valuable to hear his thoughts on the implications for logistic systems should the West come to face an opponent capable of deploying cyber or kinetic counter measures. Or indeed how provision should be made to replace combat losses.
In its formative years, especially in the UK and USA, the “independent” use of air power complicated cooperation with other Service arms. The third part of this compilation examines the very different relations and operational environment where integration with other military and civilian agencies is essential.
Harvey Smyth reinforces operational experience with scholarly research to examine historical examples of airland integration, emphasising the need for joint training, doctrine and especially personal relations. His emphasis on the importance of liaison appointments should tweak an occasional personnel management conscience.
Trevor Hallen charts the almost perennial obstacles and constraints on air-sea integration. The inauguration by the UK of the Joint Harrier Force and its legacy of joint F-35 air-sea operations remains to be examined elsewhere.
James Keras concentrates primarily on US experience in integration with special forces, inevitably relying largely on secondary sources. He also emphasises the importance of personal relationships, which would have been reinforced had he included the integration of the British Long Range Desert Group in attacks on airfields in North Africa in World War Two.
Everett Carl Dolman’s contribution on Air-Space Integration will introduce many readers to a very new aspect of air power. He emphasises the integral reliance on communications, and constructs a model handbook entry. What is it? How does it work? What can it do? What are the problems? Where are we going? All the questions are answered clearly and concisely. He also, rather more controversially, argues for a separate space force.
Richard Andres’ study on cyber integration should be read alongside Dolman. He asserts that it is the only domain of warfare which is entirely manufactured and owned by humans. He examines recent instances while acknowledging that much of the relevant information is not in the public domain and reminds the reader that cyber activity permeates many commercial and political activities. Indeed, perhaps the most important contribution of this article is the stimulation it provides for almost limitless speculation about the implications of cyber interference with all aspects of air power.
James Corum has never been an air power zealot. He brings considerable academic depth to his examination of integration in counter-insurgency and unconventional operations. He traces the evolution in the USA of structured cooperation with other military and civilian agencies to overcome the previous absence of coordinated command and control, doctrine, training and operations. The reader is left in no doubt about the central role of air power in surveillance, reconnaissance, interdiction and seizure in operations well below the conventional threshold of war.
Karl Mueller looks back at the interaction of deterrence by air power and coercive diplomacy, comparing the fear of bombing in Europe in the 1930s with the period of western air power dominance in the 1990s. The link between coercion and deterrence and the objective of avoiding war becomes problematical when opponents do not share western values. The success of deterrence is determined by the value placed on the threatened targets by the opponent, virtually removing deterrence from options against organisations such as Daesh and confining air power to the process of coercion.
In the last resort, air power is determined by how much a government can afford and what access it has to an industrial base. Trevor Taylor examines the costs of equipping and maintaining a modern air force, with a clarity which may not assuage the concerns of those who advocate more resources be allocated to air power, but at least will understand why so often procurement costs are underestimated by governments, airmen and manufacturers. Unfortunately, a study of operational cost effectiveness, an even more complex equation, was beyond the remit of this author.
Keith Hayward describes the evolution of the international aviation industry. He explains the emergence of the US after World War Two ahead of all competitors, a lead which it has sustained from aircraft to space and from systems to sub systems. Reduced volume, reduced frequency and longer development times have increased costs and led to increasing industrial consolidation and globalisation. Robotic warfare is, however, comparatively cheap and provides an opportunity for low cost entry to the defence aerospace industry. Costs of high performance UAVs, however, are likely to remain high and continue to be the preserve of traditional aerospace companies. As the final collection of case studies illustrate, those factors have had a considerable impact on the ability of several countries to apply national air power.
Xiaoming Zhang describes the current rapid growth of Chinese air power and its evolution from concentration on home air defence to a balanced force capable of discharging all major air power roles. The transformation has been accompanied by a move away from dependence on Russian imports to the indigenous development of a fifth generation fighter. The Peoples’ Liberation Army Air Force may soon challenge US air power hegemony in the western Pacific, but the pervasive presence and tight control by the Communist Party as well as the military dominance of the army may inhibit the potential of Chinese air power.
Conversely, in recent years the influence of the political commissar in the Russian air force has markedly declined, allowing military expertise to determine promotions and appointments, with corresponding improvements in pilot skill levels. After describing the current structure and equipment of the forces which apply Russian air power, Igor Sutyagin nonetheless attributes the poor showing by the Russian air force in recent campaigns to inferior technology, delayed procurement programmes and insufficient training. He identifies however, the danger to the West of Russia using its air force to exert psychological superiority in the face of apparent western diffidence to risk a forceful military reaction. The implications of this particular assertion merits much deeper study.
The examinations of the Indian and Pakistani air forces should be read together. Sanu Kainikara analyses in great depth the problems afflicting the Indian Air Force, while Jamal Hussain gives a consistently upbeat assessment of his own. The former has a proud inheritance but delayed procurement problems, inter-service rivalry, failure to introduce structural reforms, lack of foresight, failure to implement combat lessons, poor intelligence and threatened on two fronts, the Indian Air Force has been choked logistically by political neutrality which has resulted in the deployment of several different types of combat aircraft. This forthright account by a former Indian fighter pilot makes painful reading for one who has always respected the Indian airman. Perhaps there may be better times ahead. India has very significant computer, communications, artificial intelligence and cyber industries. As Keith Hayward observes, there is a “low-level” entry route into the aviation industry where such expertise has considerable potential. Sadly for now, the considerable value of this chapter lies in its lessons on how not to manage air power.
Jamal Hussain’s pride in his air force permeates his chapter and is justified by its performance in recent conflicts. He is, however, fully aware of its dependence on external support, which has been and may again be susceptible to “allied” priorities. Moreover, an uncomplicated foreign policy in the face of a single perceived threat has allowed an air force focus on air defence, ground attack and nuclear deterrence. Not anymore. Pakistan now faces insurgency and non-state actors, which are stimulating interest in industrial expertise in avionics and electronics with potential for the indigenous production of drones.
By contrast, Brazil has a thriving aviation and weapons industry with Embraer an international competitor. As Colonel Rosa explains, the air force has long been aware of the importance of doctrine in the successful application of air power. Much of the air force’s activity is influenced by the huge geographical extent of the country and internal challenges. Unified doctrine, Joint Service structure, close association and frequent exercises with the USAF have ensured that the air force may be comparatively small in number but in every sense is a modern model.
Tomoyuki Ishizu explains the unique circumstances of Japanese air power. Against a background of international air power he traces its evolution from the early preWorld War Two period, when offensive operations were a high priority, to the current position of restriction to defence and close alliance with the US. His article is a timely reflection on the political and military difficulties in preparing for the uncertainties of 21st Century warfare.
Finally, Air Chief Marshal Sir Stephen Hillier, Chief of the Royal Air Force, reflects on the content of the volume. Among several salient points, he reminds the readers that while the asymmetric advantages enjoyed by western air power in recent years may be diminishing, its vital significance to all current and future joint military operations will continue — provided that the culture of vision, direction and investment is nurtured throughout our organisations. He justifiably endorses the “wellhoned guidance” offered in the volume to “those with responsibilities for the higher command of air forces”.
John Olsen’s Conclusion, “The Shape of things to Come” defies summary. It should perhaps be read as a stand-alone foreword, encapsulating as it does the major issues and ideas contained within the thirty chapters. He specifically refers to “robotisation” and it is regrettable that the reader will need to consult an index to discover the fragmentary references to it rather than a single in-depth examination which it merits.
The Handbook is nonetheless a mighty addition to the international air power lexicon. Only Gene Emme’s 1959 compilation of original sources in The Impact of Air Power can compare in quality, breadth and significance. Indeed it is intrinsically superior to Emme’s masterpiece because of the vast bibliography accessible via the hundreds of references, which simply did not exist sixty years ago.
The Routledge Handbook of Air Power is an indispensable purchase for the operator, advocate or scholar. Moreover, it is available for free to all RAF and other Defence personnel online in digital form.
Biography: Air Vice-Marshal Tony Mason is a former Air Secretary, has completed tours at the RAF College Cranwell, as Director of Defence Studies (RAF), an exchange tour with the United States Air Force Academy and as Director of Personnel policy. Additionally he attended the MA course in War Studies at Kings College London, the RAF Staff College and the USAF War College.
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