The UK Should Be Careful Not to Hand the Middle East to China
As the UK turns its gaze to the Indo-Pacific, Beijing is moving to strengthen its relations with Oman and increase its influence in the region.
In 2017, the UK and Oman signed a series of military agreements, including on British naval access to the emerging Arabian Sea port of Duqm. The UK defence minister of the time, Michael Fallon, stated that “our commitment to the Duqm port project highlights the strength of our relationship.”
Four years later, the UK announced a tilt to the Indo-Pacific (PDF), citing the region’s importance to the British economy and growing geopolitical competition with China. This commitment is ongoing, as demonstrated through participation in major exercises in the region this summer. Yet London should not take its position west of India for granted. As the UK turns its gaze elsewhere, Beijing is moving to increase its influence in this region. Its growing relations with Oman are a strong example of a threat that London should not ignore.
Considering Oman’s location on a strategically significant shipping route, it is not surprising that the port of Duqm is emerging as an important hub for maritime trade and security. Currently, the British position in Oman remains strong, building on over two centuries (PDF) of close relations with the Sultanate, centred around shared maritime interests. The importance of maritime security is embodied in the joint Saif Sareea military exercise, which has been ongoing since 1986 to reinforce the relationship and to test the UK’s expeditionary warfare capability.
China’s growing relations with Oman are a strong example of a threat that London should not ignore.
For now, the UK’s commitment to its relationship with Oman remains stable. After the third Saif Sareea exercise, the two countries signed a Joint Defence Agreement in 2019. The UK’s commitment to the partnership was again signalled in 2020 with a further £23.8 million investment in expanding its logistics hub at Duqm port. This facility is capable of supporting the UK’s two aircraft carriers and will help facilitate Royal Navy deployments to the Indian Ocean. To boost investments, the UK and Oman have signed a Sovereign Investment Partnership in 2022.
However, the port also draws the interest of China. Recently, Beijing has made considerable strategic investments in the port of Duqm in a bid to increase its influence in Oman and the wider region. In 2016, a consortium of Chinese companies committed some $10.7 billion to build an industrial city in the Duqm Special Economic Zone. Similar investment models allowed China to get significant political and economic leverage in other countries, including Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Togo. Investment in the port could help China to establish a military facility there, a possibility which it has discussed with Oman. A similar scenario has already played out in Africa, including in Djibouti.
More importantly, Beijing’s actions in Duqm are representative of growing relations between Oman and China. In January, China’s ambassador to Oman praised the “deep-rooted friendship”, saying the partnership had reached new heights. In 2023, trade between the two countries, consisting primarily of oil and gas, exceeded $30 billion and Chinese investment in the Sultanate rose by 27.8%. The two countries are also growing closer at the military level, with Oman joining a military drill in the Gulf of Oman organised by China, Iran and Russia earlier this year. Lastly, Oman leveraged its traditional role as a mediator to host the first round of the Chinese-sponsored talks between Saudi Arabia and Iran and continues to do so to ensure the implementation of the Saudi-Iranian normalisation deal that was signed in March 2023.
The push for closer ties with Oman reflects China’s ambitions to protect its economic interests and gain more influence amid growing geopolitical competition. Establishing physical presence, including for the Chinese military, is key in demonstrating commitment to a region. Since 2008, China has dispatched 45 naval escort task forces to the Gulf of Aden which help it build experience in extended deployments, as well as to project power by deploying equipment exceeding the requirements of anti-piracy missions. This increased presence allows China to challenge the UK and its allies through actions such as intelligence gathering, coercive diplomacy or enabling military operations.
How will Oman react to this courtship? Since its established policy is not to pick sides, the Sultanate can be expected to take the steps it sees as suiting its own interests. With dwindling oil and gas resources, Oman will seek investment and support to diversify its economy and pursue the Vision 2040. Although Muscat will likely aim to maintain good relations with both actors, growing ties with China might end up being to the detriment of the UK if Beijing can offer more attractive deals. For example, Oman is one of the UK’s priority markets for arms sales, but British manufacturers are facing fierce competition. Oman is reportedly looking to diversify weapons suppliers, and China can be expected to challenge the UK’s position.
Overall, the Chinese focus on developing relations with Oman is but one element of the growing global competition between China and the West. The UK does not have to turn east to face this threat. As Darshana Baruah argued, “the western Indian Ocean is the missing conversation in Indian Ocean geopolitics.” In re-evaluating the Indo-Pacific tilt, the new UK government should make sure it is not too distracted by the affairs of Southeast Asia and ensure it gives attention to its interests west of India. As China’s growing ties with Oman show, Beijing is already doing the same.
This originally appeared on rand.org on August 13, 2024.
