What to do about Cahill?
Red Bulls fans and players will make the trek this weekend down to DC, an experience that will only be worthwhile — given the cavernous, raccoon-infested monstrosity that is RFK — if RBNY snatch three points from the Scum. While visions of Juan Agudelo capping an emphatic 4–0 win at RFK with one of the best goals in Metro history will dance in our heads, the reality facing the team this weekend is much more bleak. After coming off the worst season of any team in league history — which we did not savor nearly as much as we should have — a rejuvenated DC are now firmly at the top of the eastern conference after trouncing the defending champions at Sporting Park. The task before Mike Petke and company is a difficult one, but one that is achievable and right for fans to expect. So, let’s get down to business: how can Petke ensure that the team that shows up on Sunday plays like it did in the second half against Montreal or against CD FAS (minus the finishing component)? There are no sure cures to the inconsistency that has plagued RBNY thus far this year, but — now that the season is near completion — there are signs that can point us as fans — and, hopefully, Mike Petke — in the right direction.
Previously, I have been a proponent of tactical experimentation as the best option at Petke’s disposal to fix the team’s woes, particularly a switch to a midfield diamond. Petke, having employed the diamond for one half after going down a man against the Revolution, has opted to stick with the 4–4–2, a decision which, like it or not, is final at this point. A mid-year switch of system — see: LA Galaxy try to play the diamond against Sporting KC — is a risky and more often than not unsuccessful endeavor, and at this point, the 4–4–2 is here to stay, at least for the remainder of the season. The establishment of a new system would not have enough time to develop to the point of being successful, and designing a new system with next year in mind would be unproductive given the possible departures of Thierry Henry, Bradley Wright-Phillips, and/or Tim Cahill. Changes may be made around the fringes of strategy (e.g. substitution policy, a matter which Petke showed a surprising and refreshing willingness to adapt against Montreal), but at this point, the only change fans can reasonably expect is tinkering with the players that fill out the 4–4–2.
Mike Petke’s philosophy when it comes to filling out the team sheet is perhaps best summed up by his reflection on the team’s last trip to RFK, an excruciatingly frustrating 1–0 loss. “If I have 11 guys who are my best players and are playing in practice and showing me, I’m going to find a spot to put them in,” Petke is quoted as saying by Franco Panizo on mlssoccer.com. “Doesn’t matter if they’re not naturally a left midfielder or right midfielder or forward.” This approach has its merits and its faults. To Petke’s credit, experimenting with players in different positions — Peguy at center mid, Ambroise Oyongo pushed up on the wing, and Eric Alexander out left — has yielded some positive results. Furthermore, especially in MLS, the talent gap between the best eleven players and the bench players is more vast than that in Europe, so any deficiencies with regard to positional awareness or experience may be compensated for because of a far superior level of talent.
However, on a whole, this philosophy has been roundly rejected by modern coaches and analysts of the game. For years, Argentina tried fitting Messi, Higuain, and Tevez into the same lineup, only to end up stifling the abilities of all three. At Real Madrid, the galacticos era failed spectacularly because the sum of Zidane, Beckham, Ronaldo, Roberto Carlos, Raul, and others was not as great as a that of a well-oiled machine of more modest players, such as Mourinho’s Porto.
In Major League Soccer, the players who coaches are most especially inclined to squeeze into their lineups are designated players. DP’s are the biggest names, the biggest talents, and, of course, have the biggest salaries, so no matter what, coaches and organizations are inclined to start DP’s at all costs. DP’s such as Omar Bravo, Denilson, and Clint Dempsey last year — when he played an attacking midfield role instead of his preferred secondary striker position — struggled mightily when playing outside of their preferred places within the side. Conversely, last year’s two MLS Cup finalists were at their best when their designated players — Claudio Bieler and Alvaro Saborio respectively — were on the bench.
To put this into context for RBNY, the glaring question facing Mike Petke each and every week is what exactly to do with Tim Cahill. Since the 4–4–2 is here to stay, and BWP and Henry are guaranteed to start given their respective performances this year, the only place left for the 2013 team MVP has been central midfield, where his partnership with Dax McCarty has been somewhere between mediocre and catastrophic.
As a designated player, a World Cup star, and one of the league’s best players last year, Cahill is almost assured of a spot in the squad. Throughout his career though, he has not played as a central midfielder. During his prime with Everton, Cahill was most effectively used as a second striker with Louis Saha in front of him and Mikel Arteta creating behind him. With the Australian national team at the 2014 World Cup, Cahill scored twice in two games when playing as a traditional number 9.
Cahill struggled mightily during his first half season with RBNY though when playing a deeper central role with Henry and Kenny Cooper ahead of him. Last year, his best play came toward the end of the year when paired up top with Henry. However, as some may point out, there were long stretches last year in which Cahill did play centrally in midfield and did so with great success. Why, then, has he failed to recapture that form since the emergence of BWP up top and his return to central midfield?
There are several possible factors that come to mind and have been touted by fans and analysts alike for this decline: age, deteriorating physical shape, diminished competitive desire because of a supposed move back to England, among others. These concerns may have legitimacy, but I will focus on a few other potential, more measurable, reasons behind the drop off this year.
While RBNY played a 4–4–2 last year and this year, that does not mean that they have played the same way either technically or tactically the past two seasons. Last year, RBNY scored the most goals in the league, despite lacking either a central attacking midfielder or a deep lying regista type player. Where the team found most of its goalscoring success was via the counterattack. Although the team was not suited to break down compact defenses, the Red Bulls did manage to score plentifully against possession-based teams because of the potency of their counters (see: 3–1 win away at Sporting Kansas City). This year, playing in a comparatively dreadful eastern conference, the team has been less reactive in its attacking strategy, creating 2-v-1s on the wings or by funneling possesion through Thierry Henry.
Moreso than last year, Henry has played a withdrawn creative role in 2014. In 2012 with Kenny Cooper and in 2013 with Fabian Espindola, Henry was paired with players who ran the channels and sought the ball in wide areas. This year though, his strike partner Bradley Wright-Phillips has stayed near and around goal, where he has feasted upon the opportunities provided to him. This has given Henry greater creative license to roam out wide and especially to drop deep into midfield.
How does this all relate to Tim Cahill then? In relation to the first part, Tim Cahill was an energetic sparkplug for the counterattack, and his secondary runs — similar to those he made in a more advanced role at Everton —meant that he was able to latch onto service effectively. As the opposition have learned to cope with RBNY’s counterattacking strategy and the team has become less dependent on it, so too has it relied less and less upon Cahill’s attributes that suited that approach so well.
Furthermore, in relation to the change in Henry’s positioning, Cahill’s role has become less defined. Described by Zonal Marking’s Michael Cox as a “false midfielder” (as opposed to a false nine), Cahill often surges into the attack, encouraged to do so even more as Henry drops deeper into the center of the pitch. While Cahill’s warrior, do everything, be everywhere attitude has drawn much fanfare, it does come at the expense of positional discipline. Given the drop off in play of midfield partner Dax McCarty and the decreased mobility of the center backs with the departure of Markus Holgersson, defensive scrambling to cover for Cahill’s free role has been woefully insufficient. Teams must be well organized to accomodate one player in a free role; covering for two — in the case of RBNY, Cahill and Henry — borders on impossible.
To the left is the map of Cahill’s passing events against Montreal. As the diagram illustrates, Cahill flared wide, dropped deep alongside or behind Dax, and ventured forward as well. Against Montreal — who play three in the middle with Piatti often playing inverted to add support —the team was already outmanned in the middle, and Cahill’s lack of tactical restraint meant that RBNY stood no chance of controlling the middle against a team that is in reality quite poor.
By comparison, Peguy Luyindula’s passing map from the same game after coming on for Cahill is extremely consistent. Luyindula is less mobile — distributing almost exclusively from the center circle a la Tampa Bay Mutiny era Carlos Valderamma — but this gives the team greater control over the middle of the field. This in turn provides greater defensive cover and ability for others to venture forward and enjoy greater freedom when attacking. While the sample size of 23 minutes in a game in which the team was winning is small, further evidence supports the notion that Luyindula may be a better option.
Against the Houston Dynamo in April, Luyindula played central midfield. Again, as demonstrated in the passing map to the left, Luyindula held his position centrally. Although he did not receive the plaudits on a night in which Henry ran the show, BWP notched a hat trick, and Roy Miller beasted the since-departed Warren Creavalle, Luyindula was part of the spine of the team that exploited the Dynamo so well en route to a 4–0 victory, setting up other players and enabling others to get forward.
Tim Cahill earns about 40 times what Peguy Luyindula does, has played in three more World Cups, and has earned a level of international fame and respect for his stellar play. However, being a better all around player does not make Tim Cahill a better option at center midfield. Against DC, RBNY should not try to outmuscle the hard-nosed pairing of Davy Arnaud and Perry Kitchen. Rather, the team would be much better suited to start someone who could be tactically smart with his positioning and capable of picking apart the space between Steve Birnbaum and Chris Korb with his passing. Even if it means dropping one of the team’s most prominent superstars to the bench, there is compelling evidence to suggest that going for the right fit over the biggest star may be the best move for Petke against DC and beyond.
