Are metapersons real?
Or are they a useful fiction?
Re-Assembling Reality #22 by David A. Palmer and Mike Brownnutt.
What is actually going on when people have relationships with these strange persons we have called metapersons? Are they crazy? Are we crazy for taking all of this so seriously?
In Re-Assembling Reality #20, we discussed the personhood of the following things:
- Humans who have physically died,
- Things, forces, and phenomena in the world,
- Virtues and qualities,
- The universe, cosmic forces, and ultimate reality,
- Mediating figures.
The question we will consider now is not whether these beings are real, but whether they are persons (metapersons). Whether there is such a thing as a dead human, a mountain, compassion, destruction, the universe, a transcendental power, or Mohammad, is a question we discussed in Re-Assembling Reality #15. Here, the question is: is their personhood real?
Let’s consider the question through the different types of realism we’ve discussed in Re-Assembling Reality #17.
Ontological realism
Remember our discussion of humans treating humans as persons, in Re-Assembling Reality #18. The anti-realist will consider that humans are not inherently persons. Human personhood is entirely a product of peoples’ imagination. Humans are free to confer personhood on some or all beings, in whichever combination they wish. This will not change anything in the universe, because personhood does not exist independent of human minds anywhere in the universe.
We argued that treating humans as persons works. From a non-realist perspective, however, something that works is not necessarily real. It might be a useful fiction. We argued, in the example of the Amazon, that treating non-humans as persons works. From a non-realist perspective, this is a useful fiction.
In practice, in our relationships with each other and with non-humans, there are situations when we treat others as persons, and situations when we treat others as objects. How we treat each other or other beings depends on what works best for the purpose at hand: humans as persons for friendship, as objects for employment; animals as persons for companionship, as objects for meat; dead humans as persons for remembering virtuous deeds, as objects for medical and historical research; invisible forces as persons for spirituality, and as objects for science. Thus, from an anti-realist standpoint, we can add and remove personhood from different beings at will.
The realist, on the other hand, will consider that humans are inherently persons, independently of what we think of them and how we treat them. Personhood is not an attribute that can simply be added onto a human body; it is an intrinsic and inseparable aspect of what a human is. And since humans are persons, the proper way to act as humans is as persons, treating other humans as persons.
The same logic applies to metapersons. Is personhood inherent to dead humans? Is personhood inherent to the forest? To loyalty? To the universe? To the force creating the universe? If so, the personhood is independent of how we, humans, treat them. Personhood is inherent to the way they act in this world, and the proper way to relate to them is as persons.
No religion is ontologically realist about all of the metapersons we have listed in Re-Assembling Reality #20. Most religions are ontologically realist about one, some, or many metapersons. And they are ontologically non-realist about others. Some religions tend to be more realist (such as the Abrahamic religions) while others tend to be more anti-realist (such as Hinduism and Buddhism). But combinations of realism and anti-realism can be found in all religions.
This is evident in the way people practice religions. Christianity is absolutely realist about the personhood of God and Jesus. But in their relationship with Jesus, people imagine him in according to their own preconceptions, cultural biases, and personal inclinations, experiences and desires. The Jesus worshipped by a specific community is to a certain extent the creation of that community. This is something that many Christians would acknowledge. Thus, they combine realist and anti-realist perspectives on the way that people relate to Jesus.
Some forms of Buddhism and Hinduism are anti-realist about the personhood of the different beings in the universe. They consider that the ultimate reality transcends the relational quality of personhood — the ultimate reality is absolutely one and knows no division between self and other, you and me. So, for them, all of the deities and spirits that people worship are fictions that express peoples’ lowly desires and ignorance. But these fictions are helpful to people, because the ultimate reality and cosmic forces can’t be imagined or understood in the abstract; people can only relate to them by personalising them. So metapersons are accepted within the religion. And enlightened people who have reached the station of transcending self and other, do not disappear from personal relations: they become compassionate beings whose only purpose is to help those in suffering. Their connection with the ultimate reality leads them to act as persons to persons, even as they are completely detached from this world. They reach a point of being “true persons”. Thus, these religions combine realist and anti-realist perspectives on the way that people relate to the ultimate reality.
Epistemic realism
Is it possible to know a metaperson? Do statements about metapersons tell us about their reality?
The Holy Qur’an is considered by Muslims to be the revealed Word of God, that was conveyed to humanity, word for word, by Mohammad, who was illiterate. It is considered to be the most beautiful work in the Arabic language. Muslims are epistemic realists about the Qur’an: it is the Voice of God, giving us perfect knowledge about the reality of God. No human could ever have written such verses.
Baha’u’llah suggests that the signs of God can be found in all creation: “No thing have I perceived, except that I perceived God within it, God before it, or God after it.” [1] He also wrote that “The spirit that animateth the human heart is the knowledge of God.” [2] These statements seem to be examples of epistemic realism: God can be known, and the human heart has the capacity to know God.
But Baha’u’llah also wrote, “So perfect and comprehensive is His creation that no mind or heart, however keen or pure, can ever grasp the nature of the most insignificant of His creatures; much less fathom the mystery of Him Who is the Day Star of Truth, Who is the invisible and unknowable Essence” [3]. This statement seems to be epistemically anti-realist: the human heart is incapable of knowing the essence of God.
The Baha’i Faith thus seems to combine epistemic realism and anti-realism about God: The human heart can discern the signs of God everywhere in the universe, but it can never understand His essence.
Semantic realism
Is it possible to describe metapersons precisely and literally?
The Bodhisattva Avalokitesvara, known in Chinese as Guanyin 觀音, is described as a man in Indian Buddhist texts. In later Chinese texts, she is depicted as a woman.
For a semantic realist, one of these depictions is necessarily false. If Guanyin is a man, it is false to depict him as a woman. If she is a woman, it is false to depict her as a man. A semantic realist will then want to find out what is the correct and accurate description of Guanyin. Once the correct description has been determined, all variations must be rejected as false.
For a semantic anti-realist, the discrepancy doesn’t matter. Guanyin is the personification of compassion, which can’t be described with any precision. Male or female depictions of Guanyin can express different aspects of the bodhisattva’s character and virtues.
A famous expression of semantic anti-realism is the first verse of the Daoist classic, the Book of Dao and its Virtue 《道德經》: “The Dao that can be spoken of is not the eternal Dao” 「道可道非常道」.
Different combinations
We can find different combinations of realism and anti-realism in conceptions and discussions of metapersons. At one pole is realism across the board: The personhood of the ultimate reality is independent of human minds; he can be known by humans; and he can be precisely and accurately described. Most Christian understandings of Jesus are realistic in this fashion: Jesus was a historical figure; he was visible and knowable to anyone in his presence; and his life is accurately described in the Gospels.
The opposite pole is anti-realism across the board: the personification of the ultimate reality does not exist independently of human minds; any knowledge of it is the imagination of human minds; and any description of it is merely a play of the human language. Some conceptions of the ultimate reality in Hinduism and Buddhism are anti-realistic in this fashion.
And there are many other possible combinations:
Voldemort is a fiction of the human mind; as such, he can be known, and he can be accurately described. He’s a creation of J. K. Rowling, and you can get accurate and precise knowledge about him in the Harry Potter series.
Aliens exist independently of our minds, but everything we think and say about them — flying saucers and little green men — is a pure figment of the human imagination. Some would say the same about the ultimate reality or God.
The ultimate reality exists independently of our minds and can be known, but can’t be described. This view is common in mystical and contemplative traditions of all religious traditions: it’s possible to reach a mystic knowledge of God, Dao or the ultimate reality, but this reality is so profound or transcendent, that it simply can’t be described with words.
But as we discussed above, what we often find in different religious traditions is positions that, ontologically, epistemically or semantically, are somewhere in between realism and anti-realism.
“Does God exist?”
By now, you can understand why we don’t think this question is of much use in any discussion of the relationship between science and religion. What people usually mean by this question, is “where is the physical evidence for God? If I see it, I will believe in God.”
But religion is about relations between persons.
What did our investigation of persons show?
“Person” is not synonymous with “human”. We objectify some humans and we personify some non-humans.
A religious community includes a combination of human, non-human and para-human persons — metapersons.
Among the things that can be personified are live humans, dead humans, trees, animals, virtues, creative forces, the universe, the ultimate reality, and so on.
Few people doubt that living humans, dead humans, trees, animals, or the universe exist. It’s not too difficult to reflect on and discuss virtues, creative forces, or the ultimate reality as abstract concepts.
The issue isn’t so much whether these things exist, but whether humans should relate to them as persons?
There is no scientific evidence of personhood, whether human or non-human. Scientific evidence can’t decide where to draw the line of personhood.
There are three ways of considering the question:
(1) From an ontologically realist position: personhood is intrinsic to some things, and therefore we should treat them as they really are: as persons.
(2) From an ontologically anti-realist position: Personhood is a fiction of human minds. (2a) Personhood being a fiction, it is bad; therefore, we should stop treating beings as persons. (2b) Personhood is a useful, valuable, inevitable, or even morally necessary fiction; therefore, it is preferable to treat certain beings as persons.
If the answer is (1) or (2b), then the next set of questions is: who should we treat as persons, and how? And what are the effects and implications of doing so?
This essay and the Re-Assembling Reality Medium series are brought to you by the University of Hong Kong’s Common Core Curriculum Course CCHU9061 Science and Religion: Questioning Truth, Knowledge and Life, with the support of the Faith and Science Collaborative Research Forum and the Asian Religious Connections research cluster of the Hong Kong Institute for the Humanities and Social Sciences.
[1] Gleanings from the Writings of Baha’u’llah, XC.
[2] Gleanings from the Writings of Baha’u’llah, CXXXIV.
[3] Gleanings from the Writings of Baha’u’llah, XXVI.
