德國能源轉型現況2016–2017 Energiewende in Germany, 2016–2017
能源轉型ABC系列文之二 Energiewende Basics for Taiwan#2
「非核即煤。德國人的能源轉型是喊假的啦！」
“It’s nuclear or coal. The Energiewende is fake!”
德國人是真正的環保還是假環保？這篇文章要來說明目前德國能源轉型真正的現況。
Is Germany truly green or not? This article is to explain the current situation of Germany’s Energiewende.
一、燃煤發電佔比
1. Coal in Electricity Production
自2013年以來，德國燃煤佔發電比例便持續降低（圖一）。跟2003年比起來，13年來燃煤年發電量降了45TWh（14.8%），同時核能年發電量也降了80TWh（48.5%）；即使是跟2010年福島核災前夕相比，2016的燃煤發電量也減少了3TWh。
Since 2013, the proportion of coal in the production of electricity has been continually falling in Germany (graph 1). As compared to 2003, the annual electricity production by coal has dropped 45TWh (14.8%), while annual electricity production by nuclear also dropped 80TWh(48.5%). Even compared with the statistic of pre-Fukushima 2010, electricity production by coal still reduced 3TWh in 2016.
德國在今年2月啟用了一座新的燃煤電廠（goo.gl/rmwZ4M ），裝置容量為1100MW；不少人認為這很有可能是德國最後一座蓋得起來的燃煤電廠。另一方面，4月時兩座燃煤電廠亦除役（goo.gl/L2yTZa ），總裝置容量有2234MW。一加一減，德國仍然朝著持續減煤的道路前進。
This February, a new 1100MW coal power plant became operational in Germany(goo.gl/rmwZ4M), which some believe to be the last coal power plant the Germans would ever be able to build. On the other hand, two coal power plants were decommissioned in April, with a total capacity of 2234MW. As one goes online, two went offline; Germany is still on track of reducing its reliance on coal.
然而這個趨勢能否持續，確實有所隱憂。目前最令人擔心的是偏右的基民黨和自民黨聯合政府5/14在煤礦重鎮NRW邦大選勝出後，揚言抑制該邦再生能源發展以及減緩原來社民黨和綠黨對該邦的除煤時程。9月中（大概就是本龜飛去德國的時候）的聯邦大選如果由基民黨和自民黨組成保守派內閣，以上對低碳轉型造成危害的路線將成為全國性政策。
However, there does exist menace on whether such trend can endure. The new right-lingered CDU/FDP coalition elected in the coal state of NRW calls for a deceleration of coal phase-out and renewable developments planned by the previous SDP/Greens government. If the Bundestag election in mid September turns out to favor also a CDU/FDP coalition, the threatening policy might become nationwide.
二、再生能源成長情況
2.Developments of Renewables
2016年德國能源政治中，最受矚目的新聞便是再生能源法（Erneuerbare Energie Gesetz）的修法。2017年開始，大規模的再生能源計畫將不再得到躉購費率的補貼，政府改採用總量競標的方式，讓廠商叫價，喊到較低補助費率者得標。
In the energy politics of 2016, news of the revision of the renewable energy act (Erneuerbare Energie Gesetz) is definitely on the spotlight. Beginning in 2017, all large scale renewable projects will no longer be in the feed-in-tariff system; instead, a cap-and-auction method is now implemented, where companies bid for the lowest subsidy demand gets the license.
一般認為此舉為基民黨為了抑制再生能源「過度擴張」的一種手段。在國際上，總量競標制度往往有完成率嚴重低於原定規模的問題，且獨厚大型財團。在5月時的競標出現了公民主導的陸上風能專案取得93%標的的意外情形（goo.gl/sKadNm ），然而此事是否能維持常態、而相關專案能否陸續完成，仍是一大問號。
The policy is usually considered as a way to inhibit “over expansion” of renewables by the CDU. Auctions tend to have problems on the completion ratio, and they also favor large enterprises. Accidentally, in an on-shore wind farm auction, 93% of the bid was won by citizen led projects(goo.gl/sKadNm), although we cannot tell if this will become normal, and if these projects can be carried out in the future as scheduled.
總量競標最主要的優勢在於大幅度壓低成本，因此受到極有可能在9月大選後和基民黨組成聯合政府的自民黨的大力支持；五月初的離岸風能競標達到零補貼的結果，似乎印證了該黨的論點。然而亦有論者指出，由於技術的演進，躉購費率本就可以達成近乎相同的成本降低幅度；更重要的是，總量競標制度反而可能過度抑制再生能源發展，使成長率遠低於政府的規劃（雖然目前再生能源發電量的年佔比早已超過原定2020的目標）。
The main advantage of cap-and-auction is that it reduces the cost, which is why FDP greatly supports this policy. The auction on off-shore wind farm, resulting in zero governmental subsidy, seemed to have proven this claim. However, some claim that, due to improvement of technology, the previous FIT system could have had similar reduction on cost anyway; what is more important is that auction might inhibit the development of renewables too much, such that the growth rate of renewable capacity fall well below government’s target in the future.
同前所述，NRW邦大選後，基民－自民聯合政府上台，對於德國能源轉型的未來浮現了一道陰影。燃煤發電廠仍否如期除役是其中一個問題，再生能源發展比例能否如政府原定規劃又是另一個；在德國正在錯失它2020的氣候目標的當下，梅克爾和其政黨的種種政策與傾向，實難讓我們稱呼她為「氣候首相」。
As mentioned previously, after the NRW state election, Germany’s road to Energiewende is cast with shadows. Whether coal power plants can be decommissioned is one question, the development of renewables is another. With Germany very much likely to miss its climate target in 2020, the policy and aptitude Merkel and her party take can hardly let us call her the “climate chancellor”.
三、碳排趨勢
3. Carbon Emission Trend
隨著再生能源逐步發展、燃煤發電逐步減少，即使在核能漸漸除役的情況下，自2013年以來德國的能源部門依舊穩定下降（圖二）；2016年和2010年福島核災前夕相比，能源部門仍減碳24百萬二氧化碳當量（6.7%）。和1990年相比則減碳95百萬二氧化碳當量（22.2%），然而仍然低於政府對總碳排提出的2020減量達40%的目標。
As renewables gradually develop and coal on the fall, since 2013 the energy sector of Germany managed to reduce its carbon emission even with a gradual nuclear phase-out(graph two); compared with pre-Fukushima 2010, the energy sector still managed to reduce 24 million tonnes of CO2 eq (6.7%). Compares with 1990, the reduction reached 95 million tonnes of CO2 eq (22.2%). However, this is still well below the target of 40% total emission reduction in 2020 the government set.
相較於2015年，2016年德國總碳排微升4百萬二氧化碳當量。微升的主因為運輸部門長期的碳排成長趨勢以及該年較寒冷的冬天使住屋暖房需求增加。運輸部門的碳排增加乃全歐洲共同趨勢，也是歐洲深度低碳轉型面臨的最大挑戰。詳情可以參考這篇文章： goo.gl/8sD6wf。
As compared with 2015, total annual carbon emission rised 4 million CO2 eq in Germany in 2016. The slight rise was mainly due to the long trend of emission increase in transport sector, and also the colder winter which resulted in greater demand of residence heating. The increasing trend in transport sector can be found throughout all Europe, and remains the greatest challenge for a deep low carbon transition for the continent. For more details, one can refer to the following link: goo.gl/8sD6wf.
四、供電情況
4.Electricity Supply
自2003年以來，德國一直是電力淨出口國。重要的是，德國通常是在一日負載較多的中午時段出口較多電力，並且在一年負載較多的冬天有最高的電力淨出口。亦即，能源轉型並沒有造成缺電，相反的由於傳統發電方式彈性不佳，德國必須出口更多電力給其他國家。此可參考本系列第一篇文章的相關說明（goo.gl/oxxq8V）。
Germany has been a net exporter of electricity since 2003. More importantly, Germany usually exports more electricity at noon, when the load demand is also the most; Germany also exports more electricity in the winter than in the summer, when the demand is also the greatest in the year. That said, Energiewende does not cause electricity shortage, in the contrast the inflexibility of conventional power sources makes Germany export electricity to other countries more. One can refer to our first article of this series for a more detailed explanation(goo.gl/oxxq8V).
有兩個方法可以印證這個論點。參考下圖三，當太陽能發電尖峰時（同時也是負載尖峰時），德國有最高的電力淨出口。下圖四則顯示，歐洲用電高峰的冬季，德國也有較高的電力淨出口。通常冬季的再生能源佔比仍能保持在30%左右（圖五），使這段期間傳統能源發電量的國內需求不至於提升過多。比如2016年1 月的傳統能源發電比該年6月增加7TWh，不過大部分都反映在出口量的變化上（1月比6月多了5TWh）。
Two ways can prove the arguments above. As shown in graph 3, the peak of solar power production in summer, which coincides with peak load, also coincides with greater electricity export. Graph 4 shows that Germany exports more electricity during peak demand in winter. The proportion of renewables in electricity production in winter is usually above 30%(graph five), so the share of conventional power sources domestically does not increase too much. For example, the conventional power sources produced 7TWh more electricity in January than in June in the year of 2016, but the difference is mainly due to electricity export(Jan has 5TWh more export).
比較值得留意的是2017年1月德國再生能源佔比因為天候因素大幅下滑時，德國該月的電力出口不僅明顯比去年同期減少，並且需要大量增加傳統能源發電量以維持國內需求。但這樣的情況並不常見，且如果把時間尺度拉長，從3月以來風能和太陽能的供電表現持續搶眼，德國今年的再生能源發電總量佔比應該會成長。從第一篇文章開始我們不斷強調的一點是，能源轉型的中期目標不應該過度擔心再生能源的變異性，而應該專注在如何透過調度和裝置容量增加等方式將再生能源平均的佔比持續向上增加。
What worths mentioning is that during January 2017, due to meteorology factors the share of renewables dropped significantly in Germany (to only about 27%). In that month, Germany not only exported less electricity than the previous January, it also has to increase the power production from conventional sources substantially to meet its domestic demands. But such scenario is rare, and if we view things in a greater time scale, solar and wind has been performing extraordinary since March, so the annual renewable share of electricity in Germany will probably increase this year. As we have been mentioning from the first article, the variability of renewables should not be over-emphasized in the mid-term target of Energiewende, what is more important is how to boost the share of renewables via dispatch measures and increase of capacity.
而另一個在台灣常出現的論點，法國的核電是否在德國有尖峰負載時支援它，則可以從法國和德國與比利時的商業流（commercial flow）檢視。之所以用商業流而非錯誤地討論德法之間的物理流（physical flow）是因為物理流只能呈現是否流經一國電網，而不能呈現兩國真正的電力交易情況（不然巴拿馬運河就會是全世界經濟最繁榮的地方了）。
Another common question in Taiwan is that whether France supports Energiewende by giving its nuclear power to Germany during peak load. To answer this question we examine the commercial flow between France and Germany/Belgium. The reason why we should use commercial flow but not physical flow when examining this issue is because physical flow data only tells whether the electricity passed through the border; it does not tell you the real situation of market exchange (or else, the Panama canal must be the most economically prosperous place in the world).
實際上法國和德國最近的商業流如下圖六所示，在下午用電尖峰時有最大的進口。如前所述，3月以來德國再生能源表現亮眼，本月（6月）尤是（圖七）；此時德國日照充足，尖峰時段對於法國的出口也如同對其他國家一般，有所提高。
In reality, France and Germany recently has a commercial flow as graph 6 shows; France imports electricity from Germany in the afternoon, when demand is highest in both countries. As mentioned previously, renewables in Germany have been performing perfectly since March, especially this particularly month (June, see graph seven). The abundant solar radiation in Germany results in an increase of electricity export to neighboring countries, including France.
總體來說，法國就和其他國家一樣，在冬季負載較高時從德國進口較多；不過可以看到，夏季負載較低時則對德國有淨出口（圖八、九、十、十一）。之所以會如此，主因是因為法國的核能機組的負載上限大約在63GW，考慮到虛功平衡法國的核能機組通常不會運轉超過60GW，因此在國內用電需求較低的夏季才比較有充足的電力可以向外輸出（圖十二）；然而夏季卻是德國再生能源表現最好、傳統發電需求最少且依然有淨出口的季節。因此法國核電支援德國能源轉型的論點實難成立。
Overall, like any other country, France imports more electricity from Germany in winter, when demand load is greater; however, France has net export to Germany in summer, when demand load is lower (graph 8,9,10 and 11). The reason behind this is that France has a maximum nuclear capacity of about 63GW, if you consider reactive power balancing the fleet generally won’t be supply more than 60GW, and thus France can only export more electricity in summer, when its domestic electricity demand is lower(graph 12). But summer is also the season when Germany’s renewables perform the best, conventionals produce the least and yet it remains a net electricity exporter. Therefore, it is hard to make a claim that French nuclear power supports Energiewende in Germany.
題外話，如果說德國在能源轉型過程中，將繼續面臨冬天化石燃料佔比可能較高的問題，法國人則會在接下來10年之內，面臨核電廠因各種安全問題可能供電不穩的狀況。去年秋天至今年一月便發生1/3的法國核能機組因核安問題停機，使該國電力進口大增的情況（圖十三）；2012年也發生過類似的狀況。隨著法國各核電廠進入正常除役的年限，接下來十年同樣狀況發生的頻率應該會越來越頻繁。詳情可參考： goo.gl/Cb2Qu3。
By the way, as Germany will likely have to continually face the problem of relying more on fossil fuels in winter during their Energiewende, France will have to face power supply instabilities due to security issues of its nuclear plants. From last autumn to this January, ⅓ of France’s nuclear fleet were shut down because of safety issues, which made France import more electricity from neighboring countries(graph 13); similar events have occurred in 2012. As the french nuclear power plants enter their designed-decommissioning age, such thing should happen more and more frequently in the next ten years. For further information, please refer to: goo.gl/Cb2Qu3.
五、單位電價
5.Electricity Prices
德國的電力批售價格（wholesale price）由於再生能源佔比不斷增加，有逐年遞減趨勢。目前一般家戶所支付的電價中，躉購制度產生的差額補價（renewable surcharge）以及電網費用仍佔大宗（圖十四）。
As the share of renewables in electricity continues to rise, the wholesale prices of electricity in Germany gradually decreases. For an average household in Germany, the electricity bill is now mainly consists of a renewable surcharge due to the FIT system and a grid fee(graph 14).
然而躉購制度的差額補價主要提供給能源轉型早期（2010年以前）的供電者，預計在2022年開始將逐步下滑（goo.gl/znkTsH ）；電網的成本則因為管理技術的提升，調度相關的費用在2016年甚至比前一年下降（goo.gl/dXxqKq ）。當然在短期，電網的擴增仍會持續使相關費用增加，然而長遠來說這樣的投資本屬必要，且能降低調度費用未來的增幅。
But the renewable surcharge due to FIT system is mainly given to the electricity suppliers who installed their renewables in the early stages of Energiewende(pre 2010), and therefore the surcharge is expected to fall after 2022(goo.gl/znkTsH); meanwhile, due to improvement of management skills, re-dispatch costs dropped in 2016(goo.gl/dXxqKq). Of course, the expansion of the grid will likely increase the grid fee in the near future, but in the long term such investment is necessary and can reduce the increment of dispatch cost in the future.
自2013年以來，德國家戶的單位電力價格變近乎持平，半數核能機組除役並非2000年以來電價大幅上漲的主因；因為家戶節能成效良好，且經濟成長仍持續存在，比之2000年成長四倍的單位電價並未對德國社會造成明顯增加的能源貧窮問題。然而我們仍應注意不同地區電價不同的社會性不平等，以及受衝擊較大的家戶所受的相關社會福利制度是否健全。
Since 2013, power price of an average German household has remained relatively flat, therefore decommissioning half of the nuclear fleet is not the main reason why power price rocketed since 2000. And because of energy conservation and a strong economic growth, the quadrupled power price since 2000 does not increase the issue of energy poverty significantly in the German society. However we should still pay attention to the social inequality caused by regional power price differences, and whether the households who suffer the most impact receive sufficient support.
我們應該強調一點：即使家戶電價在20年之內翻漲4倍，德國人民對於能源轉型的支持度依舊居高不下。然而德國電價收費並非完全沒有問題，工業界完全不需支付差額補價並享有電網收費的優惠、沒有碳稅或最低碳價合理反映燃煤成本等等，在本次大選前皆被綠黨和左派黨提出做討論。
One thing can not be emphasized more: even with household power prices quadrupled within two decades, Energiewende is still highly supported by the majority of the German people. Of course the system is far from perfect; the industries don’t need to pay the renewable surcharge and enjoys abatements of grid fee, while there still exists no carbon tax nor minimum carbon pricing to represent the real costs of coal. This issues are discussed by the Greens and the Left during this election.
六、當前關乎能源政策的政治經濟鬥爭
6.Current Poli-Economic Struggles Regarding Energy Policies
在第一節和第二節中已經約略提到，基民黨和自民黨極有可能在秋天組成聯合政府，對於能源轉型的進程有所不利。之所以事態會如此發展，當然也和移民問題成為主要議題、極右民粹政黨另類選擇黨（不太令人意外，該政黨否認氣候變遷、反對能源轉型）抬頭等因素有關。
As mentioned in section one and two, it is very likely that CDU and FDP form a coalition and cast adversaries to the progress of Energiewende. The reason for this is of course partly due to a more concern in the immigration issue and the rise of the right wing populism AfD(which not surprisingly, denies climate change and opposes the Energiewende).
另一方面，煤礦產業的極速萎縮，使得煤礦業者和煤礦工人之間的矛盾日益浮現。一直以來，煤礦業者和燃煤業者以保障工作權的形象應對社會加諸他們的輿論壓力；然而當事情日益明顯，煤礦產業的末日已近時，對業者來說最好的應對方式就是不再投資更環保、安全性更高的設備，以在除役前達到利潤最大化；對工會和煤礦工人來說，更重要的是煤礦業者盡速成立相關的扶助基金，在仍有利潤的當下持續擴充基金，以替未來失業的煤礦工人做轉職輔導或退休扶助。
On the other hand, the rapid decline of coal industry has gradually intensified the conflict between the owners and workers of the industry. Owners of coal mining and coal power plants claim an image of protecting working rights when dealing with the pressure the society pose upon them, but when things become obvious that the end of the coal industry is near, the best way for the owners to maximize their profits before decommissioning is to avoid investment in more environmentally friendly and safer equipment. Meanwhile, for the unions and workers, what is of more importance is for the industry to set up a social-aid fund as soon as possible and expand it while profit still exists, which can then be used for job training or retirement aids in the future.
產業業主和工人之間的利益矛盾，在2016年9月，全德最大的工會之一Verdi提出一份「社會可接受」的燃煤除役時程時表露無遺。我們可以期待，接下來10年之內，德國煤礦業的業主和工人矛盾的加劇，正如我們可以期待美國發生同樣的情況，而川普的挖煤拚經濟神話破滅一樣。
The conflict in interest between the industry owners and the workers can be demonstrated no more clearly than when a “socially acceptable” coal phase-out time table was published by Verdi, one of the largest union in Germany, in last September. We look forward to seeing the intensification of the conflict between the owners and workers of Germany’s coal industry, just as we also look forward to seeing similar events take place in the US, and Trump’s myth of saving the economy with coal mining disillusioned.
在這個議題上，德國左派黨有所有主流政黨裡最堅定的立場。低碳轉型真正的重點其實不在減碳，而是在社會正義；所以這是一個「社會暨生態」的轉型（socio-ecological transition）。所以本文前述的種種問題，包括煤礦工人的權益、總量競標對再生能源發展的限制、電價計價不合理、沒有碳稅等等，左派黨都提出了符合一般人民利益的政策（goo.gl/2c9rYN）。
On this issue, the Left Party of Germany has the firmest stance among all established parties. A low carbon transition is not really about carbon reduction but more about social justice, so they claim this should be a “socio-ecological transition”. The issues this article has mentioned above, including rights of coal mining workers, restriction of renewables development due to auctions, inequality of electricity charging, the absence of a carbon tax, are all dealt by the Left Party with a set of policies which are in line with the interest of the common people(goo.gl/2c9rYN).
另一方面，以環境運動起家的綠黨，在這次大選中正在被邊緣化。事實上，能源轉型從一個小眾政黨的口號變成全國公認的政策目標之後，這種邊緣化注定發生。2011年福島核災使2012年綠黨的各個選舉皆有大量成果，然而五年過後，他們對各個環境議題的訴求已經不是大選爭辯重點。今年3月底到5月中的三場地方議會選舉，綠黨要不喪失議會席次、要不失去聯合政府的執政地位。然而，9月選舉仍有可能產生由社民黨、左派黨和綠黨組成的聯合政府，甚至基民黨、自民黨和綠黨組成的牙買加聯合政府（三黨的代表色剛好跟牙買加國旗一樣）的可能性也未被綠黨和自民黨排除。
On the other hand, the Greens, who started its presence in the arena of politics via environmental movements, is being marginalized during this election. Such marginalization is perhaps almost unavoidable after Energiewende turned from a slogan of a minor party into a nationwide policy target. The nuclear disaster in Fukushima made the Greens scores major results in the elections in 2012, but five years has past, and their calls regarding environmental issues are no longer center of the electoral debate. From late March to mid May, the Greens either lost all their seats or their position in a coalition government. However, the Bundestag election in September can still result in a coalition of SPD, the Left, and the Greens, and even the possibility of a Jamaica coalition consisting the CDU, FDP, and the Greens is not crossed out by both minor parties.
七、總結
7. Conclusion
從以上分析可以看出，德國能源轉型並不能純粹從電力結構來討論，甚至討論電力結構時，也不能僅看到核能的「基載」功能漸漸被取代。雖然2016到2017年的這段期間德國的能源政策已經出現具體的改變、大選後也很有可能出現更多轉變，但是非核低碳的轉型路線是否正確，已經不再是主要政黨爭辯的題目了。就像一句中共最愛講的話：這是歷史的選擇，也是人民的選擇。
We can see from the analysis above that the German Energiewende can not be discussed purely from the composition of electricity, and even if so, it can not be discussed purely from the trend that nuclear’s “base load” function is gradually being lost. Although the period between 2016 and 2017 has witnessed substantial change of the energy policy in Germany, and probably will see more change after the election, but whether the low carbon transition with a nuclear phase out is correct is no longer a subject of debate for the main parties. Just like what the Chinese Communist Party love to say: this is a choice of the history, and also the choice of the people.
