Developing Operational Leadership:
The Experiences of U.S. Grant
This week’s reading began with the outbreak of the Civil War and ended with Grant in the middle of his campaign against Vicksburg. Grant’s detailed accounts give us great insight into his leadership roles during major combat operations, and the dilemmas he faced in the planning and execution of these operations. We asked participants in the Summer with Grant program to do the following:
Select a key experience, either from Grant’s early career or from this week’s reading, and discuss why you believe it was influential in developing him as an operational and/or strategic leader.
The comments this week mostly focused on the operational level of war, and participants identified several experiences that paved the way for Grant’ later successes in the Civil War. Below are a few of the highlights:
The Campaign against Forts Henry and Donelson- Linking the Tactical to the Strategic and Jointness:
I think we really see Grant emerge as an operational leader. Nothing highlights this more than the assaults on Forts Henry and Donelson. This not only shows his understanding of the western theater but also shows his first major encounter of the civil war following the Battle of Belmont.
Grant had the ability to bridge tactical information, like the reconnaissance conducted in the beginning of Chapter 21, and connect his knowledge of the area to a strategic level understanding of Forts Henry and Donelson’s value. Grant knew that access along the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers would be invaluable in securing Kentucky and opening up Tennessee. This was well beyond the scope and duties at the time, however Grant was not willing to let such an opportunity slip away.
In the Army, we often talk about thinking two levels above our current situation. For example a Company Commander should look at the Brigade’s operational picture and understand the Brigade Commander’s intent. Grant goes well over this concept and views the strategic views of the Union. Cutting open Confederacy’s Western defenses goes far beyond Grant’s assigned districts around Cairo. Operational leaders must visualize the strategic level and have that understanding guide their decisions. Grant does this to an exceptional level.
When Grant had the idea of assaulting Forts Henry and Donelson he was originally told “no.” Tactfully, Grant sought the endorsement of Admiral Andrew Foote. Foote’s involvement and the inclusion of naval forces allowed Grant to receive the permission that he should have gained initially. This political move shows Grant’s fervor for not taking “no” initially and his ability to conduct joint operations.
The attacks at Henry and Donelson were also the first time Grant used the “brown water” navy for operations other than transport. Foote and Grant made quite a team. The river boats were used for reconnaissance, transport, security operations and naval gunfire. This willingness to use joint forces shows how Grant brought every asset he had to bear on the Southern forces with unity of effort. He greatly valued Admiral Foote and the appreciation was returned with valorous acts from the Navy while operating with Grant. Grant was truly a Joint player before what we think of today as Joint Operations.
The Mexican War and the Battle of Corinth- The Balance of Space, Time, and Force
One of the abilities an operational leader needs to possess is the ability to identify an objective and balance the factors of space, time, and force in achieving that objective. There were a couple of experiences noted by Grant that alluded to the importance of using time in the offense against the enemy’s force in the defense.
In Chapter 9, when discussing the charge of Worth’s troops and how the enemy retreated back to Chapultepec, he assessed that “if the victory had been followed up promptly, no doubt Americans and Mexicans would have gone over the defenses of Chapultepec so near together that the place would have fallen into our hands without further loss.” He understood that by taking advantage of time, the enemy wouldn’t have had the opportunity to regroup and reinforce the defenses at Chapultepec.
In Chapter 26, after the battle of Corinth he criticizes Halleck for not maintaining a high operational tempo (time) to keep the confederate force unbalanced. “After the capture of Corinth a movable force of 80,000 men, besides enough to hold all the territory acquired, could have been set in motion for the accomplishment of any great campaign for the suppression of the rebellion….If [Buell] would have been sent directly to Chattanooga as rapidly as he could march…he could have arrived with little fighting, and would have saved much of the loss life which was afterwards incurred in gaining Chatanooga. Bragg would then not have had time to raise an army to contest the possession of east Tenn and Kentucky..the results might have been a bloodless advance to Atlanta, to Vicksburg, or to any other desired point..”
The Mexican War- Unity of Command
“Two commanders on the same field are always one too many.” (Memoirs, Chapter 30)
Grant seemed to grasp the importance of unity of command at the operational level. Beside the quote above, he addresses it in numerous places. In Chapter 23 he says, “Johnston had greatly the advantage in having supreme command over all troops that could possibly be brought to bear upon one point, while the forces similarly situated on the National side, divided into independent commands, could not be brought into harmonious action except by orders from Washington.” He hits it again in Chapter 29 saying, “Geographical lines between the commands during the rebellion were not always well chosen, or they were too rigidly adhered to.”
He may have learned this lesson during the Mexican war where there was little cooperation between Taylor and Scott. This may be a stretch, but his comparison of Scott and Taylor show that he saw them as involved in the same struggle without any real direct support. His understanding of unity of command seems to have shaped how he structured his own command, continuously task organizing his forces under different commanders and striving to ensure that those whom he appointed to difficult missions had the abilities, authority and force to handle them without having to rely on other commanders.
And now for this week’s topic:
Week 6: Civil-Military Relations (Chapters 32-40)
When professionals and academics discuss “civilian-military relations” they frequently are addressing the subordination of military personnel to civilian leaders. This primarily takes the form of the role of military officers advising senior civilian leaders in the executive branch of the US government, but not creating or shaping policy (or the “ends” of a military strategy”). This is certainly a theme that Grant addressed on many occasions in his Memoirs, including when he discussed his view of duty in the opening chapter of this week’s reading (Chapter 32):
Every one has his superstitions. One of mine is that in positions of great responsibility every one should do his duty to the best of his ability where assigned by competent authority, without application or the use of influence to change his position…In time of war the President, being by the Constitution Commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy, is responsible for the selection of commanders. He should not be embarrassed in making his selections. I having been selected, my responsibility ended with my doing the best I knew how. If I had sought the place, or obtained it through personal or political influence, my belief is that I would have feared to undertake any plan of my own conception, and would probably have awaited direct orders from my distant superiors. Persons obtaining important commands by application or political influence are apt to keep a written record of complaints and predictions of defeat, which are shown in case of disaster. Somebody must be responsible for their failures (page 305).
While Grant seemed to maintain a healthy civ-mil relationship with those above him (namely Secretary of War Stanton and ultimately President Lincoln), he also recognized two other aspects of civ-mil relations — those between the executive (including military leaders) and Congress, as well as between the military and the populace at large. Frequently in the last few chapters, Grant discussed the importance of battlefield success to driving successful civ-mil relations across all three realms — to the President in an election year, to Congress who did not back the required all-out assault on the South to overturn their political economy after years of setbacks, and the public who were beginning to believe the Union could not win. The one-two punch of Union victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg (which both occurred on the same day) provided the North the momentum for the remainder of the war. As Grant stated in Chapter 38:
This news [the surrender of Vicksburg], with the victory at Gettysburg won the same day, lifted a great load of anxiety from the minds of the President, his Cabinet and the loyal people all over the North. The fate of the Confederacy was sealed when Vicksburg fell. Much hard fighting was to be done afterwards and many precious lives were to be sacrificed; but the MORALE was with the supporters of the Union ever after (page 381).
Do you believe positive civ-mil relations are dependent on submissive military leaders as tactical technicians (a la Huntington), political savvy generalship that develops and executes policy (a la Gentile’s view of the contemporary “Savior Generals”), or some other form of civ-mil relations? Where would Grant fit in these schemas? Which form can better result in military success? Can there be a framework for us as military leaders to follow as we gather greater responsibilities in the strategic and political realm, or are civ-mil relations all based on personalities, relationships, and current strategic and bureaucratic context? Finally, can military success itself create more conducive civ-mil relations between military leaders, Executive leadership, Congress, and the public?
