Uzbekistan’s Tyrant is Gone
What does this mean for this nation and the world?
There are few things more horrifying than dictators torturing political dissidents — well, aside from dictators torturing political dissidents while still trying to score points for creativity. And, in this event, former Uzbek president Islam Karimov took home the gold, as his administration was known for such horrifying moments as a 2002 account, when his regime was accused of boiling two political opponents alive. Karma clearly took its sweet time coming around, but now Karimov’s tyrannical regime has finally come to an end; he was reported dead earlier this week.
A brief obituary for Islam Karimov: he survived the post-Soviet era purges in Uzbekistan in 1991 and emerged with the iron fist of his former captors. He passed a law banning religious freedom in 1998 and enforced it with macabre torture methods, including pulling out inmates’ fingernails, asphyxiation, and electric shocks. His most infamous deed is the Andijan Massacre. In 2005, civilians protested at the trial of 23 businessmen, whom they felt were wrongfully convicted of Islamic terrorism. The protest ballooned up to around 3,000 people in Andijan’s main square. In response, Karimov blocked off all exits from the square and sent armored vehicles and tanks to neutralize the protesters, opening fire and wounding hundreds. Reports showed that the injured were promptly executed by soldiers. The death toll ranged anywhere from 200–1500. He modified the Uzbek constitution to allow him to remain in power for his entire life.
His potential successor, at least in the short term due to constitutional requirements, is the chairman of the senate Nigmatilla Yuldashev. More plausible candidates for long term leadership include prime minister Shavkat Mirziyoyev, and his previously disgraced daughter Gulnara. The leader will have to be approved by the two clans of Karimov’s family in Samarkand and Tashkent. Note that both clans are comprised of the political elite. As we will see later, who the new president is won’t matter much.
Karimov’s death is particularly significant because of the relationship that he had with the United States. Uzbekistan was considered crucial to the U.S. during the Afghanistan War because of its southern border with Afghanistan. Tajikistan does not have the transportation infrastructure to move U.S. vehicles, and Turkmenistan maintains neutrality so there is no viable alternative. He currently allows the U.S. to move supplies across the Uzbek border, avoiding potential showdowns with the Taliban by moving supplies through Pakistan through the Northern Distribution Network. This relationship was so crucial that even in the wake of the massacre at Andijan, the U.S. “repaired” the relationship within 4 years. Despite the fact that Karimov showed no signs of reforming his government, the U.S. only punished him with “calls for liberalization.” Uzbekistan is also one of the only nations in the region that is not allied with Russia. It is the only nation in the area that is not a member of the Russian dominated Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). (Recall that Turkmenistan chooses to remain neutral in international delegations). It removed Russian agents from its government, and ensured that their influence couldn’t pervade Uzbek politics. In light of recent rising tensions with Russia, it’s more important than ever that the U.S. and Uzbekistan maintain their friendship.
However, all of that could drastically change in the wake of Karimov’s death. He was known for his hardline stances against Russia, labeling them imperialist and rejecting the possibility of a Russian military base in Uzbekistan. Karimov’s replacement will likely not be as anti-Russia, and even then, relations between the Russia and Uzbekistan were already thawing. Russia agreed to pardon 95% of Uzbeki debt in an attempt to gain geopolitical influence in the region. Tashkent and Moscow are showing signs of becoming allies again, and without Karimov to hold off their advances, once-strained relations could, problematically for the U.S., thaw even further. Remember, Karimov was an artifact of the old Soviet Union. His strong convictions forged under Soviet rule informed his reasons for keeping Russia at bay. Uzbekistan’s new leader won’t have such a personal resentment towards his or her Northern neighbor, potentially tipping the geopolitical power in the region toward a seemingly-expansionist Russia.
Uzbekistan is also not in any position to strong-arm Russia, as they need Moscow’s assistance now more than ever. On paper, the Uzbek economy looks strong, growing at around 7.5%, but that figure doesn’t account for inflation, a rapidly growing black market, and an inability to pay government employees. Three million migrant Uzbek workers (workers who live in a country but are not nationals there) live in Russia, and they account for 25% of Uzbekistan’s GDP through what they send back home. This is especially problematic for the next Uzbek prime minister, as Putin has already cracked down on migrant workers not from the EEU. They don’t get visa-free travel, they must buy healthcare from the state as well as more expensive international passports instead of domestic ID cards. Even though Russia’s economy was reeling after UN sanctions were imposed to prevent aggression in the Ukraine in July of 2014, Putin still enacted policies that would keep workers, along with revenue these migrants could send back to their homes, out of his nation. It’s not a stretch to assume that he will keep tightening regulations, especially in the current worldwide climate regarding migrants. In the wake of the Uzbek power vacuum, expect Putin to put a little more economic pressure on Uzbekistan. The new prime minister has no cards to play, especially considering that even if more migrant workers return to Uzbekistan, there aren’t enough quality jobs to make up for that loss in GDP from remittances. There is ample incentive for Moscow and Tashkent to forge even closer ties.
But what does all of that even mean? First and foremost, Uzbek workers who come back from Russia will not be able to find well-paying work. People who can’t work are likely to take their resentment underground and join radical organizations. Karimov launched a gargantuan war on terror during his reign, and his successor is unlikely to alter the status quo; Eric McGlinchey, an assistant professor at George Mason University contends that, “The Uzbek ruling class… has a strong incentive to maintain the autocratic regime that is the wellspring of financial wealth. Pressures for regime liberalization, as a result, will remain low in Uzbekistan,”. Regardless of who wins the battle for succession, the government will be control by power and money-hungry aristocrats willing to oppress millions to preserve their assets. State repression fuels even more radicalism, creating a violent self-fulfilling prophecy. The Uzbek economy will already be reeling due to the shock from its leader’s death, and if Putin continues putting pressure on migrant workers, it might not be able to recover.
Russia has a better relationship with Uzbek neighbors Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan and the tensions between the Central American quartet are high-mostly because of a long standing border dispute. Additionally, they are mutually dependent on the other; Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan supply Uzbekistan with water, while Uzbekistan supplies them with oil. In an attempt to distance themselves from their seemingly rogue neighbor, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan started building dams to deny Uzbek access to water, thus allowing them to hold Tashkent hostage with water prices. An enraged Karimov noted that, “all of this could deteriorate to the point where not just serious confrontation, but even wars could be the result.” . So far, Russia has only kept a watchful eye on the geopolitics of its Central Asian neighbors. For example, they never fully supported Tajikistan’s Rogun Dam. This dam is incomplete, but when it is done it will steal leverage from Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan will be less dependent on their oil while Uzbekistan also will have to deal with higher water prices, further crippling its economy. Recall that one of the few reasons that Uzbekistan did not cooperate with Russia is because of Karimov’s hardline stance; without that barrier, the power vacuum and crumbling economy will ensure more economic cooperation, especially concerning the manufacturing sectors. We’ve already seen signs of this: the Russian state gas giant Gazprom agreed to purchase 4 billion cubic meters of Uzbek natural gas. Uzbekistan will cozy up economically to Russia in the face of Karimov’s death.
Due to their allegiances, drastic changes are bound to emerge in Uzbek foreign policy, mostly concerning their position on the United States. As Tashkent falls more in line with Moscow on its economy, it’s likely that those changes will be reflected in its relationship with other nations. Currently, Uzbekistan’s alliance with the U.S. is stronger than its alliance with Russia via the Northern Distribution Network. However,having Uzbekistan in their back pocket gives Russia another potential ace in the hole. The Northern Distribution Network runs through the Baltic Sea, which shares a shore with Russia. If Putin wanted, he could shut down access to the ports on the Baltic, which would force the U.S. to airlift their equipment out, which is hauntingly expensive. Having Uzbekistan in cahoots with the Russians only increases the likelihood of this occurring, especially considering the current tensions between Moscow and Washington over the Crimean annexation and the sanctions placed on Russia in response. It’s unlikely that Putin does this in the short term; after all, he does garner some $1 billion a year from its operation. The fact that Putin holds that trump card will force the U.S. to tread carefully in its future negotiations with the Eurasian giant, and is likely to increase tension even further.
Unfortunately, there is, astoundingly, nowhere to go but down for Uzbekistan. Human rights reforms, let alone stable democratic institutions, are going to be a pipe dream for a long, long time. Uzbekistan’s economy will suffer under pressure from their northern neighbor. They will strengthen their alliance with Russia, allowing Moscow to consolidate even more power in the region while putting the U.N. between a rock and a hard place when it comes to negotiating with Putin. Karimov showed an inclination to completely flip the fortunes of his people: choosing to freeze them alive instead of boiling. Perhaps his ghost can do the same for his nation’s bleak political future.
