話說1982年英首相戴卓爾夫人訪京，主權爭議令香港前途談判一直陷僵局，至1983年初戴卓爾致密函讓步才取得中方同意展開實質談判。以下節錄戴卓爾夫人回憶錄如何解畫，形容密函讓步是巧妙方法成功爭取進展。另外，當年英方代表柯利達和港澳辦副主任李後的回憶錄，最能概括這期間中英爭拗角力重要轉折，也值得參考。
《戴卓爾夫人回憶錄(下)》(1994)，頁361–362：
一九八二年九月我訪問中國，並與趙紫陽、鄧小平會談，達成了三點很好的故果。第一是確立香港未來(被收回後)的信心；二是現在我已清楚中國人要的是什麼；第三，中英形成基本共識之後，將有利於未來繼續討論香港問題。但真正的危機是，以上這些協議可能只是曇花一現罷了。殖民地的問題令人毫無把握，我們不知道該如何說服中國對香港的未來做進一步的保證。而最令人擔心的是，中國顯然不願繼續進行在我離開北京時所期待的其他會談。數月過去了，卻沒有任何消息。我向中國問題的老手基辛格徵詢意見；他的回答是「不用擔心，這就是他們的行事技倆。」但隨著時間飛逝，我的憂慮便益加沉重。一九八三年一月廿八日星期五的早晨，我和大臣、官員及香港總督舉行一個會議，討論整個情勢。中國在六月時單方面宣布他們對香港未來的計畫；我們一致認為必須阻止。我反覆思考我們的目標，並提議，我們必須發展香港的民主架構，使她能在短時間內達成獨立或自治，這其中包括了在香港建立一個更「中國」的政府和行政機關[按：即公務員本地化]，讓中國人民[按：即本地華人]日益自主，使英國逐漸處於次要的地位。我們也考慮在香港設置一個行使公民覆決權的機構，因為在立法局的選舉中可看出香港的中國人對民主有極大的興趣，政府必須予以回應。然而，當時似乎沒有人贊同我的想法；而最後我也不得不承認：在獲悉中國不會接受這樣的提議時，就無需再做進一步的研究了。但我不能坐視不理；一九八三年三月我寫了一封私人的信任給趙紫陽…如果能對香港的穩定與繁榮提出適當的安排，我將考慮向國會提出有關香港主權的問題。我巧妙地加強了這段陳述的力量：這項有關確保香港未來繁榮與穩定的協議，必須是英國和中國政府行政安排上能力所及的；同時也必須能為英國國會、香港人民以及中國政府所接受。我準備向國會提議，香港的主權必須重歸中國。傑佛瑞‧賀維和外交部希望更進一步；他們強烈主張在談判初期我應該承諾：九七之後英國將不會在香港設任何行政機關。我認為沒有理由作這樣的讓步；我希望每一張打出去的牌都能發揮最大的功效。
柯利達回憶錄形容，1982年10月至翌年7月實質談判前的各種爭持是卡夫卡式荒誕劇，中方在原則問題上企硬，拒絕處理實質事務。
Percy Cradock(1994) Experience of China, 183–186:
There were three main phases: first, the struggle to get into talks at all, which lasted from October 1982 until July 1983; then the fight to retain British administration, from July to October 1983; finally the stage of conditionality, that is the detailed examination and improvement of the Chinese proposals, on the understanding that, if we could make them satisfactory, we would be prepared to commend the result to Parliament. This final and most intensive stage of negotiation occupied us for the last year and culminated in the initialling of the agreement, the Joint Declaration, in September 1984. After that there was a period in October when Hong Kong opinion was tested on the question whether the product was acceptable. Finally, the Joint Declaration was signed in December 1984.Phase one, the approach to negotiation, was an extended Kafkaesque episode, in which we wrestled with the Chinese demand that we begin by accepting their precondition, in effect that we should give the game away before we ever got on to the pitch. I made a series of calls at the Foreign Ministry, pressing for an early opening of the talks our leaders had decided on, to be consistently told that we had only to accept the premise and the path would be smooth; otherwise, there would be, to put it mildly, ‘difficulties’. The Chinese showed no interest in discussing practical details of the talks, or any supplementary matters. We were confronted with a large issue of principle, which we could not in any circumstances accept and which for long proved impossible to circumvent.My interlocutor in the first weeks was Zhang Wenjin, the Vice Foreign Minister for Western Europe. He was an old friend…His replacement, Yao Guang, came from a different background. He was an administrator, a solid Party man with links to Zhao Ziyang…We had long and exhausting arguments about the premise, in which I would offer him a prize for any word about preconditions he could find in the joint statement. It was a debating point and gave me some private satisfaction; but, as usual with the Chinese, it did not affect the response. Their statements were opaque but stubborn…
回憶錄說中方一直拖延時間收買人心，單方面宣傳「港人治港」放風造勢，令堅持保密的英方處下風：
The situation in those early days, as we pressed and the Chinese stalled, was both frustrating and worrying. Time was passing and we were now aware there was a deadline. There were also reports of a preliminary Chinese announcement to be made in June. Though we had agreed that the talks were to be kept secret, Chinese leaks and statements in Hong Kong were proceeding apace. Our lips were sealed; in any case we did not want to get into a public argument, which would only have the effect of carving the Chinese position in stone. In November, Liao Chengzhi, the head of the Hong Kong and Macao Office, receiving a Hong Kong delegation, produced the seductive slogan, ‘Gang ren zhi gang’ (‘Hong Kong people running Hong Kong’), as the mark of the post-1997 era. It had considerable international appeal, with its suggestion that Hong Kong would be liberated from the colonialists and become virtually independent.These further elaborations of the Chinese plan reminded me of the weakness of our position and the danger that we could be locked out of meaningful discussion, while Hong Kong’s fate was decided, and promulgated, in Peking.
柯利達又形容，首相曾考慮各種「天馬行空」方案，最後願意回到現實，去信趙紫陽在主權上用「微調」字眼博得好感：
In the end we overcame this first major obstacle by a small adjustment in the language about sovereignty. Mrs Thatcher had originally spoken of being ready in certain circumstances to ‘consider’ making recommendations to Parliament on sovereignty. Tony Galsworthy, my extremely able Head of Chancery, and I together evolved the idea that we might strengthen that clause, making it: ‘would be prepared to recommend to Parliament’. We were now stressing to the Chinese that sovereignty was not in the government’s gift; it could only be surrendered by Parliament. The whole offer would of course be subject to the condition that suitable administrative arrangements for Hong Kong could be worked out. I carried the proposal back with me to a meeting with the Prime Minister in London in March 1983.It was as well I did so. Some explosive ideas were being canvassed in the frustration of the time: a public statement by the Prime Minister; a UN-supervised referendum for Hong Kong; bringing the ceded territories, Hong Kong Island and a portion of Kowloon, nearer independence. At one of our meetings Michael Heseltine, then Minister of Defence, was called in.But the Prime Minister was eventually persuaded to delay, if not abandon, these more dramatic moves and to try the effect of a personal message along the lines I proposed. I returned to Peking with it. She made plain to me, however, that this was her last word, a point I was happy to convey, since it added force to the letter I carried.
柯利達說，從趙紫陽回信及北京後續行動可見，刻意誤解與字裡行間鑽空子是中方慣技，不過難得是談判總算有些微進展：
The letter did the trick. I called it the first finesse. We had given nothing substantial away. But the Chinese are good at reading between the lines; indeed, their most important reading has to be done in just that way. They saw in the change of wording, slight though it was, a sign of the British government’s readiness to move towards a transfer of sovereignty and thereby to make a nod in the direction of their premise, if not a full obeisance. Of course, they sought to present it as an outright acceptance and I had constantly to remind them of its highly conditional nature; but even then they did not draw back. Slowly we were able to move on to settling the agenda, the composition of the delegations, the place and timing of the first formal meeting. The Prime Minister commented that we were treading on eggshells; true, but we were at last inching forward.
當年港澳辦副主任李後簡單概述戴卓爾密函前後中英磋商重點：中方堅持接收主權是首要原則，英方則以維持穩定繁榮為先決條件；後來談判議程就訂明，按次序先談九七後如何確保穩定繁榮，再談過渡期安排和主權如何移交。
李後(1997)《回歸的歷程》頁99–101：
撒切爾[戴卓爾]夫人訪華以後， 中國副外長和英國駐華大使從一九八二年十月初到一九八三年二月上旬就香港問題進行了五次磋商。英方在磋商中強調，撒切爾夫人訪華期間，英中兩國領導人就維持香港的繁榮與穩定這一共同目標而進行商談達成協議。因此，會談應以雙方領導人達成的維持香港的繁榮和穩定的共同目的為指導原則。中方則表示，中國領導人很關心香港的繁榮和穩定，但關於香港問題，首先是恢復行使主權問題。我們是在中國對香港恢復行使主權這個前提下說香港的繁榮與穩定的。因此，會談首先要解決這個前提。前提解決了，其他問題就好談。中英官員最初的五次磋商，就這樣，英方強調以繁榮穩定為共同目標，中方強調以恢復行使香港主權為前提，雙方互不咬弦，形成了「頂牛」狀態。一九八三年三月十日，英國首相撒切爾夫人致函中國總理，說，根據憲法，她作為首相無權單獨採取行動同意轉移主權；只有議會才有權做出決定。她說過在一定的情況下，她準備考慮就主權問題向議會提出建議。也許她加強這個保證是有益處的。只要英國政府和中國政府之間能夠就香港的行政管理安排達成協議，而這些安排能保證香港今後的繁榮和穩定，又能既為中國政府，也為英國議會和香港人民所接受，她就準備向議會建議，使整個香港的主權回歸中國。撒切爾夫人希望中方能同意在下個月內開始舉行實質性的會談。四月二十八日，趙紫陽覆信給撒切爾夫人。覆信在重申了中國政府對香港問題的立場和方針政策之後，表示，「中國政府同意盡快地正式談判，本著維持香港繁榮穩定的共同目的，就移交主權的方式以及從現在到一九九七年的過渡時期和一九九七年以後中英如何協作的有關問題開始實質性的討論。」從五月下旬開始，雙方就會談的其體安排交換意見。經過磋商，雙方於六月底就香港問題下一階段實質性會談的議程達成如下協議：雙方同意在會談過程中，與香港未來有關的各項問題均應討論。特別是中國總理和英國首相信中提到的所有問題。這些問題包括：一九九七年後為維持香港的穩定和繁榮而作的安排，從現在到一九九七年期間香港的安排和有關主權移交的事項。討論按此順序進行。中方首席談判代表為外交部副部長姚廣；英方首席談判代表為英駐華大使柯利達。
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