Continuing on Regret
I thought I was done with my research on regret, but then David Charles wrote an article on the topic in Philosophy Now’s latest issue. In it, Charles agrees, modestly, with Paddy Mqueen in “When Should We Regret?” (2017)
To recap, McQueen argues that we shouldn’t regret that which we acted on our best information at the time. (Paddy McQueen, “When Should We Regret?” 2017) That is, if we acted in line with who we are and on our best knowledge at the time, then we couldn’t have done any better. If we couldn’t have done any better, then we can’t blame ourselves (or regret the act.) So therefore, if we acted in line with who we are and on our best knowledge at the time, then we can’t blame ourselves (or regret the act.) In essence, we did the best we could and can’t blame ourselves.
I agreed with this, insofar as to say we can’t blame ourselves for doing our best. However, I thought, and still agree with this, that if people always act according to reason, then they will always have done their best. And if they are doing their best, then they can’t blame themselves, ever. So, if people always act according to reason, then they can’t blame themselves, ever. It is also the case that, at least for most people, they always act according to some kind of reason. Thus, they assumably couldn’t ever blame themselves or ever feel regret.
In comes Charles. Charles argues similarly, but with some caveats. “I propose that we shouldn’t regret actions in general, because actions are deliberate, based on reasons, knowledge and circumstances at the time of the action. We can, however, regret not taking particular cognitive actions, such as thinking a bit harder, planning better, and so on, which might have prevented a subsequent bad choice of action.” (David Charles, “On Regret,” 2022) In essence, the difference between Charles and McQueen is the caveat that not using reasoning at all would be the one thing that can be regretted. Briefly, Charles argues that if an agent does not use their reason, then there is a failing in utilizing that agents cognitive abilities. If there is a failing in utilizing that agents cognitive abilities, then that agent can regret it. So, therefore, if an agent does not use their reason, then that agent can regret it. Charles wants to emphasize, however, we shouldn’t regret the outcome of the act itself, but of the lack of planning and reasoning alone. (David Charles, “On Regret,” 2022)
This got me thinking. The regret and remorse that both McQueen and Charles are talking about is in relation to an act that the agent commits and later decides it was the wrong act to perform. However, it seems there are two different kinds of regret and remorse. The first is the one McQueen and Charles are talking about — what I will call active regret; regret that one feels for having committed a specific act. However, there is another, that is more related to compassion and empathy. I can regret to inform an agent of the death of their loved one, for example, without it having been the wrong act or a lack of cognitive processing, but a regret of having to do the right thing. I call this empathetic regret or remorse. So, if regret and remorse can be empathetic, then that regret or remorse has nothing to do with having decided whether the agents act is right or wrong. If that regret or remorse has nothing to do with having decided whether the agents act is right or wrong, then it is okay to regret it. Therefore, if regret and remorse can be empathetic, then it is okay to regret it.
It seems there is an agreement between Charles and McQueen about stressing the use of reason in deciding whether to regret something or not. I still agree with this — if one acts according to their best available reason, then they have no reason to feel regret or remorse. They did the best they could. I also accept the implication that since we almost always act according to best available reason, this leaves very little to regret. However, this is only in terms of active regret. When it comes to empathetic regret, however, we can regret plenty. There is plenty be sorry for, even if the apologizing agent hasn’t done anything themselves to be sorry for, its called compassion and empathy. Even in some cases where the agent is responsible for someone elses misfortune, the agent should not regret the act, but can regret having to do it. Say an agent breaks up with their significant other, they spent a lot of time deciding it was the right move. They acted according to reason and they truly think both parties will be happier if they break up. However, they can still feel regret and remorse for what they have to do, namely, break up with their significat other.
With all of this said, it is important for us to acknowledge the difference between kinds of regret. Active regret is not something to regret if we acted in accordance with our reason. However, empathetic regret is entirely reasonable in any and all situations, even if it was the right thing to do.
Want More?
If you enjoyed this article, please consider following me here on medium. Alternatively, you can find me on facebook as Five Minute Philosophy, I also run a guided self study program called Sapio Institute of Philosophy, which you can join for free at https://www.sapioinstitute.org
