Dealing with Disagreement
Introduction
I am sure that you — like me — have had online disagreements. Topics of pro-choice vs. pro-life come to mind. We always wonder why the person we are discussing with just can’t seem to see our side of the coin. This is true even when I create memes — mere jokes — on my page, Five Minute Philosophy. We are going to discuss here what in philosophy is called the epistemology of disagreement — what should we do, or how should we handle situations of disagreement. This field traverses different fields of philosophy — namely epistemology and ethics. This article will cover the fundamental research on the topic as well as answer some of the questions I had along the way while researching it. I will finally present and endorse what I call the Consideration View.
The Foundation
Every good little philosophy researcher starts out in the same place — the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (or the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy). While the piece “Disagreement,” by Bryan Frances (whom I have written on previously) and Jonathan Matheson is a great starting point, I found Michel Croce’s “The Epistemology of Disagreement” to be a bit more clear. This article will cover multiple papers engaging in different directions on the topic as we go along.
When talking about different types of disagreement, Croce points out three — disagreements with epistemic superiors, peers, and inferiors. In reference to superiors and inferiors, Croce suggests that there are obvious reactions to disagreement.
“When one party is epistemically better positioned than the other — that is, when one is an epistemic superior — it is widely agreed that this party should retain their belief while the other party — the epistemic inferior — should revise their opinion in the direction of what the epistemic superior believes.”
-Michel Croce, “The Epistemology of Disagreement”
The point Croce makes is that when someone knows more about another topic — or rather is an expert on the topic at hand — then the one who knows less should defer to the expert. In context of online disagreements, it is often very hard to tell who the expert — or epistemic superior — is before the disagreement begins. It is only after getting into the weeds that it becomes more clear — if at all. Another major problem I had with this is that we often over-inflate our own epistemic standing, and thus will more often than not claim to be the epistemic superior or expert. I also have the offhand worry that if one defers to the expert on the basis of their expertise, we may end up committing the appeal to authority fallacy — however, that is not the emphasis of this article.
This brings me to a central theme of my thought — epistemic humility. It seems we need more of that. How can we do this? Simply by considering the other party in the discussion as an epistemic peer, which tends to be the focus in the epistemology of disagreement. To which, there are really two main methods for handling disagreement. The first is of conciliatory solutions, namely the Equal Weight view.
“The most prominent conciliatory view is the Equal Weight View. Its doctrine is rather simple: once you grant that the disagreeing parties are epistemic peers, each has to treat the interlocutor’s opinion as seriously as one treats one’s own… If my partner has a 0.8 belief that we spent our holidays in Italy laster year (P), while I have a 0.4 belief that P, the Equal Weight View requires that we “split the difference” and meet in between: thus, we should both end up having a 0.6 belief that P.”
-Michel Croce, “The Epistemology of Disagreement”
The point is simple — if we are both of equal intellectual merit, we should meet in the middle with our confidence in a certain belief. If you believe John Doe would make the best statesmen, and I believe Dohn Joe would make the best statesmen, then we should lower our confidence in our position and gain confidence in the other parties as well.
There is a major rebuttal to this view that will need addressing, however. Croce cites Elga and Littlejohn in his paper, however I will take it as his words describing the situation.
“An important objection against the Equal Weight View (and any conciliatory view, in general) is that they are self-defeating… In short, the problem is that applying the view to itself would have self-undermining consequences.”
-Michel Croce, “The Epistemology of Disagreement”
In other words, say you are disagreeing with another party about what to do about disagreement. The proponent of the Equal Weight View will need to lower their confidence in the Equal Weight View itself. This is what many consider self-defeating. So what about an alternative view? Enter the Steadfast Solutions.
“Steadfast or non-conformist views understand peer disagreement oppositely: that is, by conceding that if we “have done the math” correctly, we cannot be asked to revise our belief, as it is most likely that our interlocutor has formed the wrong opinion.”
-Michel Croce, “The Epistemology of Disagreement”
Realistically, if we know we know something, can we be deterred from believing it? Ultimately, if I know that killing is wrong, can I be swayed from believing otherwise? The Steadfast Solutions seem to state that I cannot. The backing is simply that there might be correct reasons— or that I have the Right Reasons by comparison that are uncompromising.
This, too has a pretty hearty rebuttal, and it falls onto what will become a central question for this article — epistemic humility. The problem is that we have to accept that in the digital era other people have access to the same exact information we have, and they may have interpreted it differently. Who is to say that I am not the one to have interpreted it incorrectly and not them?
There are other relevant views to consider, such as the Total Evidence View, or the Justificationist View, however, these generally fall into different ways of justifying Steadfast views. It is this reason that we move on to a more central theme — epistemic humility.
Epistemic Humility
I chose to focus on modesty and humility more broadly for this section. The reason is that since humility and modesty seem to be a central backing between the justification for the Equal Weight View, the question becomes whether it actually practices humility or not. We quickly run into confrontation to this idea.
“Saying “I’m modest” sounds like a self-undermining joke… It seems as though knowing that you’re modest somehow spoils it; the modest person, it seems, must be unaware of their own modesty.”
-Nicolas Bommarito, “Modesty and Humility”
This is quite poignant in that the Equal Weight View suggests acknowledging ones’ own humility — which seems self-undermining. It is almost as if being humble or having humility or modesty is a matter of being ignorant of that fact — something well pointed out by the song “I’m So Humble” by The Lonely Island. Those who argue that one cannot admit to their own modesty or humility are arguing for what is known as the Ignorance View. Since the Equal Weight View emphasizes acknowledging humility deeply, and the Ignorance View contradicts this, the Equal Weight View cannot use this as its definition for humility. The definition I want to emphasize here, as it will be relevant in the future, is a difference between regular modesty and humility and intellectual humility in the form of the Limitations-Owning View.
“Whitcomb et al. (2015) defend a “limitations-owning” view. On this view the intellectually humble person attends to and owns their own limitations… These accounts tend to presume that there is something special about our own limitations that warrant special attitudes beyond concern for epistemic limitations more generally.”
-Nicolas Bommarito, “Modesty and Humility”
In terms of online disagreement, and even disagreement more broadly, this gives credence to the Equal Weight View by emphasizing our own limitations. When online, we don’t know the person on the other end — they could be the next Wittgenstein and I wouldn’t even know it! Treating them as an epistemic peer is itself an acknowledgement of ones’ own limitations — epistemic humility.
However, if we value epistemic humility, is it possible that epistemic pride also be a virtue? I had a conversation with my friend and fellow content creator, Every Sentence of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit who gave me the suggestion to look into this. I would not have done so without his suggestion, and for that I thank him.
Epistemic Pride
So, can Epistemic Pride be a virtue? If you had asked me at the beginning I would have said no — that pride, writ large is a vice. However, just as we saw with humility or modesty, there are a couple different ways of defining it. The obvious one is that of the vice. An arrogant steadfastness and self-assurance. We will not bother with that one here, however, the alternative sounds a lot like our definition of humility, but in reverse.
“The virtue of intellectual pride, then, is excellence in acknowledging your intellectual strengths.”
-Allan Hazlett, “Intellectual Pride”
Notice this is how we have defined intellectual humility, except replace limitations with strengths. It wouldn’t be unheard of to consider — according to this definition — intellectual pride a virtue rather than a vice. Of course, this will come with the rebuttal that it’s the emphasis on the virtue at hand that matters, in accordance with Aristotle’s Golden Mean which states that:
“Both excessive and defective exercise destroys the strength… while that which is proportionate both produces and increases and preserves it. So too is it, then, in the case of temperance and courage and the other virtues. For the man who flies from and fears everything and does not stand his ground against anything becomes a coward, and the man who fears nothing at all but goes to meet every danger becomes rash; and similarly the man who indulges in every pleasure and abstains from none becomes self-indulgent, while the man who shuns every pleasure, as boors do, becomes in a way insensible; temperance and courage, then, are destroyed by excess and defect, and preserved by the mean.”
-Aristotle, “Nicomachean Ethics”
What Aristotle suggests is that its possible that intellectual pride and humility can become a vice if taken to excess. When people think of pride, they tend to think of it in its excess form, but not humility. If need be, replace the term pride with confidence. This is pointed out aptly by acknowledging this potential for excess.
“Just as there is such a thing as the proper acknowledgement of your limitations, there is also such a thing as the improper acknowledgement of your limitations; but this does not mean we should use “proper humility” as the name of the virtue of humility. The same, mutatis mutandis, when it comes to other putative virtues, such as courage, honesty, and self-reliance.”
-Allan Hazlett, “Intellectual Pride”
Here, Hazlett points out that there can be an excess of humility, just as with any other virtue. Yet, we don’t point out the difference between proper and improper humility. In terms of disagreement, and especially online disagreement, this seems to back the Steadfast View.
So where do we go from here? Surely humility can be a virtue, and I am now convinced that pride can be a virtue too (even if I have to rename it confidence in order to be less hesitant). Both the Equal Weight View and the Steadfast View have an emphasis on a particular virtue that supports its moral standing.
One feature of Aristotle’s virtues that stands out is that vices are essentially an excess of a virtue. The Golden Mean suggests finding the right balance. However, what view would keep someone in balance in terms of disagreement? The trouble is that you believe something or you don’t right? Well, as it turns out, maybe not always.
Rational Endorsement vs. Belief
This may come as a surprise, but sometimes researchers vouch for a view they don’t believe in. They may do this for various reasons, including the nefarious reason of academic funding, scholarships and grants. However, there are examples of positive reasons:
“A healthy community of inquiry, in any field, needs researchers who will strike out to pursue theories which are not currently the most probable, or best-confirmed.”
-Will Fleisher, “Rational Endorsement”
Note that Fleisher is not saying that the theory being endorsed is confirmed false, but importantly not currently the most probable. This is important because ultimately we have two options: discover some piece of evidence that might make it more probable, or a piece of evidence that might confirm its falsehood.
One who rationally endorses something, but does not believe it is also possible. If a researcher is rationally endorsing a view — trying to confirm it as true — they will emphasize evidence or bring to light new evidence of its potential truth. However, that evidence may not amount to merit belief, even from the researcher. They may endorse the view in their quest for truth and knowledge, but if pressed, can still say they don’t believe it.
One of the biggest rebuttals is that one can only endorse something they believe to be true. Fleisher addresses this by defining belief and endorsement separately.
“The biggest normative difference between endorsement and belief involves the following principle, which I take to be a bedrock intuitive assumption about belief: it is irrational to believe some proposition p if one takes not p to be more probable than p. Put simply, you should not believe something you think is more likely false than true. This principle is not true for endorsement. One should not knowingly endorse something false, but one can endorse something unlikely to be true.”
-Will Fleisher, “Rational Endorsement”
The difference is that belief requires thinking something is true, or at least more likely to be true than false. However, endorsement only requires that something is not believed to be false. One can choose to endorse something they don’t believe for various reasons. Fleishers’ primary argument has to do with a sort of skepticism about objections. Skepticism is another topic that we will have to visit to get to the bottom of this whole subject.
“We want researchers who are motivated to continue to defend their theories in the face of difficult objections, because sometimes objections and counter-evidence turn out to be misleading. Endorsement is an attitude that is characterized by this kind of committment, and the norms of rational endorsement reflect this fact.”
-Will Fleisher, “Rational Endorsement”
It seems this may reflect that the Steadfast Views can hold merit in terms of rational endorsement rather than belief. If one is not believing some proposition, but endorsing it, the point is to be steadfast about it.
So the question remains, when in online discussions and disagreements more broadly, should we conciliate and give credence to what the other party thinks, or should we remain steadfast in our position? Some help may come from a skeptical take on the subject.
The Role of Skepticism
Every philosopher worth their salt has a skeptical bone in their body. The very essence of philosophy comes with the assumption that things wont be taken at face value. A good philosopher wont even take the idea that things can’t be taken at face value, at face value! This is emphasized when Socrates was told by the Oracle of Delphi that he was the smartest man because he at least knew one thing: that he didn’t know very much at all.
There are some more deeply skeptical takes than Socrates, of course. Most of what we know of one prominent skeptic — Pyrrho — comes from Sextus Empiricus.
“Those who are properly called dogmatists — such as the Aristotelians and the Epicureans and the Stoics and others — think they have discovered the truth; Clitomachus and Carneades and other Academic philosophers have said that the truth cannot be apprehended; and the sceptics persist in their investigations.”
-Sextus Empiricus, “Outlines of Pyrrhonism”
It seems that skeptics are the best researchers — they will investigate beyond what they believe. It is a great way to break cognitive bias and rationally endorse a view that may not be true, but it hasn’t been proven false. It even seems as though Pyrrho — and Sextus Empiricus himself — may have endorsed rational endorsement:
“Scepticism is an ability which sets up antitheses among appearances and judgments in any way whatever: by scepticism, on account of the ‘equal weight’ which characterizes opposing states of affairs and arguments, we arrive first at ‘suspension of judgment’, and second at ‘freedom from disturbance’.”
-Sextus Empiricus, “Outlines of Pyrrhonism”
One interesting thing to note is the term ‘equal weight’ here which suggests that if one is to be a skeptic, they would value rational endorsement, and probably the Equal Weight View of disagreement. Further, as previously stated, any philosopher worth their salt will have some sensitivity to skepticism.
Now, I don’t know about all that ‘freedom from disturbance’ talk, but it does seem that we must count this as a solid philosophical defense of the conciliatory views — such as the Equal Weight View. Yet, we have also seen that the Steadfast Views have strong merit as well. So, how do we create a proverbial round square here?
The Consideration View
The Consideration View is my own synthesis between both conciliatory views — namely the Equal Weight View — and Steadfast Views. It is meant to account for both the virtues of Epistemic Humility from the Equal Weight View, and the virtue of Epistemic Pride (or confidence) from the Steadfast Views. It also emphasizes rational endorsement over belief in context of the value skepticism brings to every good philosopher.
During disagreements, especially online, we may not know what constitutes an expert — or who the epistemic superior is. In this vein, we ought to consider the other party an epistemic peer and evaluate the arguments individually, regardless of their — or our own for that matter— epistemic standing. This is the starting place of all online disagreement. This stems from a basic intellectual humility that suggests we could in fact be wrong — just as the skeptic agrees.
When meeting disagreement, we have no need to conciliate our belief on the subject, as at the time of disagreement we are merely rationally endorsing the view in which we currently believe. We are endorsing a view that we do not believe to be false — we can continue to vouch for it throughout the discussion. This helps create a rich documentation of thought. In this way, we are following the virtue of pride (or confidence) in line with the Steadfast Views.
This does not mean, however, that once the discussion is over it is all said and done. In fact, most of the work of dealing with disagreement is to be done after the discussion has been had. One must carefully consider the arguments that were made — on both sides — and consider their merits and their flaws. This requires an emphasis on being skeptical of even our own endorsement, as well as the other parties. This leads to a potential conciliation from the disagreement. One may evaluate the opposing parties argument as more sound than their own and thus devalue their position, in favor of giving the other parties view more credence.
This isn’t the only way this may happen. One may actually not gain credence in the opposing parties view, but instead — upon evaluating their own position — devalue their own arguments beyond the point of the other parties. In this way, they also conciliate. Maybe they recognize a bad few points they made or — upon closer examination — recognize their argument is built upon a crucial, but fallacious premise.
This is all to say that one does not need to conciliate upon the discovery of disagreement. When having disagreements — online or otherwise — we can often employ this Consideration View to great effect. However, there are in fact times where this may not be possible. For example, a disagreement may require a decision to be made in the moment — although it can be remedied after ruminating in most cases.
For an example adapted from David Christensens’ “Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy”, lets say there is a disagreement about a bill at a restaurant. We agreed to split the bill in half, but you arrive at that amounting to $45, and I arrive at that amounting to $43. While we can endorse a view and have a discussion, I cannot carefully consider the arguments after the fact — the bill still has to get paid! We need to come to an agreement to avoid washing dishes after the restaurant closes.
Since the emphasis of this article is primarily about online disagreements, this isn’t particularly a problem. However, there is still a way to mend this disagreement with the Consideration View. We can start out conciliating, or even just pay what they believe to be the case — it doesn’t particularly matter how it gets paid as long as the bill does get paid. Consideration can still happen after that. If, after considering the arguments and “re-running” the numbers it comes up that I do indeed owe you 2$, then this is easily remedied by admitting fault and buying my friend a drink.
Conclusion
Ultimately, if you disagree with the Consideration View I have put forward — that we can endorse a view during disagreement and conciliate it afterwards, if we evaluate it to merit it — this is perfectly okay. We can discuss it and I will endorse it, and potentially conciliate after the fact, though I have put a lot of thought and work into this.
We have noted how both the Equal Weight View and Steadfast View have strengths and weaknesses. The Equal Weight View emphasizes intellectual humility in the form of acknowledging ones’ own fallibility, and the Steadfast View emphasizes intellectual pride (or confidence) in acknowledging ones’ own strengths. However, the Equal Weight View might be self-undermining, and the Steadfast View leaves little room for intellectual growth.
We looked into a potential means to hold onto what we believe during the disagreement through rational endorsement rather than an emphasis on actual belief and the intellectual benefits of doing so. This led us to skepticism and seeing it as a virtue of a good philosopher.
Finally, we brought it all together to point out that we can make our cake and eat it too. If we are willing to merely endorse our belief during the disagreement, and conciliate it afterwards — and only if it is warranted — then we synthesize both the Equal Weight View and the Steadfast Views. We are willing to change our mind on the topic at hand, but only after the disagreement has been had and if it is merited.
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