The Limits of Argument, A Reply
What are the Limits of Argumentation?
Everyone has seen the “change my mind” memes. In an article by Prof. Darmstadter on Philosophy Now called “The Limits of Argument,” he describes the reasons argumentation seems to never be able to compel an interlocutor to change their minds. For me, his article brought this meme to the forefront, I spend quite a bit of time pondering questions like this. The goal of this essay is to summarize the reasons Prof. Darmstadter gives for not being able to change others beliefs, look at the existing body of work surrounding the issue, and finally give my view as to why it is the case that argumentation never seems to lead anywhere based on the literature presented.
Darmstadter on The Limits of Argument
Darmstadter has three main reasons for why argumentation doesn’t seem to work. While he does go over what to do about it in his own way (and I encourage readers to read his article, linked at the bottom of this post) I am more concerned with the reasons why argument never seems to convince anyone.
His first reason is that we seem to hold contradictory beliefs. He uses the example of a dead car battery to explain what he means. He says “For example, suppose your car won’t start. After a few simple tests — you try the horn and lights — you conclude that the battery is dead, and that you should try connecting the car to a live battery. So apparently, you believe that (1) ‘You cannot start a car with a dead battery’, and (2) ‘You can start a car with a dead battery’ (for example, by connecting it to a live battery).” Darmstadter here is pointing out that we use context in our reasoning. He gives, however, that maybe we just need to refine what we mean when we say that a car wont start with a dead battery, he says maybe we should rephrase it as ‘You cannot start a car with a dead battery in the normal way.’ He says that we don’t however, because we all know what we really mean when we say we can’t start a car on a dead battery anyways, and that it’s more useful for us not to worry so profusely about such details.
The next reason Prof. Darmstadter gives is that there are essentially two different kinds of beliefs people hold. There are those that are central to our lives, and ones that are merely peripheral. He gives the example of a stores’ hours. If we believe that a store is open and go to the store to find that it is closed, then we will change our belief about the stores’ hours. He says this is because the belief of the stores’ hours is merely a peripheral belief, and not central to our lives or our self definitions. However, ones that are central to ourselves, will not change.
Finally, the last reason that he gives is one of social seclusion. He says “…many beliefs are not derived from personal experience but from a trusted community, so that giving up those beliefs may threaten ties to that community.” When he says this, he references social groups that we have are those who shape our beliefs that we can’t let go of unless we want to be secluded from that group.
Ultimately, Prof. Darmstadter attacks this issue through a more psychological lens. And while I agree with some of his views, I disagree with others, and find that there are many other possible reasons one may not change their beliefs. It is a complex issue that doesn’t leave us with any one way to determine what to do about not being able to change others minds.
What Does the Literature Say?
With this being almost a metaphilosophical issue, the literature is not incredibly far reaching. However, there are a few things to look into. Primarily, I want to look at ancient Scepticism in Pyrrho(nism).
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP) sets the bar for Philosophical research. There is an article about Pyrrho himself who, in his day, was a Sceptic (with an upper-case ‘S’). However, he did inspire a smaller movement later on which took his namesake of Pyrrhonism. In the article by the SEP on Pyrrho, it explains this view: “As for the avoidance of theoretical inquiry and debate, it is fair to assume that Pyrrho will have regarded such inquiry and debate as troublesome because it is necessarily fruitless and interminable. If the real nature of things is indeterminable by us, as the epistemological interpretation would have it, then to attempt to determine the nature of things, and to provide cogent grounds for the superiority of one’s own theories, is to attempt the impossible; such matters are simply beyond our grasp.” The basic understanding of more modern Pyrrhonism is that there is an equally sound/cogent argument on both sides of an issue. This could easily explain why convincing someone doesn’t work in context of Prof. Darmstadters’ argument that there are some central beliefs that are going to be harder to change. If there is an argument of an equal truth value on both sides of an issue, then there is no reason to change your current beliefs.
Prof. Darmstadter does reference Pragmatism as a possible reason as well why it may be impossible to change someones’ mind. Pragmatism, as he puts it, “sees beliefs as true if they help us reach the experiences we desire.” This is something I can agree with. However, there is another, Perspectivism. The differences between Pragmatism and Perspectivism can be subtle, however as 365Philosophy had pointed out in their article “Day 30 — Pragmatism and Perspectivism,” “…[P]ragmatism aims to be more practical in its outlook.” If this is the case, and Perspectivism doesn’t, this would explain why argumentation will not change someones’ mind. If Pragmatism is more about actually applying perspectivism to some degree, if we are Perspectivists, truth ultimately comes down to our own perspective of things. If we are Pragmatists, then truth still will ultimately come down to our own perspective of things. The application of Pragmatism is ultimately flawed in this way, it still relies on the supposed ‘impracticality’ of Perspectivism.
Lastly, I want to touch on Karl Jaspers. As I pointed out in my article “Reference Guide to Existentialism,” (https://davidklier.medium.com/reference-guide-to-existentialism-14914fc4b4c3) Jaspers sees others as acting as sign-posts towards our own understanding. If we come into contact with a sign-post (companion in thought) that says something contradictory to where we have already followed on our path towards understanding, we will disregard the new sign, barring evidence not being strong enough. This happens as, for Jaspers, the art of the argument is not about convincing your interlocutor, but instead is to act as another signpost. There is, and never was, an attempt to convince someone else of your ‘being right.’ It’s merely to share a view. One can take it or leave it, even rebut it. In fact, that rebuttal may make our own argument stronger in the end by showing its’ flaws, and going back to close up that flaw.
My View
My view, if you know me, should be clear. Karl Jaspers is my favorite philosopher, and while I follow him for his view, I don’t see his view contradictory with that of the Pyrrhonists. For the Pyrrhonist, there is an equally sound/cogent argument for ones’ opposition. Jaspers has no need to deny this. So for me, there is exactly what the Pyrrhonist says; an equally sound/cogent argument for my opposition. That is perfectly okay. My goal is to act as a sign-post for others (and read other signposts). If you disagree, maybe you might find a better sign-post elsewhere. However, I welcome disagreement for the reason that I mentioned with Jaspers. It make my own view stronger in the end.
It is important to recognize that argument is not for the sake of convincing someone, in my view. It is for the sake of learning. About each other, and about our own views. It is also a great exercise to see and evaluate the issues of others (and my own) viewpoint. Maybe, if my evaluation of another view has less issues than my own, I will change it. However, if I truly don’t think there is a need to, then I will not.
Wrap Up
So, what did we go over today? First, we took a look at Prof. Darmstadters’ article “The Limits of Argument” and summarized it. He explains his three main reasons why people aren’t swayed by argument: we hold contradictory beliefs, there are central and peripheral beliefs, and we hold on to beliefs to avoid social seclusion. Then, we looked at what other literature exists. We noted ancient Scepticism in Pyrrhonisms’ view that there are equally sound/cogent arguments on both sides of any issue. Then we looked at the difference between Pragmatism and Perspectivism, ultimately coming to the conclusion that Pragmatism is Perspectivism, but underperforms its goal of being more practical as it still doesn’t deny, but is dependent on Perspectivism. Then we took a look at Karl Jaspers’ view that others merely act as sign posts towards our own understanding, and that we have no need to try and convince someone else. Lastly, we took a look at my personal views, where I agree with Jaspers and Pyrrhonism as not mutually exclusive.
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Sources
“The Limits of Argument” — Philosophy Now — Professor Howard Darmstadter — https://philosophynow.org/issues/142/The_Limits_of_Argument
“Pyrrho” — Sanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy — Richard Bett, Edward N Zalta — https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pyrrho/
“Day 30 — Pragmatism and Perspectivism” —Medium — 365Philosophy — https://medium.com/@365Philosophy/day-30-pragmatism-and-perspectivism-75fb72072034
