This week, I have been continuing on with my research on forgiveness and regret. Last week, we took a look at the idea of whether forgiveness can ever be an obligatory act. Fricker pointed out that an insincere promise is still a promise to do something, but an insincere forgiveness is not forgiveness, and thus, forgiveness cannot be an obligatory act such as a promise. (Miranda Fricker, “How is Forgiveness Always a Gift?” 2022) However, why would one become compelled to forgive? Simply because someone is apologizing for something they regret. So with this being the case, how should an agent decide whether to regret an action, and thus find themselves compelled to apologize? That is the goal this week.
McQueen points out reason as a major factor as to whether an agent ought to regret anything. “I claim that one should not regret a past decision that one has made so long as it was justified in relation to the kind of person one was at the time of acting.” (Paddy McQueen, “When Should We Regret?” 2017) What this points out is that we cannot regret something we did because of the way it turned out, so long as we acted on our best judgment at the time. McQueen also points out when we can regret something: when we acted purposefully against our best judgment.
McQueen seems to make a better point about when we can regret something, namely, when we purposefully act against our best judgment. However, we generally speaking act according to at least some kind of judgment. For example, if I go on a date, as McQueen suggests in his paper, and decide, against my better judgment to drink as to have a good time with my date, then it is fair to say I will regret it appropriately in the morning when I am late for work and have a hangover. However, at the time, and all agents being rational beings, I surely acted on some kind of reason. In the case of the date, I acted on the premise that having a good time with my date might help secure future endeavors with said person, potentially, even, life-long endeavors. All of this is to say, generally speaking, people are acting according to judgment, and at the time of acting, all agents believe they are acting according to their best judgment. So while it is fair to say that we should regret when we know we acted against our best judgment, to say we can’t regret that which we did act on our best judgment leaves the response that 'I always act according to my best judgment at the time.' This means, according to this response to McQueen, the only things we can regret are those that we purposefully and intentionally act directly against our best reason at the time of acting. This happens far less than we actually assume, as rational agents always act on what they assume to be their best judgment. So, if an agent can’t regret much, then they really have very little to apologize for, ever.
David Klier runs Five Minute Philosophy where he posts content daily. He also operates as Praeceptor Magnus at Sapio Institute of Philosophy, a free guided self-study in philosophy.
