Serbia’s Ethnic Status Threats and Political Reality Checks
Why a Serbia on the cusp of EU membership is going against its economic interests in supporting the Russian Invasion of Ukraine?
When it comes to Serbia’s foreign policy, two competing sets of political and economic interests are at play: it’s European Union (EU) membership aspirations and its close ties to Russia. The EU offers an economic incentive and a path to stable financial growth. Even more so Serbia is very close to joining the EU compared to other Balkan states, opening 22 out of 35 chapters (standardized requirements) that are needed.
However, it seems that Serbian ethnic ties to Russia are deeply rooted and more powerful than any pull from the EU. Indeed, Serbia refuses to support sanctions or explicitly condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This prompts the question that policymakers are asking, why is a Serbia on the cusp of EU membership going against its economic interests and supporting Russia in its invasion of Ukraine?
Understanding the deep ethnic ties
Since the breakup of the former Soviet Republic of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, Serbia has been trying to find a position where it can benefit from the EU while maintaining its Russian relationships. Along with economic growth, the perks of being a European Union member are numerous. Strong international development, a large free market economy, and several wealthy trading partners are among the many incentives to join.
For the EU, there has been a relatively strong drive to sow western political ideals and democratic value in Serbia. The EU incentivizes Serbia to implement these democratic standards through economic advancement. While this EU strategy to weaken the Serbo-Russian relationship seemed to be working as Serbia continued to open EU Membership Chapters, the Russian invasion in Ukraine revealed how thick the Serbian support is.
Particularly their ethnic ties to their Slavic brothers and aspirations for a “greater Serbian” or greater Russian” nation. This notion follows the expansionist viewpoint in terms of the invasion of Ukraine but also Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina in the same light for Serbians. Serbians in turn have been supporting Russia in the Ukrainian war since the early conflict in Donbass and Donetsk regions in 2014.
This is because Russia offers Serbia legitimacy to its interests in territorial expansion in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Meaning, Serbia is placing a weak bet that Russia will be victorious in the invasion of Ukraine in order to validate forging ahead in these interests. Beyond these interests, Serbia identifies itself as a culturally and politically Russian-leaning country.
Similar to Russia, Serbia shared a deep loathing for the West and its values. When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014 and now in 2022, Serbia was one of the few countries in the world to openly support Moscow. This decision goes against Serbia’s own economic interests, as it is on the verge of joining the European Union (EU). Many Serbs saw it as an act of protection for their fellow Orthodox Christians and a defense against western aggression.
Why political competition and social status threat matter
Two complementary theories offer a possible explanation for Serbia’s counterintuitive behavior.The first theory comes from Benn Eifert and his colleagues at the University of California, Berkley, and Los Angeles. They argue that political competition makes ethnic identities salient and powerful tools for the mobilization of political support, coalition building, and many other initiatives.
Drawing from Eifert’s article: Political Competition and Ethnic Identification in Africa, when political competition is high, individuals are more likely to identify with their ethnic group. This is because they see their ethnic group as a way to gain political power. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has heightened Serbia’s Slavic identity. Thus, it has mobilized Serbia to support Russia by reinforcing the ancestorial myth of Slavic brotherhood.
As the article highlights “if ethnic identities are tools that people use to get access to political power, then they are likely to be rendered most salient when political power is at stake.” In Serbia’s context, their regional political legitimacy and power are at stake along with Russia, if Moscow’s invasion fails. This makes their ethnic ties to Russia more salient compared to potential economic gains with the EU.
In Serbia’s case, it is engaged in political competition with the European Union and the West for dominance in the Western Balkans region. This political competition comes in the form of international and regional negotiations, national and local elections, along with military exercises and religious appointments.
For example, the European Union and the United States of America are strong proponents of economically sustaining and defending Kosovo, an ethnic Albanian province that gained independence in 2008. Kosovo, or as many ethnic Albanians refer to its proper name; Dardania, was formerly under Serbian occupation for decades.
Following Kosovo’s independence, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) troops from the Kosovo Force (KFOR) were stationed in the country which borders Serbia to the south. The presence of western military forces acts as a psychological and political threat to the Slavic-Serbs while bolstering the position of their ethnic Albanian adversaries.
In this light, professor Diana C. Mutz offers us our second supporting theory. In short, Mutz analyzed the 2016 U.S. Presidential election and found that social status threat to white supremacy in America; not economic gain, is why many white voters favored Trump in the 2016 election. From Mutz, we can draw a similar correlation to Serbia supporting the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
With Slavic and ethnic Serbian status at stake, Serbians supported Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to reinforce their own perception of superior Serbian identity in the Western Balkans. In essence, they are willing to endure the economic backlash by the European Union to improve their ethnic status in the Balkans.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine also created a unique threat to the social status of its Slavic identity. This is because Russia is the sole great power that represents Serbia’s Slavic ethnic ties in the Balkans. This implies that if Russia were to fail in Ukraine, then it is a failure for south European Slavs that are ethnically tied to Russia and a major blow to their social status compared to other competing ethnic identities like the EU and U.S. leaning Albanians.
In this scenario, Serbia would undermine its ethnic identity and integrity by joining the EU. It would join a western leaning institution that is democratic, liberal, mostly non-Christian Orthodox, non-Slavic entity. In this sense, the hierarchical European Union would see Serbia and its Slavic roots at the very bottom of the EU nations compared to French, German, among other established ethnic identities and cultures.
With Russia, the Slavs are not strangers, but are treated as equal brothers. This core Slavic ethnic identity is embedded in its culture, political and religious institutions, and the very fabric of the Serbian nation. Therefore, Serbian Slavic identity has woven its ethnic identity to Russia for better or for worse.
The last line of defense?
There is a sense among some Serbs that they are “the last line of defense” against Western encroachment into Eastern Europe — an idea that resonates strongly with Russian president Vladimir Putin’s own narrative about protecting “traditional values” from a decadent West.
One of several manifestations of this is in public opinion. A recent poll conducted by the European Council on Foreign Relations showed that 54 per cent of Serbian citizens see Russia as an ally, and 95 per cent view it as either an ally or a necessary partner. In stark contrast to the overwhelming Serbian support of Russia, only 11 percent of Serbs consider the European Union as an ally despite being their largest trading partner and provider of financial assistance.
Due to Putin portraying himself as a defender of Serbian Orthodox Christian values, his rhetoric strikes a chord among some conservative Serbian nationalists for whom protectionism extends beyond borders into the culture.
Consequently, when faced with a choice between siding with Europe or siding with Russia, many Serbians saw no choice at all — they had to support their fellow Orthodox Christian brothers in arms. Even though it went against their economic interests, supporting Russian aggression was simply too strong an ethnic pull for most Serbians.
