2nd and 1: What Should be the Most Valuable Play in Football

Football is structured as a game where the offense’s objective is to move the ball ten yards at a time in a set number of downs. This option to “reset the chains” creates a very valuable opportunity for teams to ramp up/down the risk of their play calling, depending on how close they are to the first down marker. And yet, analyzing over 200,000 plays over the past 5 years, it appears that NFL coaches are not utilizing one of the most valuable options in football — the option to increase the risk and diversity in play calling when faced with 2nd and short.

Play calling, and the optimal level of risk in play calling, is not static as any offensive team moves through their downs. When faced with 3rd and 10, any offensive coordinator will optimally select a much different type of play to run than when faced with 3rd and 1. And, analyzing the play calling of all offensive teams since 2013 (214,272 plays in total), shows that the prevailing wisdom among coaches and offensive coordinators is that “the fewer the number of yards to go, the more risk-averse we must be in the play we run”.

This simple heuristic of play calling could hold as a valid strategy for most down/yard-to-go combinations, but certainly falls apart when considering one very valuable position on the field — when a team has 2+ downs to go a very short distance. Consider, for example, a team with a strong offense, facing 2nd and 1 on their opponent’s 40 yard line. They are down 7 and it’s the fourth quarter, so they know that they will be going for it should it come to 4th down. When faced with this situation the average play call in the data set will be to take the risk-averse move of running the ball in the hopes of picking up 2 to 3 yards to secure the first down.

Yet, this play neglects to take advantage of an ideal situation for an offensive coordinator to get creative and ramp up the risk. It is actually quite intuitive: you know you have two more plays after your 2nd down where you can play risk-averse football to pick up the first down. All you have done by rushing the ball on 2nd and short is pick up the first down and reset the chains to another 10 yards to go, while staying at nearly the same position on the field. You have squandered a very valuable opportunity to have two extra plays at no expense to your offense.

Coaches need to stop viewing 2nd and short as merely an easy opportunity to pick up the first down, and need to shift their view to the optionality that 10-yard markers afford. Defenses should be on edge when facing a 2nd and short opportunity, since the offense knows it is something close to a free play. The value of 2nd and short should be greatest the stronger the rush offense of the team (weaker the defense they are facing), since the offensive team can induce that they will have a higher likelihood of picking up the 1st down should it come to 3rd and short. The value should also be greatest when the ball is between the midfield and the opponent’s 30, since this is the part of the field where the offense is most likely to utilize all four downs. And, yet this does not unfold in the data — coaches seem to call equally risk-averse plays over all these situations and in fact appear to be playing more conservatively on 2nd and short than even 3rd and short, which doesn’t match any rational intuition at all.

Supporting Data: Play Selection by Down

First, investigating all plays partitioned by their down and distance to go, the table below highlights that 2nd and short has the most risk-averse play calling of all positions. 2nd and short has the highest percentage of rushing attempts, lowest average yards per play and the lowest standard deviation of yards per play. This even holds when comparing 2nd and short to 3rd and short — offenses pick up 0.26 fewer yards as compared to 3rd and short, and a whopping 11.85% greater chance of a rush (both differences are statistically significant at the 0.01 level).

This conservative play calling even holds when investigating the selection of rush v. pass attempts. Not only do teams disproportionately rush the ball on 2nd and short, they also show a lack of creativity (or risk taking) when they choose to actually throw the ball. On passing attempts on 2nd and short, teams tend to disproportionately (as compared to all other downs) throw short and to the side-lines (not risking down field passes or those in the middle). These are the exact opposite results one would like to see if teams were properly using the optionality of 2nd and short.

Play Selection Across Different Positions on the Field:

Offensive coordinators should take most advantage of a 2nd and short situation when they are in a position on the field where they are most likely to go for it on 4th down (aside from a field goal attempt). Most likely, this corresponds to being between midfield and the opponent’s 30-yard line. But, again, it appears that coaches are playing no differently in this area of the field than any other. Here, coaches are gaining only 4.8 yards per play on 2ndand short (less than or equal to the yards per play on their own side of the field), and are rushing the ball with the same frequency as well. And, bafflingly, teams are still playing more conservatively than their 3rd and short counterparts across all measures of play selection and volatility of yards per play (significant at the 0.01 level using an F-statistic). These data points are highlighted below.

Good Offenses v. Bad Defenses:

Finally, if coaches are to utilize the value of a 2nd and short opportunity, it should be most valuable to a team that has a strong offense and is facing a team with a weak rush defense (since the probability of picking up the 1st down in a 3rd and short is highest in this scenario). To empirically test this, I categorize each team’s offense and defense by total yards allowed/gained in a given year (partitioned by rush and pass). The top ten teams in the league per year in each respective category (total offense, rush offense, pass offense, total defense, rush defense, pass defense) are labeled ‘Good’ teams and the bottom ten teams in each respective category make up the ‘Bad’ teams.

For robustness, I investigate all forms of offensive strength v. defensive strength, but only include a few of the most interesting match-ups. Again, the results do not show that good offensive teams facing bad defensive teams are taking this 2nd and short opportunity to try unique and bold play calling. In contrast, we see a greater percentage of rushing attempts on 2nd and short, lower standard deviation of yards per play, and slightly more yards per play (though not significant at the 0.05 level, as compared to all other match-ups). Nothing in the following tables jumps out as significant evidence of the proper use of the 2nd and short option.

Conclusion:

Across key positions on the field and particular defense/offense match-ups, 2nd and short seems to be a wholly misused and squandered opportunity by offensive coordinators. Instead of viewing this unique situation as one where creative play calling can come into play, on average the down is treated merely as one where the offense opts to play entirely too conservatively with the single goal of picking up the first down by moving the ball just a few yards. This pervasive strategy neglects the beautiful value this particular down offers an offense, which is the freedom of a near costless play — especially if you are a strong offensive team.

Going forward, teams should investigate the value of 2nd and short even further. Although not mentioned in this writeup, there should be many other subtle situations where the value of 2nd and short should also be evident, including when offensive teams are down by more than three but less than seven in the 4th quarter. Finally, hopefully this work can be extended to challenge how wide receivers and running backs view first down markers. Traditionally, we tell each player to use every ounce of energy to reach the ball out and stretch for that first down marker. While that might be the best strategy in most cases, perhaps teaching them the value of a 2nd and short opportunity could make them think twice of straining for that extra yard if they have already picked up nine.