Walt, ISIS, And The Wages of “Socialization”
To be accepted into the community of nations, however, radical or revolutionary movements eventually have to abandon some (if not all) of their most ferocious practices. As Kenneth Waltz pointed out more than 30 years ago, eventually all radical states become “socialized into the system.” Over time, they learn that their grandiose ideological ambitions are not going to be realized and that uncompromising fidelity to their original revolutionary aims is costly, counterproductive, and maybe even threatening to their long-term survival. Within the movement, voices arise that call for compromise, or at least a more pragmatic approach to the outside world. Instead of “world revolution,” it becomes time to build “socialism in one country.” Instead of spreading the “Islamic Republic,” it becomes time to cut deals with both Great and Lesser Satans. The new state gradually adapts to prevailing international norms and practices, and it eventually moves from pariah to partner, especially when its interests start to coincide with those of other states. It may still be a troublesome presence in world politics, but it is no longer ostracized. If the Islamic State survives and consolidates, that is what I’d expect to happen to it as well.
But make no mistake: This process of “socialization” does not happen automatically. Radical states don’t learn that beastly behavior is costly unless other states join forces to impose the necessary penalties. If the Islamic State manages to cling to power, consolidate its position, and create a genuine de facto state in what was previously part of Iraq and Syria, then other states will need to work together to teach it the facts of life in the international system. And because the Islamic State is not in fact that powerful, preventing it from expanding or increasing its power and imposing costs for its abhorrent behavior should not be all that hard.
— Stephen Walt.
Kind of funny that Walt thinks that, given that he has repeatedly inveighed at length about the radicalism and irrationality and even “liberal imperialism” of the good ‘ol US of A. Walt’s America is an America that is not just radical, irrational, etc but one also strongly influenced by powerful domestic elements that systematically distort US foreign policy and prevent it from otherwise complying with the dictates of structural realism. But by the standards of Walt’s own quote, shouldn’t the process of “socialization” force the US into compliance with the norms of the international system? Shouldn’t it stop focusing on international revolution and dominance and abandon its quasi-religious belief in its own exceptionalism? Shouldn’t it stop taking risky and irrational actions due to its imprudent ideology?
By Walt’s own admission, some states are not socialized. They keep behaving in an manner contrary to the logic of the international system. They continue to be revolutionary. So how does Walt reconcile the gaping contradiction between his “chill out, ISIS will be socialized” and “America’s dangerous, aggressive revisisionism must be stopped” messages? Now, Walt may counter that it is a big leap to compare the United States and the Islamic State of Iraq (ISIS). After all, the United States is a superpower that has not been punished by other states for its behavior and has not yet learned that such behaviors are costly. So let’s take a look at some considerably less powerful players that ought to have been socialized for their dangerous behavior. Were they?
North Korea, Iran, and Russia surely have been punished repeatedly for said norm-flouting behavior, and continue to engage in it despite frequent and costly punishments as well as international isolation. For example, General Martin Dempsey recently noted the following:
US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Martin Dempsey visited Israel on Tuesday, when he said that sanction relief in the wake of a nuclear deal with Iran will lead to increased funding for the Islamic Republic’s proxies in the Middle East. “I think they will invest in their surrogates; I think they will invest in additional military capability.”
The same proxies that, as Middle Eastern expert Philip A. Smyth noted, have been so destabilizing to Middle East stability. And let us also wax lyrical about the tremendous effect that “socialization” has had on making North Korea comply with the putative norms of the international system, such as its continued aggression and provocation against its neighbors. Gee, such socialization! What a throughly socialized international actor! And what’s that you say? Russia pushing the limits of the international order?! It’s “anti-modern, conservative, and expansionist” and it advocates for a wholly different model it would like to spread?! Surely its neighbors will push back against it and show it the limits of its ability to flout the norms of all that is good and holy! Or not:
Publics of key member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) blame Russia for the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Many also see Russia as a military threat to other neighboring states. But few support sending arms to Ukraine. Moreover, at least half of Germans, French and Italians say their country should not use military force to defend a NATO ally if attacked by Russia.
Hmm…..so given all of this, what kind of odds do we put on Walt’s suggestion that this will occur?
Within the movement, voices arise that call for compromise, or at least a more pragmatic approach to the outside world. Instead of “world revolution,” it becomes time to build “socialism in one country.”
This is extremely dubious, to same the least. But let us assume, for the sake of argument, that this occurs. If a new book on al-Qaeda and the “Arabs in Afghanistan” is correct, such voices within the Afghan Taliban were nonetheless unable to prevent more radical authorities from launching the most devastating terrorist attack in American history on New York and the Pentagon. Indeed, a multiplicity of voices might actually be a bad thing!
Hamid and Farrall describe the process of change among the “Arab-Afghans”, whose introduction to transnational jihad came with the war against the Russians from 1979 to 1989. As other Arabs followed in their footsteps after 1989, the Arab-Afghan groups splintered, allowing the emergence of new schools of thought in which violence became more important than political strategy. This process was neither led by al Qaeda, as is often assumed, nor the natural outgrowth of Islamist militancy. Rather it was the result of competition among different groups of Arab volunteers in Afghanistan, of which al Qaeda was only one; the impatience of young men looking for a fight; the availability of funds; and the unintended consequences of outside events. This produced fighters whose worldview was forged in the rootless and fractured jihad that flourished in Afghanistan after the Soviet Union left and has since seeped into many countries in the Muslim world. With private funding from rich Gulf merchants, they were like soldiers-of-fortune, except they were seeking martyrdom not money. Their kind dominates Salafi jihadi movements today. The book therefore not only gives us a rare insight into the drivers of change, historically, but also helps illuminate the influences likely to be at work inside major threats today such as the Islamic State.
Walt also suggests that because the Islamic State is not that powerful, preventing its spread ought to not be that hard. This seems at variance with ISIS’ expansion, no? Moreover, it’s also not a statement that many counter-terrorism scholars who have actually studied ISIS would necessarily take for granted. It is possible to credibly believe that ISIS’ threat is overhyped without necessarily holding to the a priori assumption that ISIS and all groups like it are easy to contain and handle, as Walt and his fellow travelers do.
Finally, let us also dwell somewhat on the qualifier “eventually.” Even if Walt is completely correct that states converge to reason eventually, how long does it take? Ten years? Fifty? One hundred? One thousand? In the meantime, policymakers still have to deal with ISIS and similar groups as they are today.
Walt’s argument has enormous logical inconsistencies. States that engage in aggressive, revolutionary, and imprudent behavior are socialized into compliance with the system! Unless they are neoconservatives and liberal interventionists in the United States. If Walt’s argument is right, why worry and write columns issuing overwrought warnings about the dangers posed by US foreign policy? Surely the US will be socialized into the system!
Perhaps Walt knows, as per the examples of everything from Iran to the Taliban that were enumerated above, that this is too pat and simplistic of a story. Some states aren’t socialized. Some states decide to stubbornly continue to flout norms; some states refuse to give up ideologically driven dreams or are compelled by domestic dynamics into imprudent and counterproductive behaviors. And some states and movements, despite their weakness and pariah status, are difficult to contain and deter.
So perhaps its worth it to worry about ISIS, despite Walt’s optimistic predictions of “socialization.” If Walt disagrees, he ought to apply the same consistent reasoning about why I am wrong towards his own opinions about the United States and its foreign, security, and defense policies.
