Hello Hallyu!
Part II: Looking into the brand of the Hallyu ecosystem
Diplomacy is an important practice in international relations as it fosters countries’ relationships with each other. In the previous article, “K-Pop Diplomacy” was discussed whereby South Korea bolsters its rapport with other countries while promoting its culture at the same time. The surge of Hallyu has made South Korea feel that its relationship with different countries–western countries in particular– is mutual (Hong 2014). The article finished by noting that popular culture is produced by the private sector. Thus, this second part of the series will explore how the South Korean government has reached out to private companies in order to carry out their plans of exporting their culture. Moreover, this part is heavily influenced by the book “The Birth of The Korean Cool: How One Nation is Conquering the World through Pop Culture” by Euny Hong.
PART II: Consistency // Nation Branding
Surrounded by bigger players like China and Japan in the region, South Korea is considered a middle power. A middle power lacks “superpower capacity”; and in order to promote its reputation, they would have to pursue “niche diplomacy” to enjoy a comparative advantage (Spies 2016). With cultural diplomacy, there is always human connection no matter the circumstance. In this manner, there is consistent contact with the audience, making culture a strong strategy for diplomacy (Goff 2013). Therefore, South Korea has chosen to export its culture to make an impact.
Through Hallyu, South Korea is trying to assert itself in the world by making the audience consistently consume their culture through music, film, dramas, and even video games. The theory of constructivism can help us understand this approach. The theory explains that identities and norms are constructed; hence, a country can create a middle power image of itself based on their behavior (Spies 2016). To understand more about how South Korea has successfully developed the Hallyu ecosystem, we shall learn more about nation branding, which means how a government promotes their attractiveness in the world.
Nation branding, according to Gienow-Heicht (2018 p 265), is to set an image of a country and induce the world with a desire to experience that image. In other words, it is a country’s campaign to make its audience want to visit, invest, and cooperate with it. This explains why Hallyu is often mentioned when discussing concepts of “new economy” or “national brand” or even “national competitiveness” (Lee 2008). The cultural evolution that brought Hallyu can be traced back to South Korea’s political and economic development (Kim 2012).
After the Korean War, South Korea had managed to pull itself out of poverty and wanted to move on from its poor, war-torn image. In 1988, the Seoul Olympics was a good way for South Korea to showcase their economic development, especially in industrial production (Howard 2010). However, the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis posed another challenge as the country faced an obstacle in their economic development (Hong 2014). President Kim Dae Jung reached out to a PR firm to rebrand the country’s image (Hong 2014). As part of restructuring the economy, the South Korean government believed in six key technologies that would lead the country into the 21st century. In these technologies, the government would give their support through financial investments and administrative assistance. These technologies included, information technology, biotechnology, and cultural technology (technologies that produce dramas, film, pop music, computer games and animation) (Shim 2008). President Kim Dae Jung specifically wanted to push for information technology and popular culture as new ways to generate income, unite people, and create an export that would showcase Korean culture.
KOREAN DRAMA (K-Drama)
The South Korean government saw how the US’ shows popularity led to the spread of American culture. South Korea also had their own dramas; however, they were poorly produced, and the plots were recycled and idle. As one of their first efforts to revamp K-Dramas, in 1990, they enacted the Investment Broadcasting Law which required Korean networks to buy a percentage of their programs from independent production companies. This move was also to address the creative block that the in-house writers and producers were experiencing. The South Korean government is also in-charge of the funding for the translation (including dubbing and subtitling) of the dramas. Now they were ready for to be exported.
In order for the dramas to be picked up by the networks in Hong Kong, the South Korean consulate’s office contacted the Korean companies in Hong Kong to purchase ad time during the shows’ airtime. This effort bore positive results. Not long enough, the K-Drama fever spread to other countries. In the Philippines, Filipino viewers preferred originals to the remakes. In Taiwan, the government had to ask the network to reduce the airtime of K-Dramas. In the Middle East, viewers schedule their dinner in a way that their drama will not be interrupted. The South Korean government has also considered not airing the dramas during times of prayer.
The drama “Winter Sonata” won the hearts of many viewers around the world. This drama was popular in Iraq, Russia, Egypt, and Uzbekistan; more so in Japan where the show had for runs. The first three runs were dubbed, and the last run was subtitled as the fans wanted to enjoy the drama with a “genuine Korean feel” (Kim and Hyeon Gi in Shim 2008). Japanese women adored the leading man Bae Yoong-Joon because of his character who was strong, smart, and compassionate. He had soft features, yet he was manly. As an effect, tourism from Japan to South Korea rose by 40 per cent, and business ventures with a total worth of $2.3 billion was credited to Bae Yoong Joon.
Across the Pacific Ocean, K-Drama became big in South America too. In fact, in Paraguay, K-Dramas are dubbed in Spanish and Guarani to cater to the indigenous viewers.
In Cuba, the drama “Queen of Housewives” and its leading man, Yoon Sang Hyun, were so popular. When he visited Havana for a promotional tour, the airport was full of female fans who welcomed his arrival. Cuba and South Korea have no diplomatic ties with each other, nevertheless, there is a Korea Trade- Investment Promotion Agency office in Havana due to the popularity of the drama.
Recently, Netflix has reportedly acquired 41 K-Dramas to be streamed on its platform.
MOVIES
When it came to movies, more foreign films than local films were being shown in Korean theatres. During the 80’s local movies and foreign movies was 81–25. By 1988, it was 87–175, and in 1993, it was 63–347 (Korean Film Council in Shim 2008). Instead of banning them, South Korea wanted to step up its film industry. The Presidential Advisory Board on Science and Technology got some inspiration from the success of Jurassic Park and suggested to President Kim Young-Sam that South Korea could also push for media content as a “national strategic industry” (Shim 2008 p17, Hong 2014). In 1995, President Kim Young Sam issued a presidential decree enacting the Promotion of the Motion Pictures Industry Act. In this decree, movie theatres must show Korean films for at least 146 days. Otherwise, their license will be suspended. The government also gave financial support to filmmakers. There was a film council to allocate funds via a grant application system with a focus on alternative films (Hong 2014). Moreover, it gives tax incentives for film production and invites investments in the film industry (Shim 2008). There is also a cultural fund by the Korean Venture Investment Corporation to promote Korean popular culture. The funds exceed $1billion worth of government and private money.
One issue with exporting films was the language. “Many feel that the subtitle issue will prevent the film aspect of Hallyu from being strongly felt in the United States” (Hong 2014 p 155). Indeed, it was difficult to penetrate the US market. But in 2019, “Parasite” was the first movie not in the English language to win Best Picture at the Academy Awards in its 92-year history. The movie also won in the Golden Globes where Director Bong Joon Ho said in his speech that once audiences overcome the one-inch tall barrier of subtitles, they would be introduced to more amazing movies.
K-POP
Psy’s “Gangnam Style” was the first video to reach a billion views on Youtube. BTS scored three number one albums on the Billboard 200 chart within a year– the only act to achieve this since The Beatles. The group also went on a world stadium tour holding gigs from Seoul to Osaka to Wembley to Riyadh to Sao Paulo, and many more cities. How did K-Pop grow this big?
One reason is KCON or Korean Convention, which is a music festival that is held annually and in different parts of the world. Hong (2014) credits the success of KCON to shareholders who have invested in long-term goals. The Convention is organized by entertainment company CJ E&M and according to its chief operating officer, Angela Killoren, the KCONs in North America were in a breakeven stand despite having 50,000 fans attend the event. However, they were convinced that in the long run, KCON’s would help boost South Korea’s brand value (Kim 2016).
In a similar case, Choe Jun Ho used to be the director of the Korean Culture Center in Paris. In 2009, he founded the Korean Connection, a non-profit organization where he can gather French fans of Hallyu. Through Korean Connection, Choe discovered that the French fans wanted a K-pop concert. With this, he went to the Korean Ministry of Culture to discuss funding for the said concert saying that “if we do this concert in Paris, you will see Hallyu really take off in Europe.” The Ministry gave 250,000 euros. However, it was not enough budget for the project. Therefore, he proposed to SM Entertainment to sponsor a concert in Paris with their own artists. After a few discussions, the concert was given a go signal, and the tickets were sold out in 15 minutes. Some tickets were even being resold at ridiculously higher prices like 1,500 euros. And when the artists arrive at the airport, thousands of fans greeted them with the police commenting that it was the biggest crowd they witnessed at the airport. In Japan, K-Pop took off because recording companies produced songs in Japanese. No other country has exerted effort in entering the Japanese music market like South Korea (Hong 2014).
VIDEO GAMES
Another surprising branch of the Hallyu ecosystem is video games, which occupies a fourth of the gaming industry in the world. During the 1997 financial crisis, President Kim Dae Jung had a vision for South Korea to be the most technologically advanced country. In making this vision a reality, he increased venture capital for computer hardware and online networks. The president also provided tax incentives for software start-ups. Currently, Korean video game exports make 1200 percent more revenue than K-Pop. To demonstrate, in 2012, Korea’s popular culture export revenue was around $4.8B with $2.38B from video gaming alone (Hong 2014). Korean video games tend to focus on the plot more than the graphics. In this manner, one can have some kind of a “lived experience” of the stories through the games.
Despite the success and praises for Hallyu, the phenomenon is not without criticisms. In terms of Hallyu as an export, one of the senior researchers at the Korea Culture and Tourism Policy Institute, Chae Ji Young, said that the Korean wave was not due to the strategies made by the South Korean government nor the broadcasters. Instead, one might say that it was timing. The international market conditions were in favour of the exportation of Korean Dramas since they were cheaper than importing Japanese or Hong Kong Dramas (Shim 2008). In terms of Hallyu as a modern popular culture, Lee (2008) has noted that culturalists view Hallyu as a cultural construction that has evolved from a mixture of the Americanization of popular cultures and the surge of Japanese popular culture. Hence, progressive cultural critics have claimed that South Korean popular culture is placed under transnational pop culture. Shin (in Lee 2008 p 184) called South Korean popular culture “a regional variant of global pop culture… nothing uniquely Korean.” Yet Yi O-Ryong, former minister of culture and tourism, has considered Hallyu an example of a glocalization process that gives an improved and positive image of South Korea. A country with an evolved cultural identity from being invaded by neighboring countries to war-torn, to poverty stricken, to a major cultural exporter in Asia (Yoo et al in Lee 2008)
Due to Hallyu, South Korea’s GDP has increased. In 2005, South Korea earned 1.87 billion dollars in sectors that are related to cultural contents and activities: products, tourism, and film and television programs (Joong Ang Daily in Lee 2008). Korean dramas, movies, music, and video games “subtly and overtly promote Korean values, images, and tastes to their international audience” (Hong 2014 p 142). Millions of tourists fly to South Korea not just for vacation but also to visit shooting locations of film and dramas (Korea Times in Lee 2008). “The Korean government, the entertainment companies, IT companies, and even corporations that have nothing to do with entertainment know that they have to work together in order to pull off Hallyu world domination” (Hong 2014 p 109). In sum, Hallyu would have been difficult to export without the cooperation of private industries. Nevertheless, it must be noted that “a country’s soft power is sustained by enduring perceptions, but is susceptible to change — either in a positive or a negative way — in its effect in influencing diplomatic capacity (Lee 2011 p 140).” This is now the challenge that South Korea faces: the sustainability of Hallyu as a nation brand. In 2014, President Park Geun Hye created a new ministry which is initially called Ministry of Creation and Science where they would establish a creative economy ecosystem. South Korea is no longer a small country that can be easily taken advantage of by its neighboring countries. South Korea now knows how to pursue its national interest.
See you next on finale of this trilogy!
Special thanks to Wallea Eaglehawk for giving support and encouragement, and for editing
References
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Goff, P. (2013). Cultural Diplomacy. In The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy (pp. 324–336). Oxford University Press. DOI:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199588862.013.0024 2013
Hong, E. (2014). The birth of Korean cool: How one nation is conquering the world through pop culture. Picador.
Howard, K. (2010). Music across the DMZ. In Music and conflict (pp. 67–88). University of Illinois Press.
Kim, D. (2016, June 21). Korean Wave success rides on long-term outlook. koreatimes. https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/art/2019/11/688_207494.html
Lee, K. (2008). Mapping out the cultural politics of “the Korean Wave” in contemporary South Korea. In East Asian pop culture: Analysing the Korean Wave (pp. 175–190). Hong Kong University Press.
Shim, D. (2008). The growth of Korean cultural industries and the Korean wave. In East Asian pop culture: Analysing the Korean Wave (pp. 15–32). Hong Kong University Press.
Spies, Y. K. (2016). Middle Power Diplomacy. In The SAGE handbook of diplomacy (pp. 281–293). SAGE.
