The Silver Jubilee: Tracing India’s 25 year old relationship with Israel
By Shreyas Shende
In May 1949, as the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution granting membership to Israel in the UN, India’s Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru instructed the Indian delegation to vote against the resolution, saying — “India couldn’t recognise an Israel which had been achieved through the force of arms, not through negotiations”. Since then, the Indo-Israeli relationship has come a long way and is currently on an upward trajectory. The recent signing of an arms deal worth Rs. 17,000 crore will be accompanied by a visit to Israel by current Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the first such visit by an Indian prime minister. With 2017 marking 25 years of diplomatic ties between two nations, it is worth revisiting the ties between the two nations, and looking at the way ahead for India. This is a task worth undertaking not just to mark a significant year in Indo-Israel ties, but also to mark a relationship that has undergone vast changes in a relatively short period of time, and continues to strengthen in the face of a fast evolving new world order.
India’s foreign policy during its formative years was largely guided by Congress, which in large part relied on Nehru. As Shamir Hasan notes in Evolutoin of India’s Palestine Policy: A Fall from the Heights? in 1936, the All India Congress Committee stated that “the Committee deplores that in Palestine the Jews have relied on British armed forces to advent their claims and thus aligned themselves on the side of British Imperialism.” Fighting British Imperialism at home, the Palestinian cause was one that Nehru could identify with. As India was on its way to gaining independence, the situation in Palestine was deteriorating with the British government referring the issue to the UN. Once Israel had gained membership into the UN and was recognised by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, India had to have a definite stance on Israel, too. India chose to recognise Israel de facto.
India maintained its Nehruvian stance towards Israel, one defined by anti-colonial solidarity coupled with the official non-alignment policy, without much change till the end of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War also marked a change in India’s foreign policy, and India now had to function in a unipolar international order with America reigning supreme. In 1992, the Narsimha Rao government opened diplomatic relations with Israel and the subsequent BJP government sought to develop a strategic partnership with Israel. The year 2000 marked two high profile visits to Israel by then Home Minister L.K. Advani and then External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh. Following the BJP government, the two United Progressive Alliance regimes post 2003 developed on the Indo-Israel relationship; since 2000 Israeli defence sales to India have surpassed $ 10 billion. The recent arms deal, which will guarantee the deployment of Barak 8– air defence missile system– by 2023, is a continuation of the growing defence-based relationship between India and Israel.
Since the opening of diplomatic ties with India in 1992, Israel has worked hard to develop these links. It has done so in a number of ways– by cultivating relations with certain Indian states (notably, Gujarat under the leadership of then chief minister Modi, and more recently with Maharashtra). Further, it has established stronger economic ties, agricultural ties and most importantly, defence deals.
Modi’s trip to Israel this year will also serve a symbolic purpose, as Palestine won’t be present on his itinerary. India initially justified its recognition of Israel as a means to bring Israel and Palestine to the negotiation table, but over the years it has become clear that India doesn’t have the diplomatic clout to manoeuvre a solution between the two. Furthermore, in the new international order where American power is on the decline, India will have to work towards empowering its ties with states– or even entire regions– one-on-one instead of hoping to gain from globalised relations unconditionally.
Israel believed for the longest time that its relation with India was “held under the carpet” — India was happy to make arms deals with Israel as long as the relation was out of sight. India’s shift towards an increasingly public pro-Israel stance is merely an extension of Indian foreign policy towards Israel — a shift largely engineered by Israel. Furthermore, since New Delhi doesn’t have the political will, or the ability, to find a solution for the Israel-Palestine issue, it should continue to provide lip service to the Palestinian cause every once in a while (as it has been doing) while exploring more avenues to further benefit from its relation with Israel. India and Israel can continue to build on their work in the agricultural, water conservation and defense sectors without, as one scholar puts it, Israel feeling like India’s mistress — happy to engage with it intimately, but hesitant to acknowledge the relationship publicly.
