Bio-medical Ethics: Darwinian Evolutionary Theory and Morality
Moral systems are considered as systems of indirect reciprocity arising as results of the complexity of social interactions in groups of long-lived individuals and existing because of histories of conflicts of interest, indefinitely iterated social interactions, and confluences of interest (Alexander 4). This paper explores Darwin’s (1874) theory of the origin of the moral sense. Darwin posited that the roots of morality comprise in a set of pro-social instinct that have evolved in many social species. The view of Darwin is surprisingly radical and reductionist even by today’s standard, and he analyzed morality from the biological point of view. I argue that biological mechanism as described in the evolutionary theory alone cannot be used to analyze morality and that several different mechanisms may be responsible for the creation of moral standards and beliefs, in particular, mechanisms that bring about social schemata, moral systems, self-persuasion, heuristics, rational deliberation, and self-judgment; although these mechanisms may be conditioned by biological predisposition.
Everyone can appreciate what a sense of morality is. A mental phenomenon that consist of feelings and thoughts about good and bad character traits, rights and duties, motives and behaviors, and right and wrong is referred to as a sense of morality. According to traditional psychology theories, a sense of morality appears in infancy and changes as kids develop. In other words, a sense of morality is acquired the same way that most laypeople acquire essential skills –by internalizing social values (Bandura 58). Contrary to the psychological theories that postulated that a sense of morality is of ontogenetic origin, Darwin (58) focused on the evolution of human species. It was theorized by Darwin that a sense of morality stemmed from precursors possessed by other animals that became expanded and refined during the course of human evolution (67).
From his evolutionary point of view, Darwin argued that moral obligations originate from social instincts with difference to other instincts because they are ever present (71). However, this explanation is incomplete; choosing to gratify a transient personal need, which may leave a more enduring social need ungratified, may cause people to feel they have made the wrong choice. However, it does not necessarily induce these people to believe that their choice was immoral. The significant difference between feelings of moral obligations and feeling of obligation is that the former is related to shared standards of conduct about what are respected of members of groups that are reinforced by sanctions. In a nutshell, moral standards are formulated for cooperative solutions to what affect people’s welfare. Without gainsaying, there are great deals of evidence to support the submission that human beings are adapted to living social institutions of tribes or tribe to evoke strong commitment or sometimes fanatical commitment.
One of the important facts that Darwin did not consider in his theory of evolution is that genes are the primary unit of inheritance; he assumed that the process of natural selection was driven by the propagation of offspring and the survival of the fittest individuals. Though Herbert Spencer (1820–1923) grounded his theory of morality on biological in line with Darwin’s theory of evolution, he admitted that certain moral norms are beyond what can be determined biologically; these are jointly adopted by society and accepted by tradition (Ayala 11). There were some missing links in Spencer’s evolutionary theory; according to Abraham and Morgan (70), Spencer’s theory is undulated with fallacies. These fallacies included (1) his belief that organisms do not emphasize their free character, (2) that organisms are not dispersed, but consciously concentrated, and (3) that social parts do not focus upon the benefits of individuals. The impacts of cultural traditions and religious beliefs on morality are profound. People are evolved to feel a sense of belonging when supporting and contributing to the welfare of those with whom they have formed social bonds, and to feel shame and guilt whenever such social obligations are not met due to their failures. In the same vein, people are evolved to express gratitude when others contribute to their welfare, and when they are betrayed or violated, they feel moral outrage.
Morality is a product of cooperative, differential, decision-making strategies or altruistic (social instincts), that enabled early man to resolve their conflicts of interest in adaptive ways and to maximize their profits from social living (Krebs 149).The activation of the evolved mechanisms that induce people to behave in pro-social ways produce psychological states that people experience as awe, disgust, shame, righteous indignation, fear, love, empathy, sympathy, a sense of solidarity, forgiveness, gratitude, or loyalty (Krebs 157). According to some philosophers, morality is not biologically determined as postulated by Darwin and Spencer, but rather originates from religious beliefs or cultural traditions. Moreover, for the fact that moral codes are different from one culture to another; therefore, they are not biologically predetermined. Most of the moral codes or rules are predicated on cultural traditions and religious beliefs, with the thought about sets of norms, or moral codes that determine which actions to be considered to be evil or good.
Moral behavior is a biological characteristic of human beings because it is influenced by our high intelligence, a consequence of our biological make-up. It is evident that the moral norms through which we assess particular actions as either morally right or morally wrong are not products of biological evolution, but products of cultural evolution. Like other products of human culture, moral codes are consistent with the biological predispositions of animal species especially human species. However, moral norms are formulated without dependence on biological predisposition or necessity, because they lack any necessary biological consequences. That is to say biological welfare (e.g. survival and reproduction) is no way responsible in determining ethical norms in any given culture.
Conclusion
Undoubtedly, some of the ideas of Darwin have ostensibly outdated and have been faulted by recent findings; however, his basic ideas and overriding approach have constituted some of the most useful existing frameworks to understand the complexities of morality. It is crystal clear that the biological mechanism as described in the evolutionary theory alone cannot be used to analyze morality, and several different mechanisms are responsible. For instance, culturally relative norms evolve because of the difference in cultural experiences with different adaptive problems. It is because morality may evolve from cultural and social processes that may only have an indirect association with biological evolution. Moral Darwinism has no place longer as an essential premise in the evidential argument for the descent of human beings; however, it may be relevant in philosophical theories of evolutionary ethics or sociobiology.
Works Cited
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