I’m reading the Colombian Peace Accord, so you don’t have to (Part 2)

Overall, this is a tricky chapter. Some aspects are clearly necessary (e.g., better guarantees and security for the opposition). However, I think we should recognize the government opened a massive door for the FARC to expand its political franchise at little cost.

We continue our journey through the peace accords by looking at Chapter 2. I’d like to thank those folks who provided feedback, in particular those who mentioned that some of my questions around implementation have answers on Chapter 6. So, let me caveat my analysis by saying that I’m raising questions as we go along, and I’ll update my views as needed.

Chapter 2 deals with three critical questions that, let’s be honest, lay at the root of a lot of the issues around enfranchisement and political participation in Colombia:

1. How do you ensure that people with views different from those of the establishment can participate in politics safely? (a strained analogy in the U.S. context would be how can you ensure Bernie can agitate, and so can the alt-right without getting systematically assassinated).
2. How do you expand and strengthen mechanisms to ensure that all the major segments of society can become active participants in the political discourse?
3. How do you enfranchise rural voters who have, for a few decades at least, not seen effective presence of the state or the government in any meaningful way other than, say, military operations?

The first question is both vexing and crucial. If, like me, you spend most (or all) of your time in the comfy first world, I don’t think you’ll understand just how difficult it is to oppose establishment orthodoxy in Colombia. Obviously, the laws against killing are already in the books, but that hasn’t really worked. Labor and leftwing leaders get systematically killed, death threats are often issued against those who speak up, and the last time the FARC tried to demobilize 3,000 members of their political party were assassinated. (This is as good place as any for me to say that I believe that their outdated leftist ideology would be incredibly harmful to the country if implemented. I just don’t think we have to go around killing folks that we disagree with).

Chapter 2 addresses the first question with a pragmatic combination of escalation and relatively minor institutional changes (section 2.1). It calls for yet-another-law to establish guarantees for the opposition (mildly useful — if at all), and for an increase in minimum sentences for those who commit crimes against opposition leaders (also mildly useful-- if at all). The most interesting proposal here is the creation of a new government agency directly accountable to the President that will oversee all matters of opposition security, including protective details. Obviously, how this gets implemented will be key, but at least this will raise the profile of these issues. This section also calls specifically for protective details for FARC political leaders. I guess… Lastly, the Chapter also stipulates effectively similar mechanisms to protect NGO, labor, and human rights advocates. Again, makes sense.

Section 2.2 indirectly addresses the second question above, but it does so in ways that, depending on both execution and your degree of skepticism and paranoia will lead to fundamentally different assessment of what the chapter actually agrees. For starters, the government will set another kumbaya committee right after the accord gets signed to identify all the ways in which we can increase political participation (Section 2.2.1, pages 37–38). Sixty days after this committee gets formed, it’ll issue a set of recommendations that will, just as in chapter 1, lead to a new law. As I read it, a lot of the guarantees are common-sensical, but some are either silly (e.g., a “right of reply” when the government says something you don’t like) or can lead to abuses (e.g., treating violent protests in a “civilized” way. I mean, sure, but what do we mean by that?).

The first real issue comes with the creation of a number of community radio stations to promote peace, reconciliation, and inclusiveness, with a focus on FARC strongholds and operated by the local community (Section 2.2.3). I think this can quickly become a bedrock in the FARC’s electoral and political strategy. They better than most understand how to do community outreach, and, while the accord explicitly says the stations cannot engage in proselytism, I’m not sure you can enforce that. The most effective counteract to this threat is to ensure we have a competing alternative and neutral parties getting the radio stations up and running.

The remainder of Section 2.2. deals with the creation of yet another committee/council (The National Committee for Reconciliation and Coexistence — Section 2.2.3), and a number of vague proposals around education and outreach initiatives to foster a peaceful and inclusive environment. I’m naturally skeptical of these programs, and I find it hard to get worked up one way or the other.

The potentially key section here is 2.2.5, which calls for the establishment of independent citizen oversight and accountability offices to monitor the implementation of all aspects of the peace accord. If properly implemented, this will be the biggest safeguard against corruption, misspending, and, frankly, all the BS that the FARC may want to pull as we implement this agreement.

As a good meal, Chapter 2 saves the best for last with the most controversial and critical concessions in the last section.

As a good meal, Chapter 2 saves the best for last with the most controversial and critical concessions in the last section. First, the government has agreed to drop minimum voting requirements for political parties to keep their status (Section 2.3.1.1). A discussion of the hilariously large number of political and constitutional reform acts that Colombia has seen since 1991 is well beyond my scope, but suffice to say that one good outcome of this reform-palooza has been to minimize the number of one-person parties that don’t have institutional durability. A key mechanism to do this currently is the so-called umbral, which requires parties to obtain a minimum number of votes to keep their status as political parties. The agreement drops this and instead suggests alternative measures (e.g., number of members). I’m skeptical, but I can live with it.

The government has also committed to appointing a commission of experts (another commission, though this one seems to have reputable members) to review all electoral processes and laws and issue a set of recommended reforms within six months of its formation (Section 2.3.4). The government then commits to submitting those reforms to Congress. Only reason I don’t quite worry about this is the commission membership, but, make no mistake, this is a big concession.

This is big. The government has agreed to creating 16 new and temporary house districts to represent those communities that were heavily affected by the conflict — aka, FARC strongholds- for eight years (2018 and 2022 electoral cycles) (Section 2.3.6). Only locals and those displaced from the regions will vote in these districts, and they’ll vote also in the regular state elections for house representatives. The agreement also precludes existing political parties from postulating candidates and limits the eligible pool to those “members of the community.”

This is a big concession and can go wrong really quickly. The establishment parties won’t compete in these districts, and, while presumably the FARC’s official party can’t compete either, you can imagine they can quickly identify “community leaders” to run on their behalf. If you add the 16 seats to the five seats already allocated to the FARC (we’ll discuss this in a subsequent chapter), that means they can control 21 of the 187 seats during eight years (166 existing seats plus the 21 new ones). That’s 11% for the mathematically challenged. 11% is nowhere near enough to pass laws and make Colombia into a Castro-Chavist paradise, but it’s enough to influence policy and law-making.

Lastly, the government also committed to the creation of an government-funded TV station for political parties to broadcast their message (Section 2.3.8). Purely as a matter of conservative principle, I find those channels at best useless and distasteful, and at worst, a really pernicious tool for political proselytism.

Overall, this is a tricky chapter. Some aspects are clearly necessary (e.g., better guarantees and security for the opposition). However, I think we should recognize the government opened a massive door for the FARC to expand its political franchise at little cost. Not only that, but you could argue it effectively gives the FARC an outsized (and definitely undeserved) voice and influence in Congress.

How you much you get worked up about this comes down to how much value and meaning you assign to political institutions, and Congress in particular. Obviously, I think it’s outrageous that we are giving a ragtag bunch of has-beens the opening to control 10%+ of the house, but I also think the house is such an ineffective and discredited institution, that if the price we have to pay to get these folks out of the woods is a few congressional seats for two periods only, so be it.

More worrisome are all the new channels for political awareness and participation. If these channels end up becoming FARC mouthpieces, then I gather it would be possible for them to become a political force with influence that far outweighs their actual influence. The onus, then, is on us to prevent that from happening by out-organizing them and out-communicating them. Color me skeptical.