I’m reading the Colombian Peace Agreement, so you don’t have to (Part 3)

Well, that took a while. Chapter Three, “End of the Conflict,” lives up to its title and is long, dense, and incredibly detailed. Unlike the previous two Chapters, which deal with concessions and new initiatives, Chapter 3 is a masterpiece of logistics and operational planning. It provides the answer — or at least an answer — to the question of how to demobilize and disarm 10–15k FARC members. The devil here is in the details, and details does the Chapter provide. The agreement also includes a number of protocols and annexes around disarmament and verification. Bear with me as I go through my (longish) notes for the three sections of this chapter.

Section 3.1 (Demobilization and disarmament)

This section deals with disarmament and demobilization. The section goes into day-by-day details on how this process will work, starting with the government and the FARC’s disclosure of their respective positions, going all the way to full FARC disarmament 180 days following the joint announcement of the ceasefire (D-day). The basic mechanics are as follows:

• The government and the FARC will create a mechanism for monitoring and verifying compliance of demobilization and disarmament (MM&V). This “mechanism” (have to love peace accord language) has participation from the government, the FARC, and, critically, international observers under the UN umbrella (mostly from Latin American countries). The MM&V is tasked with ensuring compliance with the ceasefire, disarmament and demobilization. Crucially, the international members have ultimate authority in cases where the FARC and the government can’t agree, and the international members will oversee and execute the disarmament process.
• The government and the FARC have designated 23 Zonas Veredales Transitorias de Normalizacion (ZVTNs) where the FARC will concentrate its troops following the signing of the agreement. A vereda is a geographic unit that doesn’t translate well into English, but basically means a small village within a larger city’s limits.
• The FARC will mobilize all their troops to these ZVTNs within eight days of the signing of the agreement. The accord goes into all sorts of logistical details around ensuring safety and expediency in getting these movements done.
• While the ZVTNs are in place, the government will withdraw all armed forces from them (including police!) and will commit not to fly below 5,000 feet in these areas. There are a number of additional safeguards and technicalities (e.g., 1km buffer zone around these areas, staffing levels for the MM&V), but I think the gist of these ZVTNs is clear: Relatively limited geographic areas where the FARC will concentrate, under the oversight of the MM&V, while the disarmament takes place.
• The FARC will then stay in these ZVTNs for the duration of the disarmament period (180 days). During this period, the FARC can designate 60 members who can move freely across the country to aid with peace-related activities. Additionally, they can designate 10 members per ZVTN to move in their respective states for similar activities. FARC members who leave the ZVTNs will wear civilian clothing and not carry weapons.
• The international component of the MM&V will receive from the FARC an inventory of all weapons and munitions (including those hidden in outposts and deemed too dangerous to transport to the ZVTNS — e.g., decaying explosive materials). The international component of the MM&V will coordinate the destruction of all weapons other than those carried by FARC members within the first sixty days of the ceasefire (D+60). The FARC will hand in all light weapons (e.g., rifles, carbines, pistols) as follows: 30% at D+90 , 30% at D+120 and 40% at D+150. At that point (D+150), the FARC will have handed in all their weaponry, and it’ll now be in the hands of the international members of the MM&V. Note that as part of the MM&V, the government can call BS on the FARC if they believe the FARC has not delivered an accurate arms inventory. At D+180, the MM&V will have removed all arms and weaponry from the ZVTNs, and, assuming everything else went according to plan, the ZVTNs will cease to exist.

What really comes across in this section is how thoroughly negotiated and planned out this disarmament process will be. This is not surprising given the participation of two legendary generals in the overall negotiation (Generals Naranjo and Mora), and active generals as well as it related to this specific chapter. I’m not an expert in peace agreements, but I’ve studied and embarked upon my fair share of complex endeavors and projects, and this accord shows an extraordinary degree of project planning and management. The verification and monitoring scheme looks solid, especially as it’ll have the oversight of the UN (ultimately, that means the Security Council can get involved), and some clear milestones around deliverables.

Obviously, nothing prevents the FARC from not disclosing its armaments fully, and I expect them not to do so. However, I think we should expect the majority of the weapons and men to end up in the ZVTNs. Once there, the MM&V appears strong enough to get the job done.

Section 3.2 (Political Participation and reentering civil society)

The FARC will establish a new political party following the signing of the agreement, and will deliver the party’s internal charter and statutes to the relevant electoral authorities 60 days after the signing of the agreement.

The government will commit to funding the FARC’s new political party for 10 years by granting them 10% of all state funding for political parties (Section 3.2.1.1). This funding is incremental to the current funding levels for the existing political parties. Additionally, the government will grant the FARC the equivalent of 5% of all state funding for political parties to support the political and educational activities by the FARC’s new political party (this will only run for two years — until 2018). Lastly, the government will fund the establishment of a think tank, which will receive the same 5% equivalent funding for five years (Section 3.2.2.4).

Net/net, the party will get slightly less than 20% of all state funding for political parties to finance itself and related activities. I’m currently tracking down state funding numbers to understand how big a number this is. Regardless, it’s definitely way higher and more generous than it’d be if the FARC were to set up a political party under the existing regime.

As I previewed before, this section grants the FARC a minimum of five seats in the Senate and five seats in the House for the 2018 and 2022 electoral cycles. Based on my reading, these are inclusive, so that means that if the FARC — for some weird reason — manage to get five senators elected as part of the ordinary elections, they won’t get an additional five seats. However, if they get only two senators elected, then they get an additional three seats.

The FARC will also create a cooperative (ECOMUN — Section 3.2.2), financed by the government, to assist all FARC members in reentering civil society. As part of this process, the FARC will deliver a census of all its members, with an emphasis on women and children (3.2.2.4). The government will accept the census in good faith, but it will have the opportunity to provide feedback and comments, and the FARC and the government will then sit down to has out the differences. For those people who say there is no mechanism for the FARC to “return the kids home,” this is it.

Key: During the demobilization process, the government has agreed to:

• Section 3.2.2.6. Provide up to COP$8mm (~$2,700) for every FARC member that has a “viable” entrepreneurial project. The viability will be determined by a technical committee of the National Reconciliation Commission (made up of the usual FARC, government, experts mix).
• Section 3.2.2.7. Pay 90% of the monthly minimum wage (currently COP$689,454, ~$240) for 24 months to every FARC member until and unless they have a job. Note that this is currently the same mechanism in place for those leave the FARC voluntarily. Afterwards, the government will continue to provide a stipend to those FARC members who are continuing their education and reintegration process.
• Additionally, each FARC member will get COP$2mm (~$700) at the end of the ZVTN.

Section 3.4 — Security guarantees for FARC and for fighting and dismantling paramilitary organizations

The incredibly amount of detail and safeguards in this section indicate how much importance it has for the FARC. It covers security guarantees (including physical security) for the FARC leadership and membership, as well as escalation instances up to and including the President. It also covers a set of detailed (and relatively common-sensical) steps the government will take to address existing and emerging paramilitary organizations. If you think the FARC are being paranoid, you have to remember that the last time they launched a political party, the Union Patriotica, they were systematically assassinated by paramilitary and other forces.

Overall impressions

This chapter is a great Rorschach test on how most people will feel about the peace accords. In the abstract, offering the FARC five house seats and five senate seats, copious political funding, and a generous (though not outside the ordinary) economic stipend sounds ridiculous. It becomes more infuriating when you think about all the people, unemployed and innocent, who don’t get a salary for two years from the government. Or who don’t have a voice in government. If you are an Uribe supporter, you are probably livid about giving these folks all these political benefits while the government is seeking to extradite former Agriculture minister Andres Felipe Arias for some irregularities in signing some contracts. And the list goes on…

But that’s the whole point of a negotiation. I’ll save a final yes/no statement after I can look at the whole package of concessions, but so far nothing jumps at me as either too fundamental or too expensive. In principle, it’s outrageous and aggravating, but, again, in principle, we shouldn’t even be speaking with this awful and cold-blooded murderers. Yet here we are.

Given that we are in a negotiation, I think the chapter is rock solid. Clear and detailed protocols with specific milestones and commitment. Short timelines to avoid delays and minimize any funny business. International oversight with teeth. If you don’t trust the FARC at all, and you think the international oversight is not enough or credible, that’s reasonable. But then, as I’ve said time and time again, the question becomes — what do you propose short of unconditional surrender or a clear military superiority that further reduces the threat of FARC?