Science Advancing Diplomacy in the Middle East: When Political Positions Create Technical Problems
By Nizar Farsakh
In general, territorial disputes arise over contending conceptions of titles and rights. One party believes it has title over a territory or an asset and the other party believes it has the same or overlapping rights. While a large part of the dispute boils down to subjective opinion, there is always a distinct and objective set of facts that neither side can dispute. Moreover, those sets of facts are often the starting point for conflict resolution. This is where technical aspects of the conflict are distinguished from their political aspects — politicians ask the technical experts about the facts to strengthen their negotiating positions or to find technical solutions to political stalemates.
However, frequently enough, technical experts face the problem of dealing with political negotiations that are managed with inadequate or even erroneous information. That is, that the politicians are deliberating on an issue, thinking they are progressing, when in fact they are not — since the information they are basing that judgment on is incorrect. This was the case in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in 2007–2008.
Without going into too much background, the basic problem during this time period was that the two sides agreed to discuss land exchanges around the West Bank not realizing that they defined that area differently.[1] These separate and diverging definitions emanated from the two parties’ different perspectives on the territory. Therefore, the definitions themselves had political value that both parties held on to; see map of the area in Figure 1, below.
The Issue
During the negotiations that took place in 2007–2008, the Palestinian and Israeli teams where engaged in detailed discussions over potential land exchanges (commonly referred to as “land-swaps”) around the West Bank border. Land-swaps were an issue because Israel was interested in retaining certain areas of the West Bank. The Palestinian side was willing to negotiate a land exchange whereby any land that Israel desired to annex from the West Bank would be reciprocated with land of equal size and value from Israel. Talks went ahead with Israel specifying areas in the West Bank that it was interested in, and the Palestinians considered the Israeli proposals based on the size and value of land Israel was offering in return.
However, the talks moved into a discussion of the percentage of the West Bank Israel was interested in annexing. This would not have presented a problem had the two sides been talking about the same “West Bank.” For Israel’s definition of the West Bank area is not the same as the Palestinians’. The Israelis excluded three areas: the No Man’s Land in the Latrun Salient, the East Jerusalem municipal area, and the territorial waters of the Dead Sea (see Figure 2, below). This meant that when Israel said it was interested in keeping 10% of the West Bank it did not translate to 10% of the West Bank in the way the Palestinians defined it. It was, therefore, a classic case of comparing apples to oranges.
The political issue was that Israel, out of principle, did not consider any of these three areas as part of the West Bank, and the Palestinians — also out of principle — considered all three as being part and parcel of the West Bank. Therefore, neither side was willing to concede to the other’s definition, even for technical matters, because that would amount to a political concession. Such situations are not uncommon in territorial disputes. A party may not have an interest in acknowledging that there is a dispute because then it would be entertaining the possibility that the territory might not be entirely its own. It is a stronger negotiating position to say: “there is no dispute, the land is unequivocally mine.” Further complicating the issue was that sometimes the area of the West Bank was taken as land mass only, which would exclude the territorial waters of the Dead Sea, though the Dead Sea area was included in other instances. A final, and more common complication, was the fact that politicians were sometimes unclear on whether the percentages they referenced were the West Bank and Gaza Strip (as the total area of the putative Palestinian state) or just the West Bank. (Note: Israel never put forward requests for annexing land from the Gaza Strip). From a technical perspective, this presented a challenge.
A party may not have an interest in acknowledging that there is a dispute because then it would be entertaining the possibility that the territory might not be entirely its own.
The politicians were talking in percentages, each according to their definition, and then asking the technical experts to analyze their counterpart’s position and come up with counter-options. Without knowing exactly what the percentages were referring to, it was difficult to assess what was really meant in the deliberations. Senior level negotiations proceeded in such a way that details were not fully explored. The political counterparts would agree (or agree to disagree) on the broad points and leave the details to the technical people to iron out. It didn’t take long for the technical teams to realize we had a problem. The technical teams from both sides agreed that, regardless of politics, the politicians needed to make sure they were talking about the same thing or — at the very least — they should know where the other side is coming from when they are presenting percentages.
The technical teams recommended that politicians use the actual size of the areas being discussed instead of talking about percentages. Area sizes are absolute, not relative, and hence avoid the confusion that percentages presented especially when they are based on divergent definitions. This recommendation was not taken despite passionate pleas, and the talks continued to use percentages. Part of the reason for the dismissal was that the politicians found percentages more convenient and easier to visualize since they relate to proportions. The other reason was that the media and the public in general had already picked up on the percentages debates and was using them pervasively. It became part of the political vocabulary. Therefore, the technical teams had to do with the formidable inertia of that fait accompli.
The Solution
The solution was to find a way to translate each definition into the other. First, the West Bank and Gaza Strip were parceled out into their ‘constituent parts’ (i.e. the No Man’s Land in the Latrun Salient, East Jerusalem’s municipal area, the territorial waters of the Dead Sea, the ‘rest’ of the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip) and the area of each part was calculated separately. Then, a list was made to define the various combinations of parts used to refer to the “territory.” The sum total of the area of each of these definitions was calculated. Conversion tables were made to convert percentages into areas according to each definition and vice versa. Finally, a formula was written to calculate directly what a percentage in one definition would translate into in another definition. The following is one example:
Pal % = ((Isr % x Isr Definition) + Latrun NML + East Jerusalem + Dead Sea)/Pal Definition
Therefore, if the Israeli negotiators said they were interested in 10% of the territory and the Palestinian technical experts wanted to translate that into a percentage for the Palestinian negotiator, they would put it through this equation and come to the corresponding percentage. The technical experts could tell the political negotiators that the percentage the Israelis are demanding amounts to 14.05% of the West Bank the way the Palestinians define it. One can see that apples and oranges can be compared after all!
The solution was to find a way to translate each definition into the other.
Conclusion
This case shows how technical experts can play a part in averting political hurdles by applying their science in service of the political goal. Here, the Palestinian and Israeli technical experts managed to work around their political bosses’ preferences for using an erroneous method to discuss land-swaps in order — ironically — to help them ensure they communicate their negotiations positions accurately to their counterparts. While frustrated by that lack of understanding from their superiors, the technical experts managed to apply science in service of diplomacy.
Nizar Farsakh is a former member of the Palestinian negotiating team and adviser to senior Palestinian leadership from 2003 to 2008.
Endnote:
[1] For background material and perspectives on the peace process and the conflict in general the following reference websites are suggested:
Palestinian: https://www.nad.ps/en/our-position/borders
Israeli: http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook1/Pages/TABLE%20OF%20CONTENTS.aspx#VI
