The Week of March 28, 2021: On this Day in SCOTUS History
For the week of March 28 we will be reviewing Abigail Adams’ support for women’s rights, a product infringement case for a pencil, sin taxes on guns, the standard of review for juvenile delinquency cases, and the lifting of aggregate limits on campaign spending.
A note to my regular readers: The weekly history will now include a wider variety of practice areas. In addition to the landmark civil rights cases that regular appear on the SCOTUS historical calendar, I will also be pulling up Constitutional cases that arise out of criminal law, real property, intellectual property, and civil procedure among others.
1776, March 31
Abigail Adams on Women’s Rights
The strength, intelligence and progressiveness of Abigail Adams, the wife of founding father and President John Adams, is well-documented, especially since we have a library of 1,160 of her letters written to her husband as well as others. The couple often corresponded when John Adams was away. This happened to be true in 1776 when John Adams was in Philadelphia with the Continental Congress where they were debating a declaration of independence.
It did not escape Abigail’s notice that women were excluded from these debates. In fact, the idea of women’s rights was so foreign in 1776 that it would more likely elicit amusement than alarm. Yet, Abigail was not typical of her time. In a letter dated March 31, Abigail complained that’s John’s letters were not long enough, asked for details regarding the political state of affairs in the country, and then turned her attention as follows:
“I long to hear that you have declared an independancy and … I desire you would Remember the Ladies, and be more generous and favourable to them than your ancestors. Do not put such unlimited power into the hands of the Husbands. Remember all Men would be tyrants if they could. If perticuliar care and attention is not paid to the Laidies we are determined to foment a Rebelion, and will not hold ourselves bound by any Laws in which we have no voice, or Representation.”
It would be another 44 years before women were given the right to vote in the United States.
The full text of the letter is available here: https://history.hanover.edu/courses/excerpts/165adams-rtl.html
Historical reference for this entry: Edith B. Gelles, Abigail & John: Portrait of a Marriage Chapter 4 (HarperCollins Publisher Inc., 2009).
1858, March 30
Hyman L. Lipman Patents a Pencil with an Eraser
Reckendorfer v. Faber 92 U.S. 347 (1875)
In 1858, Hyman L. Lipman, of Philadelphia, received patent no. 19,783 for a pencil with an eraser at the end. This patent did, surprisingly find its way to the Supreme Court.
In 1862 Lipman sold his patent to Joseph Rechendorfer for $100,000. Rechendorfer, an inventor himself, made improvements to the design, patent no. 36,854. Several years later, Rechendorfer sued Faber Castell for patent infringement. In 1875, the Supreme Court ruled against Reckendorfer.
“The combination [of a pencil and eraser], to be patentable, must produce a different force or effect or result in the combined forces or processes from that given by their separate parts. There must be a new result produced by their union; if not so, it is only an aggregation of separate elements.”
Examples provided by Court included the combination of sulphur and india-rubber, a mill that automatically advances the log and saws it, a sewing machine where one part advances the cloth and another sews the stitches.
“In the case we are considering, the parts claimed to make a combination are distinct and disconnected. Not only is there no new result, but no joint operation. When the lead is used, it performs the same operation and in the same manner as it would do if there were no rubber at the other end of the pencil; when the rubber is used, it is in the same manner and performs the same duty as if the lead were not in the same pencil…. It may be more convenient to have the two instruments on one rod than on two. There may be a security against the absence of the tools of an artist or mechanic from the fact that the greater the number, the greater the danger of loss. It may be more convenient to turn over the different ends of the same stick than to lay down one stick and take up another. This, however, is not invention within the patent law, as the authorities cited fully show. There is no relation between the instruments in the performance of their several functions, and no reciprocal action, no parts used in common.”
In other words, the whole was not greater than the sum of its parts, so the patent was denied.
1937, March 29
A Failed Challenge to the Tax on Firearms
Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937)
Issue: The question in this case was whether Section 2 of the National Firearms Act of June 26, 1934, which imposes a $200 annual license tax on dealers in firearms, is a constitutional exercise of the legislative power of Congress.
Rule: Section 2 of the National Firearms Act required every dealer in firearms to register with the Collector of Internal Revenue in the district where he carries on business, and to pay a special excise tax of $220 a year. The act includes other taxes and regulations as well which are not challenged.
Petitioner Argument: Petitioner claims the levy is not a true tax, but a penalty imposed for the purpose of suppressing traffic in a certain noxious type of firearms.
Analysis:
- “In the exercise of its constitutional power to lay taxes, Congress may select the subjects of taxation, choosing some and omitting others.”
- “Every tax is in some measure regulatory. To some extent, it interposes an economic impediment to the activity taxed, as compared with others not taxed. But a tax is not any the less a tax because it has a regulatory effect.”
- “[I]nquiry into the hidden motives which may move Congress to exercise a power constitutionally conferred upon it is beyond the competency of courts.”
- “We are not free to speculate as to the motives which moved Congress to impose it, or as to the extent to which it may operate to restrict the activities taxed. As it is not attended by an offensive regulation, and since it operates as a tax, it is within the national taxing power.”
Holding: Petition denied.
1970, March 31
Is a Juvenile Delinquent Entitled to a “Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt” Standard?
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
This is one in a line of landmark juvenile justice cases.
Facts: A 12-year-old boy allegedly entered a locker and stole $112 from a woman’s pocketbook, an act which, if done as an adult, would constitute the crime of larceny. The New York Family Court Act allowed that, in the case of a juvenile delinquent, any determination must be based on a preponderance of the evidence. The child defendant was subsequently placed in a training school for 18 months, subject to extensions which could last until his 18th birthday.
Issue: Whether a criminal charge against a juvenile should be held to the same standard as for an adult which is “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” as opposed to “the preponderance of the evidence.”
Rule:
- “Expressions in many opinions of this Court indicate that it has long been assumed that proof of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required.”
- The New York Family Court Act defines a juvenile delinquent as “a person over seven and less than sixteen years of age who does any act which, if done by an adult, would constitute a crime.” A person classified as a juvenile delinquent for misconduct may be committed to a state institution.
Analysis:
New York argued that a delinquency adjudication is not a conviction, that it affects no right or privilege, including the right to hold public office or to obtain a license and a cloak of protective confidentiality is thrown around all the proceedings. “The delinquency status is not made a crime, and the proceedings are not criminal. There is, hence, no deprivation of due process in the statutory provision [challenged by appellant]. . . .”
The Court felt differently:
- “The requirement that guilt of a criminal charge be established beyond a reasonable doubt dates at least from our early years as a Nation.”
- The Court indicated that they had already expressly rejected the distinction between adult crime and the “civil label of convenience” assigned to juvenile proceedings.
- The court likewise had rejected the argument that juvenile proceedings are designed “not to punish but to save,” noting that “[a] proceeding where the issue is whether the child will be found to be ‘delinquent’ and subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution.”
Held (Opinion by Justice Brennan): Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, which is required by the Due Process Clause in criminal trials, is among the “essentials of due process and fair treatment” required during the adjudicatory stage when a juvenile is charged with an act that would constitute a crime if committed by an adult.
2014, April 2
Court Declares Limits on Contributions to Federal Election Campaigns Unconstitutional.
McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 572 U.S. 185 (2014)
Facts:
Section 441 of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) imposed two types of limits on campaign contributions: Base Limits, which restricts ow much money a donor may contribute to a particular candidate or committee, and Aggregate Limits which restricts how much money a donor may contribute in total to all candidates or committees over a two-year period.
Shaun McCutcheon, a business man who also served for the Republican party in Alabama. In his law suit he did not challenge the Base Limits, but, rather, challenged the Aggregate Limits set out in the law. In other words, he wasn’t asking to give more to any particular candidate but, rather, to give to more candidates in total, thus raising his aggregate above the statutory limit. His claim was that the law violated his First Amendment free speech rights.
Rule:
“The right to participate in democracy through political contributions is protected by the First Amendment, but that right is not absolute. Our cases have held that Congress may regulate campaign contributions to protect against corruption or the appearance of corruption. At the same time, we have made clear that Congress may not regulate contributions simply to reduce the amount of money in politics, or to restrict the political participation of some in order to enhance the relative influence of others.”
Campaign finance restrictions are permissible if targeted at financial quid pro quo (money in exchange for political favors), but any other kind of restriction is not permissible because it “injects the Government into the debate over who should govern.”
Court’s Analysis:
I will quote extensively from the Opinion here. The bottom line though is that money is speech and speech cannot be restricted without a legitimate purpose which is narrowly defined in this case as corruption or the appearance of corruption.
“Those First Amendment rights are important regardless whether the individual is, on the one hand, a lone pamphleteer or street corner orator in the Tom Paine mold, or is, on the other, someone who spends substantial amounts of money in order to communicate his political ideas through sophisticated means. Either way, he is participating in an electoral debate that we have recognized is integral to the operation of the system of government established by our Constitution.”
“[T]he degree to which speech is protected cannot turn on a legislative or judicial determination that particular speech is useful to the democratic process. The First Amendment does not contemplate such ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits. What the Constitution says is that value judgments are for the individual to make, not for the Government to decree, even with the mandate or approval of a majority.”
“[W]e do not doubt the compelling nature of the “collective” interest in preventing corruption in the electoral process. But we permit Congress to pursue that interest only so long as it does not unnecessarily infringe an individual’s right to freedom of speech; we do not truncate this tailoring test at the outset.”
“This Court has identified only one legitimate governmental interest for restricting campaign finances: preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption. We have consistently rejected attempts to suppress campaign speech based on other legislative objectives. No matter how desirable it may seem, it is not an acceptable governmental objective to “level the playing field,” or to “level electoral opportunities,” or to “equalize the financial resources of candidates.” The First Amendment prohibits such legislative attempts to “fine-tune” the electoral process, no matter how well intentioned.”
“Spending large sums of money in connection with elections, but not in connection with an effort to control the exercise of an officeholder’s official duties, does not give rise to such quid pro quo corruption. Nor does the possibility that an individual who spends large sums may garner “influence over or access to” elected officials or political parties. And because the Government’s interest in preventing the appearance of corruption is equally confined to the appearance of quid pro quo corruption, the Government may not seek to limit the appearance of mere influence or access.”
“[The] fear that an individual might contribute massive amounts of money to a particular candidate through the use of unearmarked contributions” to entities likely to support the candidate is far too speculative. And — importantly — we have never accepted mere conjecture as adequate to carry a First Amendment burden.”
“As an initial matter, there is not the same risk of quid pro quo corruption or its appearance when money flows through independent actors to a candidate, as when a donor contributes to a candidate directly. When an individual contributes to a candidate, a party committee, or a PAC, the individual must by law cede control over the funds.”
My Thoughts:
I have embedded two videos here, and I am super grateful to have found them because it saves me from having to parse out all the obfuscations and misconceptions laid out in the opinion. (I save my deep analysis for my articles on current Supreme Court holdings, not for the “On This Day” items.)
The first video, courtesy of Alexis Goldstein at the Other98 on YouTube, was release in 2013, six months before the Court’s decision was issued. The second video, courtesy of “Monsieur” at RepresentUs, was released the day after the ruling in 2014. Both videos do an excellent job of laying out the underlying problems with this case, and saves me the trouble of having to get pissed off all over again.
Alexis Goldstein’s writing, by the way, regularly appears on Medium. Check her out!
MAHALO MUCHO!!!
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