Degrees of Sexism in Aristotle
Devin M. Henry’s program in his chapter “How Sexist Is Aristotle’s Developmental Biology?” is to discuss the sexist nature of Aristotle’s Generation of Animals. Funnily enough, his method is similar to that of many philosophers and theologians of antiquity in that he first systematically invalidates widely accepted notions and only then proceeds to offer his own.
Henry at first states that Generation of Animals is irrefutably sexist and that Aristotle makes this at once clear by equating the relationship of husband and wife to that of a master and slave (with the woman — obviously — designated as the subordinated and oppressed entity). However, he believes that the ways and extent to which the text is sexist have been misunderstood and misrepresented.
The bulk of Henry’s argument centers around the section GA IV.3, 768a21–8 wherein Aristotle discusses the outcome of reproduction. Henry asserts that scholars have historically interpreted it as Aristotle saying that “the ideal outcome of reproduction is a male who resembles his father in every respect” (Henry, 258). In other words, males are ideal and perfect in every way, so an offspring which resembles that (ie one which is sexed as male) is best. Anything that strays from this — such as a female — would thus be a deviation and an undesirable defect. Put bluntly: males are perfection incarnate and females are imitative failures (according to scholars, according to Henry).
However, Henry does not agree with this interpretation. He agrees that, yes, there is a gender bias at play, but this is not it. He says that it is not the male itself which Aristotle designates as perfect or ideal, but is instead the continual line of male sexed children. By this token, the birth of a female is not problematic in that it is a failure to create an “ideal specimen”, but is rather an undesirable point of lineal discontinuity (260). Henry spends a great deal of time both reiterating that this is indeed sexist and that it also is a novel and original thought of his own. His preoccupation with situating his interpretation in Aristotle’s work becomes even more apparent in his closing section. In it he discusses the ancient philosopher’s division of animals which Henry interprets as being the main source of proof of gender bias. Henry says the bias is made apparent because Aristotle’s main explanation for a division of sexes in the animal kingdom is simply that it is “better” this way (263). Aristotle offers no philosophical backing or empirical derivations, which Henry says is proof for an internalized frame of sexist thinking which must have inevitably permeated his other writings and ideas.
Though Henry presents a probing piece, and offers some interesting takes on what could be seen as almost trite material, his argument seem ultimately problematic. Rather than delve deeper into the implications of Aristotle’s sexist treatise, he engages in a sort of oppression olympics. The fact that Aristotle was writing both from and with a sexist framework should have been a minor point of already agreed upon background — not the entire focal point. It leaves one with the feeling that Henry’s main goal was not just to offer an innovative and groundbreaking study into Aristotle, but was more aimed at delegitimizing previous schools of thought so as to situate himself and his theory as ultimately authoritative about the ancient material.
