Rules of Engagement: The Civilian and the Reservist

By Harry Creber

Rules of Engagement: The Civilian and the Reservist

“It is entirely seemly for a young man killed in battle to lie mangled by the bronze spear. In his death all things appear fair. But when dogs shame the grey head and grey chin and nakedness of an old man killed, it is the most piteous thing that happens among wretched mortals.” — Homer, The Iliad

A war of liberation, a people’s war, asymmetric warfare, guerilla warfare, resistance, rebellion, insurgency, terrorism — these are all terms bandied about when discussing what in many cases amount to the same thing. The cause of this discrepancy is not so much a case of doctrine and military science, but rather into which side or category one falls in relation with the violence.

On the 6th of April 2022, the Twitter profile of Metras Global, a media platform committed to covering Palestine and Palestinian liberation, produced a series of infographics titled The Myth of “Israeli Civilians”. In the wake of Operation Al-Aqsa Flood on the 7th of October 2023, these infographics were reposted to the Metras Global Instagram account and shared between users via stories. This was further reposted by other Palestinian activists and international media organisations following the Israeli declaration of war on the 8th of October 2023.

Metras Global’s infographic posts argued that Israel was founded upon militaristic ideals, and that the existence of Israel is inherently military through denial of the indigenous Palestinians’ right to self-determination and military occupation of their homeland. This is further explained through an analysis of Israeli policies of mandatory military service, an extensive army reserves programme and rising rates of gun ownership among Israeli citizens. Metras Global posits that Israeli citizens, who likely have some form of military training and may own firearms, are a threat to Palestinians and therefore cannot be properly considered civilian non-combatants.

The old cliché that “one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom-fighter” is difficult to escape when discussing any kind of armed resistance. Perhaps the most horrific effect of wars of resistance is the blurring between civilian and combatant and the deaths this leads to. NATO and the Israeli government maintain that Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups hide in densely populated civilian areas, with the further argument that this constitutes using those civilians as “human shields”. This is used to explain relatively high rates of civilian casualties caused by Israeli strikes, or “collateral damage” — supposedly unintended deaths through imprecise fire. Whether or not that argument is true, this nevertheless means that a certain degree of civilian casualties is completely acceptable in the eyes of the Israeli military.

Who do the Israeli military target through the denial of water, electricity and humanitarian aid to Gaza? Are those harmed by this decision truly combatants? When hospitals, schools and places of worship are bombed — are these civilian deaths “acceptable”? The collective punishment of the entire Gazan population through this denial of basic utilities and indiscriminate bombing is impossible to justify in the face of international law.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) holds jurisdiction over international war crimes, in accordance with the laws of the 1949 Geneva Conventions signed and ratified by all United Nations member states. Palestine is a member state and participant in the ICC, whilst Israel, China, the United States and Russia do not recognise the court’s authority and refuse to formally engage with it. Particularly important legal definitions under International Humanitarian Law (IHL) with regards to civilians and combatants can be found in Chapter 1 of Customary International Humanitarian Law.

Chapter 1. Distinction between Civilians and Combatants

• Rule 1. The parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants. Attacks may only be directed against combatants. Attacks must not be directed against civilians.
• Rule 2. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.
• Rule 3. All members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict are combatants, except medical and religious personnel.
• Rule 4. The armed forces of a party to the conflict consist of all organized armed forces, groups and units which are under a command responsible to that party for the conduct of its subordinates.
• Rule 5. Civilians are persons who are not members of the armed forces. The civilian population comprises all persons who are civilians.
• Rule 6. Civilians are protected against attack, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.

In the face of all of this, how does International Humanitarian Law navigate the violence between Israel and Palestine? When this principal distinction between civilians and combatants breaks down — whose deaths get to be senseless tragedies or “valid” targets?

When examined through the lens of Metras Global’s posts, it would appear that Israeli citizens, who may not be full-time military personnel but continue to hold reservist status, could be considered combatants if they are found to be taking “a direct part in hostilities”. Israeli citizens who possess firearms through private ownership and open fire on Palestinians may also be taking “a direct part in hostilities”.

Israel’s policy of widespread mandatory military service for both genders, with some exceptions for particular religious and ethnic minority groups, means that much of Israel’s population possess some degree of military training. When conscripts’ active service periods end, they are placed into the category of “reservists”. Reservists are nominally civilians who may live and work as ordinary civilians, but can be called up for service in the military.

On the 12th of October 2023, Reuters reported that the Israeli military had recalled 360,000 reservists to active duty. Those 360,000 who answer the call to rejoin active military duty are now, legally, combatants — but can they really be considered combatants fully participating in hostilities before rejoining active service? In July earlier this year, many reservists vowed to disobey calls to rejoin service in the wake of controversial judicial reforms proposed by the Netanyahu government. Are those who have previously completed their mandatory military service, but now refuse to return to service, still active combatants?

The questions here heavily involve the nature of mandatory military service. Many countries now possess volunteer-only militaries, meaning those who take up arms do so willingly, but many of those countries also maintain draft registries. This allows them to order citizens to join the military in the event of war or national emergency. The United States refers to this as “selective service”, and registration is mandatory for working in the federal sector or immigrants seeking to become citizens.

The important element is this: in countries with policies of mandatory military service, it is impossible to assume that all members of a country’s armed forces (active or reservist) share the same convictions and beliefs about how just or unjust their cause is. Mandatory military service and conscription are, by their nature, coercive. Israeli citizens who refuse to serve in the military (nicknamed “refuseniks”) are often targets of public shaming, prison sentences and other potential reprisals such as being fired from their civilian jobs. Reservists who have also refused to return to service in protest against Israeli treatment of occupied Palestinian territories have also been subject to legal repercussions.

As severe as any of these repercussions might be to those who refuse to serve in the military, they are incomparable to the collective punishment imposed by that same military on the population of Gaza. Termination of a contract is astronomically divided from the senseless mass-termination of human life. It would be unreasonably callous to suggest that the suffering endured by imprisoned conscientious objectors is in any way similar to that of entire families killed by Israeli bombings.

International law and conduct surrounding war assumes that use of force be proportional. There is nothing proportional about the collective punishment routinely imposed by Israel on Palestine — whether now, or in 2007, or in any decade prior. One belligerent holds complete jurisdiction over whether the other continues to have access to food, water and electricity. One belligerent receives multiple billions of dollars in international military aid, while the other is denied the human right to exist. To some extent, can this even be truthfully described as war?

Whether or not it was the intent of its planners, Operation Al-Aqsa Flood targeted a mixture of civilians and military personnel. Civilians, both Israelis and multinationals, were killed by direct and indirect fire from militants. Operation Al-Aqsa Flood was not an act of violence committed in isolation, and cannot reasonably be analysed without full understanding of the protracted violence committed by the Israeli state upon indigenous Palestinians since 1948. Acts of violent resistance do not happen for no reason — but this is not the same as justification for targeting innocent civilians. By International Humanitarian Law — these are war crimes — but so is the response of the Israeli military and government’s besieging of Gaza and withholding of basic human necessities from 2.2 million people.

The argument presented by Metras Global that Israel “was founded on strict military ideals”, a “settler colonial occupation…fuelled by a collective existential fear” is entirely valid when one examines Israeli policies of mandatory military service and the shunning of conscientious objectors. These could be considered features of a “military society” that relies on intimidation. However, the argument of “once a soldier, always a soldier” sets a concerning and dangerous precedent for justifying the murder of people who are, in legal terms, civilians. This does not discount nor forgive the crimes committed by the Israeli military — but even those complicit in the violence against Palestinians may themselves be victims of a coercive military system through conscription.