Iranian Disinformation Efforts: Lackluster and Disadvantaged

In 2019, government agencies identified Iran — along with Russia and China — as a major threat actor who would seek to interfere in the upcoming national elections. Our team set out to find Iranian disinformation efforts targeting U.S. citizens and institutions in advance of the 2020 elections in hopes of shedding light on their methods and motives. However, our research found a surprising lack of Iranian disinformation efforts related to the U.S. election. It also uncovered a pattern of ineffective Iranian disinformation operations. For more details of Iranian disinformation efforts, read the complete report below:

Executive Summary

The lack of concealment and lack of proper amplification of Iranian disinformation content have highlighted that while Iran has been a persistent actor, its disinformation efforts may be less likely to pose an immediate threat to the United States as compared to the disinformation efforts from either China or Russia. Iranian disinformation efforts have focused on advancing the Iranian Government’s geopolitical interests and elevating the image of Iran as the leader of the Muslim world. These efforts have been done primarily through state-sponsored media outlets and online proxies. Unlike Russian disinformation efforts, Iranian disinformation has not attempted to hide its connections to Iran. It has also been more direct and less nuanced than Russian disinformation, thus making it easier to identify through open-source methods. Social media companies have also been notably successful in their efforts to take down Iranian content and have been able to significantly disrupt Iranian amplification abilities and efforts.

Iranian Disinformation

Initial research for this report sought to uncover Iranian disinformation in advance of, and related, to the 2020 US elections. The research found a significant lack of Iranian disinformation efforts from January 2020 to July 2020 related to the US elections when compared to the amount of disinformation efforts coming from Russia or China. The broader information picture that came together via this research showed that Iranian disinformation efforts have been lacking the nuance, depth, and complexity of Russian disinformation efforts.

Nearly all disinformation content spread by Iranian actors has revolved around the Iranian Government’s specific, and usually publicly- declared, foreign policy objectives. These objectives have focused on solidifying Iran’s sphere of influence and elevating the country as the de facto leader of the Muslim world. These efforts have been closer to public diplomacy than traditional disinformation. Iran has been broadcasting a consistent message to many different audiences globally in order to combat its image as an international pariah.

Iranian disinformation has differed from Russian disinformation in five major ways:

· While Iranian and Russian disinformation both have attempted to exploit racial and social divides in the United States, Iranian social media activity has stood on a singular side of an issue as opposed to the Russian approach that has sought to infiltrate or influence multiple sides.

· Iran has had fewer resources than Russian state-sponsored outlets and, as a result, has not published the same quantity of content.

· Iran historically has had less reach into US audiences.

· Iranian messaging has been far more direct and less nuanced. Therefore, it has been easier to identify its state-related origins compared to Russian disinformation.

· Iranian content has generally focused more on specific foreign policy objectives rather than support or disdain for a specific individual. A notable exception has been its critical coverage of President Trump.

The Iranian Government’s online disinformation operations have employed proxies such as the International Union of Virtual Media (IUVM), an internet group which has operated across multiple online platforms, to make it seem as though its messaging was coming from a neutral third party. These proxies, however, have acted in contradiction to this goal, making almost no attempt to hide their connection to Iran. Our research found a lack of significant evidence to explain this contradictory behavior. These operations were often centered on creating content on websites rather than social media accounts. This differed from Russian actors who were noted creating and amplifying content all on the same social media platform. Facebook and Twitter have repeatedly taken down content from the IUVM and other Iranian proxies, thus disrupting Iran’s amplification abilities and efforts.

A significant amount of disinformation coming out of Iran has been through overt channels such as its state-sponsored news or directly from Iranian officials. Iranian state-sponsored media, as well as its online and proxy operations, have made little to no attempt to hide the hand of the Iranian Government in the messaging. This has been in contrast to Russian state-sponsored media outlets such as RT and Sputnik, which have taken a more nuanced approach. This lack of nuance and concealment has made Iranian disinformation easy to attribute through open-source methods. Iran’s disinformation operations through its proxies have made it one of the most persistent players in online influence operations. However, its content has been consistently taken down by social media companies.

Due to this constant disruption in its operations, Iran has not been able to achieve a significant level of amplification of its content. The lack of proper amplification and non-concealment of its origins has indicated that while Iran may remain a persistent actor, its disinformation efforts would likely be less of an immediate threat to the United States compared to efforts from either China or Russia.

This product was created by a team of graduate students from American University’s School of International Service. The work herein reflects the team’s research, analysis, and viewpoints.