Analysis: Argentina 2–4 Nigeria
It was something of a game of two halves in Krasnodar, and although the Super Eagles produced a rousing comeback to win 4–2, Argentina posed difficult questions all game.
It was interesting to hear, leading up to the game, that Gernot Rohr would set the team up to play with three centre-backs, in a 3–4–1–2. Even more so that he was doing it with an eye to specifically combating Argentina. Sampaoli, since his arrival, has largely stuck with a 3 at the back system, but never within a two-striker framework. Here, he played the classic Bielsa 3–3–1–3.
The real advantage of having three centre-backs is that, against an opponent that plays with two strikers, it gives you a spare man, both in build-up and in defensive situations. However, Rohr opting for a 3–5–2 meant he had three defenders picking up one striker, creating a deficit elsewhere (in this case, midfield), while on the attacking front, he was playing into Argentina’s hands.
This was apparent from the start, as Nigeria started the game by trying to pressure from high up. However, neither of the front three seemed sure of their roles; already, they were at a numerical disadvantage, which is the opposite situation for an effective press, but then the lack of coordination in their movements made things worse. Ever Banega positioned himself intelligently, and constantly received the ball with time to turn.
It should be noted, as a caveat, that this was the first time there had been a deviation from 4–2–3–1 under Rohr, and the team had only had one training session. That in itself made the sudden decision to press high impossible to understand — as we have established, this is a team that almost always prefers to sit deeper in a compact shape.
The team also had a problem in midfield with the positioning of Lo Celso and Perez. Playing in a sort of “false full-back” role, they had no direct opponent, and neither Shehu nor Aina could advance to shut them down. Doing that would have left a dangerous 3 on 3 at the back, with both Pavon and Di Maria positioned very high.
Since Ndidi naturally closes down higher up, the team’s solution was to have him shift forward and try to shut down Lo Celso, while Iwobi dropped back slightly to gain access to Perez. This would leave Ogu to deal with Dybala between the lines.
However, this created two big problems problems: (i) with Lo Celso drifting wide and Ndidi tracking, the half-space often opened up for direct runs forward from Otamendi, one of which led to a Perez shot which Akpeyi saved; (ii) Iwobi dropping onto Perez left Mascherano free, and he threaded balls into the feet of Aguero dropping off.
Critically though, the team was still trying to press high on goal kicks. This led to the second goal, as Perez and Lo Celso moved into wing-back positions, and both Aina and Shehu felt compelled to step up and maintain access to the former. Both Ndidi and Ogu pushed up at the same time (to keep the team compact) and got taken out by one pass down the middle, from Banega to Dybala. Suddenly, the 3v3 at the back was happening, and the Juventus man slid through to Pavon, who squared for Aguero to finish.
THE COMEBACK
It was important that Iheanacho’s free kick halved the deficit before the break; a set-piece was probably the only way Nigeria could have gotten on the scoresheet. What followed was a storming response in the second half, and it entirely hinged upon returning to the counterattacking approach that has served them so well.
Well, that and the introductions of Bryan Idowu and Tyronne Ebuehi. Both seemed to understand the wing-back roles better: the latter showed greater confidence going forward than Shehu had, and was more dynamic.
Idowu for his part put the Super Eagles in the lead for the first time in the match, but he had also been present in the box when Iwobi swept home the equalizer. This showed how brave he was during attacking transitions, and coming from deeper, he had crucial yards of acceleration to get beyond Enzo Perez.
Beyond all tactical considerations, the entire team just raised their level. Ndidi in particular deserves special praise: the clamor for him to show more facets to his game has been strong, and he used his remarkable stamina to get forward, playing at times like a box-to-box dynamo, proactive rather than simply reactive, raising questions rather than seeking to provide punctuation.
There was possibly a psychological aspect to it as well. Iheanacho and Iwobi rattled Otamendi and Mascherano early on with physicality(!), the former in particular causing his former teammate to lash out, and as the game progressed, both began to gain the upper hand over their opposite number.
Iheanacho increasingly dominated Otamendi in 50–50s, and Iwobi’s nutmeg on Mascherano was the final chipping away of the Barcelona man’s confidence.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the team triumphed by returning to the approach it knows best, but aside the euphoria, the major tactical experiment was less than successful. As far as Rohr’s in-game decision-making goes, the jury is still out.
