Now that we are born again (Part 1)
So, we made rather light work of this qualifying malarkey, didn’t we? Six games: four wins, two draws, an average of two goals scored per game. Four goals conceded: two of those penalties, at least one of them contentious. All impressive numbers. Look back on where we’re coming from, missing two straight Nations Cups; we are a phoenix risen from the ashes.
Why then do I have a number of concerns as I begin what will be a long post, and the first of a series? Well, here’s the thing: I don’t think football is a spreadsheet. The facts, as presented in the scoreline, are sacred and immutable. However, if that suffices, why do we give up two hours at a time watching a game? That is a lot of downtime if you’re a businessperson, and the pay-off is intangible: Nigeria will be at the World Cup, but we certainly won’t all get on the plane, and any experience the overwhelming majority have of Russia will be vicarious.
We might as well go about our business, then check in on the score and rejoice or lose our individual and collective shit at the result, yes?
It’s important to note that, as a predictor, process is more indicative than results. The longer a team flukes results, the likelier that the run will come to an end in the very next game. On the other hand, a team can lose, but if the processes are correct, it is easy to predict an upturn.
So, I’ve set this all up very nicely, have I not? If you’re still of the persuasion that, so long as we’re winning, nothing else matters, then turn back now. If you have no patience for tactical considerations, you are also excused.
Still here? Alright then. Let us begin.
Much of my analysis of how this team plays will come from our game away in Yaounde. I’m in the minority on this, but I am convinced that was our best performance tactically in this series, even though it was the first time we dropped points. Handily, it featured what can be considered our first-choice 11.
Also, it showed precisely how Gernot Rohr wants to play, as well as the attendant strengths and weaknesses.
I have stated previously the truism that the approach of a team is summarized in its deepest midfielder(s). They are the key. For us, they are Ogenyi Onazi and Wilfred Ndidi.
Both are high-energy ball winners, battlers in midfield. Neither is a reliable passer (Ndidi, in particular, is quite poor in this regard), and neither really moves well enough off the ball to provide passing options to the centre-backs, thereby starting attacks.
This dictates then that Rohr’s Super Eagles will mostly thrive on the counter. Time and again, we have seen this in the course of this series: the team retreats into a 4–4–1–1, pressing in a medium-low block, and then springing quickly.
The use of John Obi Mikel in an advanced role by Samson Siasia at the Olympics last year saw him produce his most decisive performances at international level ever, and Rohr ran with it. He first placed him there in the win over Algeria in Uyo, pairing Oghenekaro Etebo with Onazi, but while the former is multifunctional, the level of coverage was inadequate, and so in came Ndidi.
Mikel is not overly mobile or agile, and lacks incisive movement, but he makes up for it with his tenacity on the ball, as well as his vision, which enable him to both slow the play down and speed it up. He has also proven a surprisingly good finisher when presented with opportunities.
The composition of this midfield puts a lot of strain on him, however. He is the only one capable of picking a pass, and this can make our play very predictable.
Indeed, that is the bane of this team so far under Rohr: predictability. It repeats itself in various forms in different phases.
You may have noticed that much of our play comes down the right side of the attack. I make it 8 of our 12 goals were a result of build-up/a passage of play from that flank. That is a staggering percentage. Two have come down the middle, two from the left (one of those a corner). See what’s wrong with this picture?
Victor Moses has the rights of democracy to roam wherever he pleases, creating overloads. He invariably drifts to the right to link up with Moses Simon, who holds width rigidly on that side, opening up the channel between the opposing full-back and the near-sided centre-back. Odion Ighalo as well tends more naturally that way, so we end up with a cluster.
Not to say there is anything wrong with this in and of itself. As a matter of fact, creating superiority in certain zones is the very key to unlocking defences. However, we won’t be playing Zambia, Cameroon and Algeria at the World Cup (no disrespect to them); what’s going to happen when teams realise we have no left-sided width?
The reason overloads work is that, in creating superiority in one zone, you force the opponent to commit more resources there in order not to be undermanned, weakening them somewhere else. You overload on one side, and you finish on the other where the opponent is now underloaded.
However, when our entire attacking band shifts over to one side, we have to have a threat on the other. Else, the opponent can simply commit one more player than we have in that zone and squeeze, safe in the knowledge that no one is taking advantage.
In theory, you want Elderson Echiejile pushing up into that area and holding the width on the left. The benefit of that goes beyond even attacks: once the ball is lost it, his presence in that advances area makes it impossible for the opponent to escape an immediate press by simply switching the ball to the far side.
As it is, our attacking play is quite blatantly unbalanced, and you can be sure whoever comes out of the hat for us at the World Cup will have noticed.
