Though often caricatured as a violent failed state, Somalia has been calm for the last year. Piracy activity has dramatically dwindled and now accounts for less than West Africa. Despite this week’s heinous bombing of a UN compound in Mogadishu, the al Qaeda-linked Islamist militant group Al-Shabaab, which once controlled vast areas of Somalia, is now in retreat.
The international community has shown increasing confidence in the country, too: The UK has just re-opened its embassy, and the US has provided the stamp of recognization for the newly established federal government.
Despite this modicum of progresses, there remain many unresolved issues threating Somalia’s future. One of the most troubling is the brewing debate over the status of Kismayo, Somalia’s third capital city.
The largest and most important city of Kismayo is at the center of a debate over whom has the legitimacy to establish a federal state. The Somali federal government wants to be in charge of this process, which it called “lead from Mogadishu,” but the self-declared Jubbaland state wants to chart its own path apart from Mogadishu, similar to Puntand and Somaliland. Moreover, Jubbaland claims the legal basis for its existence is rooted in the federalism of the Somali constitution. Mogadishu, however, cites various clauses in the same constitution that say the federal government must guide in the creation of the new regional government.
Aside from the constitutional crisis, the Jubbaland state feels that they have done so much to rid the city of al Shabaab, incurring huge financial and human life cost, that their administration is a fair reward. While the government has legitimate governmental concerns, the Jubbaland state has equally legitimate grievances to shape their own future.
And therein lies the conundrum.
For months, the government has sent delegates to Kismayo, blaming Kismayo authorities of undermining the constitution and the unity of Somalia. Jubbaland has responded angrily, and clan bellicosity has risen to an unprecedented level.
For their part, Jubbalanders, too, have not played a constructive role. Their respective leaders declined to intervene in some recent clashes between two clans, letting the situation deteriorate at the expense of innocent people. Instead of trying to calm tensions, they’ve blamed the government for sending ammunitions to one faction in a proxy war against the other.
Worst yet, Mogadishu’s stance on the Jubbaland crisis has been obscure, if not vague altogether. The current dynamic — of sending delegates and a constant barrage of communiqués, and lobbying via neighboring countries — has only proven a recipe for failure, producing a patchwork of paranoia that has reached a level never seen before.
Mogadishu has not implemented a coherent strategy to resolve the crisis. They expended too much political capital in mobilizing regional support for Jubbaland’s full integration into the government while pursuing failed policies against domestic challenges. That “hard on domestic, and soft on external” approach has fuelled the social polarization of southern Somalia and entrenched Kismayo’s suspicion of the Mogadishu government.
This dual-track approach to Kismayo is simply unsustainable.
The president was right to say that the government should not decide the fate of Kismayon people, but he should make clear — in practical and conceivable terms — his interest and intentions. More importantly, he should not hide behind the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)/Kenya and the international community’s initiatives.
Crisis Emboldens Al-Shabaab
The failure to resolve the crisis in Kismayo will eventually provide an opportunity for al-Shabaab to regroup. The Jubba region is also home to a conglomeration of differing ethnic tribes who are profoundly divided along clan lines. The militants can exploit that division to regain lost territory without a functioning local administration to establish control.
For years, Kismayo was under the thumb of al-Shabaab and was its bastion for a lucrative campaign of high-seas piracy and smuggling. Al-Shabaab not only caused havoc inside Somlia: Their depredations spilled over into northern and coastal Kenya. Al-Shabaab militants relentlessly attacked civilians, including grenade attacks in villages and kidnapping tourists and aid workers. In response, Kenya launched a military campaign that eventually ejected al-Shabaab from Kismayo.
Kenya is thought to want to create a buffer zone in southern Somalia to keep any future militancy out of its territory. Yet, paradoxically, their meddling in local Somali politics might make things worse.
As the former Somali envoy to the US Abukar Arman put it: “al-Shabaab’s aim is clear: Seize the vacuum created by prevalent false sense of security and total preoccupation of political bickering.” This week’s brutal attack on the UN compound in Mogadishu is a direct consequence of that bickering.
Al-Shabaab is, ultimately, a product of the political vacuum in southern and central Somalia coupled with a frustration created by statelessness. While Mr. Arman’s suggestion of accelerating the enforcement of Somali National Forces should be taken seriously, we cannot neglect the desperate need for Mogadishu to improve its relationship with local communities. Both the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali forces have often overlooked this soft approach. In reality, a military operation is meaningless unless it’s in support of community engagement in the joint effort of rooting al-Shabaab.
Kismayo’s Future in Somali’s Hands
While president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s call for a national reconciliation conference on the future of Kismayo in Mogadishu is an admirable initiative, he needed to include more than just “Kismayons.” It should have been a broad-based Somali national reconciliation conference. Given the raised tensions, it is unrealistic to think that Kismayo’s fate can be somehow decided from Mogadishu. And therein lies the anxiety of its leadership and people.
For this reconciliation conference to succeed, the government must engage in an all-inclusive dialogue as it cultivates a national solution. Since the Kismayo crisis is just one of many Somali political challenges, it should be part of a broad, holistic strategy.
Additionally, Kenya’s infamous ambition to create a “buffer zone” in Jubbaland must come to an end. Plenty of recommendations and suggestions have been written about how Kenya could protect its security concerns while respecting the country’s sovereignty. But this parochial approach has proven wrong so far.
The Somali government is justifiably edgy about the prospect of a renewed proxy regional administration that is remotely controlled from Nairobi. Kenya’s stance threatens the new Somalia government in addition inflaming clan tensions in the region and wider Somalia. It is a dangerous policy that could spill over into a renewal of open conflict.
As the standoff deepens, it’s time for the government to craft a national strategy — a Somali one that can accommodate all warning parties into a credible political settlement. The failure to undermine the legitimate grievances in Kismayo carries a staggering cost: Somalia at war itself again, at war with its neighbors, and at war, once again, with al-Shabaab.
Abdihakim Ainte is a Somali analyst and researcher. You can tweet him @Abdikhakim.
