Defending Australia Amidst an Ailing Alliance in the Asia-Pacific
An interview with Emeritus Professor Hugh White
Maintaining close connections to allies with greater power has long been the established norm for Australia’s strategic and defence policy. However, despite being mutually beneficial for all parties throughout the years, these alliances may not stand the test of time.
Referred to here is of course our strategic posture in the Asia-Pacific between the US and China.
Situated as we are, Australia has become tethered between the former, a long-standing, now departing, hegemonic ally, and the latter, an ever-growing power and contender for regional primacy.
Very shortly, Australia will have to answer an important question surrounding the reliability of our alliance with the US, and the way in which Australia can best secure its strategic interests and objectives amidst a diametric geopolitical shift.
Seeking to answer this, I recently had the opportunity to interview the former Deputy Defence Secretary for Strategy and Intelligence, and now Emeritus Professor at the Australian National University, Hugh White.
As Professor White sees it, Australia is skirting an increasingly dangerous position in our neighbourhood — one that will likely come to a crossroads sooner than most think.
While both Washington and Canberra would have it that our nations are united under ‘mateship’, Professor White remains sceptical. No matter the rosy picture painted of our alliance, it is far from the truth.
Power in the region has shifted, and Australia may not be able to rely on the US as it once did.
A Diminishing Superpower and the Rise of Another
By any measure, it is hard to dispute the overwhelming evidence that China has expanded its power and influence in recent decades.
Despite contractions since the pandemic, the World Bank has described China’s economic growth as “the fastest sustained expansion by a major economy in history.” And for good reason. Following the decision to open China to foreign trade and investment in 1979, the forty years between 1978 and 2018 amounted to a real annual GDP growth average of 9.44%, and an increase in its share of the world economy from 2% to 16%.
Militarily, the expansion continues. While exact figures are difficult to pin down, estimates suggest that in 2020, China’s defence spending was US$245 billion, six times greater than what it was spending two decades prior. Its nuclear arsenal is expanding rapidly, with the US Department of Defense predicting that the nation’s stockpile will quadruple by the turn of this decade.
This is not even mentioning China’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative’, a global infrastructure and investment strategy developed under President Xi Jinping currently spanning over 130 countries, now considered the ‘nail in the coffin’ for US primacy in the Asia-Pacific.
Once cracks in US primacy began to appear, the US has offered little other than rhetoric and aspirations.
China’s rising economic and military influence is difficult to refute, and has led to growing concern, particularly in Washington, over the geopolitical implications.
However, to Professor White, “China is actually in many ways, a very normal, rising, great power.”
“If you think of the rising power of Spain, for example, in the 16th century, I think [of] the rising power of France in the 17th century, the rising power of Britain in the 18th and 19th century, the rising power of America in the 20th century… I could go on. What makes China an ambitious rising power is not that it’s Chinese or that it’s communist, it’s that it’s normal.”
“It’s just doing what other great powers have done.”
Until quite recently, the US remained the dominant power throughout Asia. From 1945 until at least 1991 with the collapse of the Soviet Union, US primacy in the region remained unquestioned. Either through economic dependency on the US or sheer complacency, the consensus in both Washington and Canberra according to Professor White was that China would never become a strategic challenger.
However, with aggressive expansion, China is likely to replace the US as the most dominant regional power — and the US has been anything other than decisive. Once cracks in US primacy began to appear, the US has offered little other than rhetoric and aspirations.
Nowhere is this more evident than with the ‘Pivot to Asia’, launched under President Obama in 2011. The hallmark foreign policy initiative which called for an integrated approach to security, diplomacy and economic agreements, was the first attempt to contain China. Despite its intentions, the strategy has largely defaulted on all fronts, and for many, was a failure from the start.
At the time, the US had been preoccupied with the emergence of terrorist groups, the most prominent of which was Islamic State in the Middle East and brokering a nuclear deal with Iran. Both required immense resources to achieve, side-lining other priorities and the ‘Pivot to Asia’.
US investment in Asia stagnated shortly after the announcement, which has meant that the strategy became nothing more than boilerplate rhetoric. To top it off, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a comprehensive trade pact as part of the strategy, was not ratified prior to the 2016 election.
Under President Trump, the geostrategic response took a turn for the worse. Multilateral cooperation was upended with a systematic turn to unilateralism. The TPP was soon pulled from the equation, a decision that the Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien believed would “hurt the credibility and standing of the U.S., not just in Asia, but worldwide.”
In place of the TPP was the ‘Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific’, which recycled much of the same aspirations of past commitments to alliances and friendships without offering anything substantive. Ironically, President Trump swung a proverbial “wrecking ball” through US alliances within Asia, clinging to the ‘America First’ doctrine. Focus was instead directed to the Middle East once again, leaving the Asia-Pacific absent of any concrete defence or strategic planning.
Now the US has President Biden, whose first year and a half has been marred with domestic crises including the fallout of a domestic attack on the capital, an ongoing pandemic, and cost of living rises to name just a few. And, adding further fuel to the fire, an increasingly volatile conflict between Ukraine and Russia, with little attention for the Asia-Pacific.
US resolve in Asia has clearly declined. All at the same time, China continues to expand its sphere of influence as US primacy fades — and should serve as a wakeup call for Australia and its dependence on greater powers.
Dated Defence and Fragile Alliances
Alliances have historically been the bedrock of Australia’s defence and strategic posture.
For Professor White, many of these alliances came to the fore during the mid-20th century and have shaped what is now referred to as the rules-based international order.
“We have all got used to having these very big alliances that were established during, and after the Second World War, right at the heart, not just of our national policy, but almost of our national identity.”
However, according to Professor White, it would be a serious error in judgement to view these as friendships. Alliances only go so far if either side has the necessary power, and the benefits outweigh the costs for its formation. In light of these conditions, alliances are more akin to business partnerships, each seeking their own interests.
“They’re not between people who have individual loyalties, they’re between corporate entities, states, and they’re judged like business partnerships are, on the basis of what they’re delivering.”
“And if they cease delivering them, the partnership is dissolved, and we all go our separate ways.”
A stark instance of this was the very close alliance that Australia held with Britain prior to the Second World War. Although united under the empire, when Australia faced an increasingly adversarial Japan in 1941 and 1942, Britain had become deeply preoccupied and could not be relied upon to defend Australia.
“They made the decision that it wasn’t in their interests to endanger their position in Europe in order to support Australia.”
While detrimental to Australian interests, Professor White cannot fault them. From the British point of view, “that was absolutely the right decision to make.” However, who he criticises is Australia.
“I would criticise Australians at the time for deluding themselves that Britain would act to support us in defiance of their own interests.”
Since this withdrawal, Britain has been replaced with the US — and for Professor White, the story is playing out much the same.
Like Britain before them, the US will withdraw.
Australia’s strategic posture has been dependent for some time on the US alliance, which was codified with ANZUS, becoming among “the most politically powerful and longest lasting and effective alliances the world has ever seen.”
Our alliance has appeared to deepen since this, with the recent establishment of both the QUAD and AUKUS. However, Professor White insists that this should not be taken at face value.
Neither multilateral network has been particularly beneficial for Australia. Despite the frequent meetings in the foreground of flags and politicians standing alongside one another, the QUAD remains an unbinding diplomatic forum, with no country obligated to militarily assist the other. Problems continue with AUKUS, as the security pact drives a wedge between France and Australia amidst ballooning costs.
Some may point to Australia’s recent planned acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines as a sign that AUKUS is providing real benefits. However, it should be noted that these submarines require immense capital for maintenance and training, the latter of which Australia does not yet have. But neither do we have the submarines, which may not arrive in Australia until the mid-2040s.
For Professor White, these alliances appear to only provide the illusion of defence and security. Instead, what makes the alliance strong is the fact that the US “has been committed to sustaining a strong strategic position in East Asia and the Western Pacific.”
“But if the US reaches the conclusion that it no longer seeks [a] dominant or even a strong position in East Asia and in the Western Pacific, which I think is most likely, then that alliance will evaporate.”
With the US already stumbling in the region, China’s resolve to continue expanding will inevitably outstrip their commitment to primacy. The costs of defending and securing Australia’s strategic posture is likely to exceed the US’s benefits of doing so. Like Britain before them, the US will withdraw.
Responding to these Changes in our Neighbourhood
So, what does this mean for Australia?
From this analysis, Professor White is adamant that we can no longer treat our alliance with the US as an ‘end in itself.’ Ties between Australia and the US are unlikely to remain strong in the wake of a conflict with China that uproots the benefits of the alliance for either side.
“I don’t think we can rely on America to solve our China problem for us by forcing the Chinese back into their box. […] I don’t think that the America of today, both because of its declining relative power in relation to China and because of its declining resolve to sustain its position in East Asia and indeed more broadly, can do for us what we want them to do.”
Through a rational lens, this checks out. However, neither Australia nor the US has always acted solely in the pursuit of self-interest.
In fact, contrary to Professor White, some scholars have argued that the alliance constitutes a sort of ‘special relationship’. Much of this is situated on a cultural affinity for one another through shared histories, interests and values. Instead of self-interest, Lloyd Cox and Brendon O’Connor posit that the alliance between Australia and the US is one that is sustained through collective emotions.
Decisions to support one another, as was the case in World War II, the Vietnam War and Iraq, are all instances in which these emotions came to the fore. Both nations were committed to defending values of liberty, democracy and freedom of enterprise. Another was US assistance in the Australian plight to secure East Timorese independence in 1999, despite having “no obvious strategic interest at stake” and only sympathy for our efforts.
So, it is contested that the US would not support us in the event of hostilities with China.
Regardless, Professor White would certainly be uncomfortable in leaving this to chance. Instead, our strategic posture must be safeguarded without relying solely on another major power.
What has become clearer is that Australia must acknowledge and learn to live with a powerful China.
Above all else, this involves developing power projection capabilities that can secure our nation’s interests and objectives at home and “prevent other countries projecting power by air and sea against the continent.”
Detailing this further in How to Defend Australia, Professor White argues that such an endeavour is largely achievable with the expansion of the Australian Defence Force. As a revitalised force, the ADF should be capable of defending Australia’s territorial integrity and our closest neighbours, two strategic objectives that are paramount. With strategic independence and a bolstering of our defence, the ADF would have the capacity to deny China and other potential adversaries from any overextension.
“It’s plausible for Australia to believe that it could build forces which could impose sufficient costs and risks on a great power adversary like China in our own backyard, where we have the advantages of geography, and the advantages of maritime defence, we could impose costs and risks on China which would be high enough for the Chinese to desist.”
But this is where our strategic posture ought to end. Australia cannot expect to compete with China’s economic and military might within the broader region.
What has become clearer is that Australia must acknowledge and learn to live with a powerful China.
“I think we have to accept that a country as powerful as China is today and as powerful as it will be in the future, and as ambitious as China is today, [will resolve to] assert itself as a great power in Asia.”
And if we fail to accept this, we are likely to be pulled into a conflict that we are unlikely to win — and one that will almost certainly become nuclear.
This is not as far-fetched as some might think. China has undoubtedly increased its sphere of influence in the Asia-Pacific, and its resolve, and ambition, have deepened. The country is willing to risk far more in comparison to either Australia or the US.
“People often think that judgements about whether you go to war or not are on matters of high principle. Well, there are high principles involved, but there also matters of sheer practicality. Right. If you’re not going to win, don’t start fighting.”
And this is something we must come to terms with regarding our interactions with China. It will mean dramatically scaling back antagonistic military operations in the Asia-Pacific, operations that have frequently heightened tensions between Australia and China.
Of course, this is far from what we have grown accustomed to. But Australia would be remiss not to address the geopolitical shift in its own backyard. And for Professor White, it all comes down to this.
The security of our nation depends on it.
Ben Colter is a fourth-year PPE student at UQ .This is his second article for Statecraft.
Hugh White is an Emeritus Professor of Strategic Studies at ANU. His researcher profile can be viewed here. Professor White’s 2022 Quarterly Essay, Sleepwalk to War: Australia’s Unthinking Alliance with America, delves deeper into the nature of Australia’s alliance with the US and served as inspiration for this interview.
Thanks to Max Broad and Evan Keast for helping with this piece, and to Caitlin Goston and Tom Watson for their editing.
