Liberalism in China: Culture and Politics
Samuel Huntington once argued in his Clash of Civilisations that the two civilisations most different from the West are China and Islam. That values and beliefs differ across cultures and that it can be difficult to understand the values and beliefs of other cultures might sound like a banal truism, however, the political implications of this are many and as such I wish to elaborate upon this seemingly-simple statement and explore these differences.
The most important difference to point out is the degree of perceived security that each civilisation possesses. This is important because it has been the catalyst of a failure to achieve mutual understanding between the liberal West and almost all other civilisations. In the post-Cold War period, the capitalist West had achieved an unquestionably glorious success. Much like the Roman Empire in its peak or the Chinese Empire at its zenith, the West could look around all the known world and proudly proclaim itself at the centre. None in the world could challenge the West, at least on the fronts of culture, warfare, or the economy. It is under this sort of unprecedented sense of security that the new generation of Westerners have grown up.
However, this is not a feeling that is shared by the citizens of other civilisations. Others do not feel this safety, and they are constantly preparing for the prospect of more conflict and violence. Russia is wary of the West’s constant expansion into the “Russian world”, and its increasing military deployment in the former Soviet bloc. China still hasn’t recovered from its memories of constant foreign invasions and internal disorder. India constantly worries about the military presence of China and the US, while also fretting about its so-called “Muslim problem”. And the list goes on for the countries in Africa and the Middle East.
The non-Western world lives in insecurity. This is a strong and motivating emotion that people in the West can hardly understand, and could understand even less prior to the 9/11 attack. The people of these countries are often willing to commit to actions they believe will prevent their insecurities from coming true, and these actions are often unpleasant to behold for Westerners. This explains the popularity of leaders like Putin and Modi, who take a tough approach towards the perceived security “problem”. However, this form of “problem-solving” often increases the insecurity of the other side, and in the end, these countries all find themselves in a quasi-prisoner’s dilemma in which they will either dominate or be dominated. The non-Western world is one that resembles Mearsheimer’s aggressive realism.
As mentioned, China is not an exception in this case. It very well remembers the bad experiences of colonialism, foreign invasion, internal disorder, and political disunity. And the contemporary experience of China has only worsened this mindset. For example, In China, three particular events of the 90s continue to be remembered as the 三大恨 (three remorses): (1) the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Serbia by US aircraft, (2) the interception of a Chinese commercial freighter in international waters by the US military, and (3) the crashing of a jet fighter in South China after collision with a US military aircraft which ended with the Chinese pilot dead. Beyond these, there has also been China’s exclusion from the International Space Station, and constant post-Cold War technological sanctions. These events, both contemporary and historic, have greatly shaped the formation of the Chinese perception of a hostile world in which Chinese people must earn everything they have, including their basic dignity and right to exist, one way or another.
However, despite having all these unhappy experiences with the liberal West, there was a very recent period within China when the liberal ideology had an overwhelming amount of support, and when Western democracy was seen as the “correct” form of governance: as opposed to the authoritarian system of the CCP. Superficially, it would be natural to think that this is the same judgement the West has after comparing the political systems of China and the West: “Democracy is better”. While it is true that, at the time, Chinese people had a judgement that democracy was better than the system of China, this conclusion came from a completely different perspective.
Here, I must introduce the second core difference between the way of thinking of the Chinese people and Westerners: pragmatism. When it comes to ideology, I would argue that Chinese people tend to see political systems, forms of governance, and the ideologies attached to them, as mere tools to achieve their agendas. Meanwhile, in the West, people treat political systems, governance, and ideology as beliefs which are morally justifiable in themselves. In the West, discourse on politics and governance is moralised; the ideology and the style of rule is an end and an agenda by itself.
These different perspectives on pragmatism can be seen in the different political arguments seen in China and the West when it comes to forms of governance and the election of leadership. Chinese people often try to convince others by arguing how the system ensures the quality and competence of the officials selected, while Western people often judge a system of governance by how the elected are representative of those who are governed. The difference here is that Chinese people view the selection of leaders as a part of the problem-solving process: the final agenda is to select a capable leader. While Westerners often think the election of officials as a procedure that legitimises the authority, thereby satisfying a moral requirement. It is undeniable that, in a Western context, the concept of democracy is largely moralised, and to many people, the political system is more about morals than practical applications. In the West, the degree of political pragmatism is nothing compared to the ruthless and unsympathetic pragmatism inherent in Chinese political culture.
Therefore, when many Chinese people were supporters of Western democracy (predominantly from around 2000 to 2010) they did not praise freedom, or the right to be represented and governed by those whom they approve. Anecdotally, I can remember the exact rhetoric used to justify democracy: “think about what can we achieve once the shackles of this institution are removed”. Democracy was deemed to be a solution to China’s problems, and in the Chinese context, something that solves problems is a good thing. The CCP’s system was at the time failing to solve extant problems (poverty, foreign aggression, and weakness), and so democracy experienced an ascent in the discourse — but the justification was always pragmatic, never moral.
In two later articles for this publication, I intend to discuss the shifting ideologies of China.
