Metaphorical Musings: Navigating the Linguistic Labyrinth
Part II: Ariadne’s Thread
In the ancient world of ideas, Aristotle emerges as a pioneer in the realm of metaphor, crafting a precise theory that lays the groundwork for understanding this linguistic device. His perspective, though narrow, offers invaluable insights into our initial understanding of the mechanics of metaphorical expression.
According to Aristotle, metaphor is more than just a play of words — it’s a deliberate transfer of meaning from one object to another, based on their shared characteristics. It’s like borrowing a name from its usual home and giving it a new address. Aristotle credits this skill to poets, suggesting that it requires a natural knack for spotting similarities between different things.
In Aristotle’s taxonomy, metaphors come in four flavours. The first three involve swapping names between different categories of things, like moving from the general to the specific or vice versa. But it’s Socrates’ metaphor that stands out as the fourth type, described by Aristotle as a ‘transference by analogy’. Here, the relationship between elements mirrors that of others, creating a rich tapestry of symbolic meaning.
Essentially, Aristotle teaches us that metaphor is all about relocating names, shifting them from their usual habitats to new territories of meaning. This idea forms the cornerstone of the first genealogy of metaphor, reminding us of the power of language to reshape our perceptions and understanding of the world around us.
Ever the keen observer of language and thought, Aristotle adds a fascinating layer to his theory of metaphor — one that broadens its scope beyond the confines of conventional naming. In his exploration of the ‘transference by analogy’ species of metaphor, Aristotle shines a light on a unique phenomenon: situations where no existing name adequately captures the relationship between elements. Here, metaphor steps in as a linguistic bridge, crafting a new name to fill the void of expression.
Take, for instance, the act of scattering seeds compared to the dispersion of sunlight. While we have a word for the former (‘sowing’), the latter lacks a direct counterpart. Yet, through metaphorical thinking, we can analogise the two, giving rise to expressions like ‘sowing the god-created fire’ (Poetics, sec. 1457b). In this way, metaphor becomes a tool for linguistic innovation, breathing life into concepts that defy traditional categorisation.
What Aristotle unveils is a world where language and reality intersect in unexpected ways. Metaphor, in its analogical transference, not only names the nameless but also renders the unknown accessible to human understanding. It is a testament to the creative power of language and the endless possibilities it offers for shaping our perception of the world.
In the timeless clash of ideas between Plato’s Republic and Aristotle’s Poetics, a fundamental disagreement emerges regarding the creative potential of metaphor — a disagreement rooted in their differing views on mīmēsis (μίμησις).
Plato’s Socrates dismisses the poet as a mere imitator of life, lacking true knowledge of what they portray. In his eyes, poetic activity is relegated to a secondary realm, removed from the essence of reality. Aristotle, while acknowledging poetry’s mimetic nature in most cases, offers a nuanced perspective. He suggests that in certain instances, such as the use of metaphor, poets play a vital role in expanding language and giving names to previously unnamed concepts.
This passing acknowledgment by Aristotle hints at a deeper purpose behind metaphorical expression. It suggests that metaphor serves not only to imitate but also to generate new understandings, bridging the gap between the visible and the invisible, the known and the unknown. Could it be that metaphor acts as a catalyst for linguistic creation, imbuing words with meanings beyond mere reflection?
Indeed, the rift between Socrates and Aristotle’s views on poetry, mīmēsis, and metaphor resonates throughout the ages, echoing in the space between their respective genealogies. It underscores the enduring debate over the nature of language and its capacity for innovation and transformation.
As we navigate this intellectual terrain, let us not overlook the profound implications of metaphor as a site of linguistic generation — a space where creativity transcends imitation, shaping our understanding of truth, reason, and the human soul.
In the realm of Aristotle’s theory of metaphor, language takes centre stage, with a particular focus on the function of names. According to Aristotle, names are naturally applied to objects, and metaphor involves an intentional exchange of these names for poetic effect. Take, for instance, Socrates’ metaphor, where the shining ‘sun’ is temporarily transferred to the object of ‘being’ for didactic purposes.
Aristotle categorises language use into two camps: natural and unnatural. In the natural realm, names align with their objects, while in the unnatural realm, names are transferred to objects to which they don’t naturally apply. However, Aristotle doesn’t view the unnatural use of language as inherently negative. Instead, he sees it as a display of artistic proficiency, particularly in contexts like poetry and rhetoric.
For Aristotle, a skilled poet or rhetorician will masterfully combine various forms of speech, including metaphor, to elevate their language beyond the ordinary. This combination of strange words and ornamental language prevents diction from being mundane while maintaining clarity — a value consistently emphasised in Aristotle’s first genealogy.
Yet, despite Aristotle’s more favourable view of poets compared to Plato, his natural/unnatural language division suggests that language is inherently mimetic. Nature, in this context, represents the primary order, while language serves as a secondary construct. Philosophers, as seekers of truth, are relegated to the natural use of words, aiming to express reality as it truly is.
However, the allure of figurative, ornamental, and metaphoric language introduces a tension between aesthetic variety and clarity of meaning. While these linguistic flourishes may offer aesthetic pleasure, they deviate from the clear conveyance of primary, non-linguistic truths.
As we now venture deeper into the labyrinth, Aristotle treads more cautiously, acknowledging metaphor’s potential for both enlightenment and deception. While he recognises its role in adding colour and depth to language, he maintains that metaphor’s specific and limited use prevents it from conveying truths with utmost clarity.
This sentiment is echoed by Thomas Hobbes — an inheritor and disseminator of the narrow delineation — who, in his work Leviathan, categorises metaphor alongside other ‘abuses’ of language, such as lying and insults. Hobbes sees metaphor as a departure from the ordained sense of words (that is, their natural application or words as ‘directly memetic’), akin to an indirect imitation of an imitation — a sentiment reminiscent of Socrates’ criticism of poets.
However, Hobbes goes further than Aristotle, positioning metaphor as a potential catalyst for ‘rampant absurdity’ and societal chaos if left unchecked. He emphasises the importance of precise definitions and clear language in the pursuit of truth and rational discourse, likening the misuse of metaphor to wandering among innumerable absurdities:
The Light of humane minds is Perspicuous words, but by exact definitions first snuffed, and purged from ambiguity; Reason is the Pace; Encrease of Science, the Way; and the Benefit of man-kind, the End. And on the contrary, Metaphors, and senseless and ambiguous words, are like Ignes Fatui; and reasoning upon them, is wandering amongst innumerable absurdities; and their end, contention, and sedition, or contempt (I.5.38; sic).
Despite Hobbes’ stern warning against the use of metaphor in serious discourse, he acknowledges its permissible use in common speech. Yet, he cautions against its employment in reasoning or the seeking of truth, fearing its potential to lead to contention and discord.
The tension between Aristotle’s relatively flexible approach to metaphor and Hobbes’ strict delineation reflects broader philosophical debates about the role of language in society. While Aristotle sees value in the creative use of language, Hobbes emphasises the necessity of clarity and precision in maintaining social order and advancing human knowledge.
In navigating this linguistic labyrinth, we must carefully consider the implications of metaphor’s dual nature — both as a tool for expression and a potential source of confusion. As we continue to grapple with these complexities, the future of discourse and human understanding hangs in the balance.
Hobbes frames language as a tool for transferring mental discourse into verbal expression. Unlike Aristotle, who views language as a secondary system corresponding to natural objects, Hobbes sees it as a conduit for conveying our internal thoughts and emotions. He acknowledges the inherent variability and ambiguity of language, rooted in the diversity of human perception and interpretation.
To achieve effective communication, Hobbes advocates for the eradication of biases, passions, and contextual influences, emphasising the importance of social agreement on word usage. He envisions a language akin to mathematics, devoid of the uncertainties of interpretation, achieved through rigorous definition and explanation of terms. In this rationalised language, metaphor becomes an obstacle to clarity and precision, hindering the pursuit of truth.
Following in the footsteps of Hobbes, Locke draws a clear distinction between language used for pleasure, such as poetry and rhetoric, and language employed for the pursuit of knowledge and improvement, as seen in philosophy and science.
Locke emphasises the dual nature of language, which can be either figurative or literal. He posits that words serve as signs for our ideas rather than direct representations of reality. According to Locke, when we engage in debate or discussion about a term, we are essentially debating the idea it represents, regardless of its correspondence to the natural world. For Locke, words are
the signs of our ideas only; and not for things themselves…. When we argue about [a term] we truly argue only about the idea we express by that sound, whether that precise idea agree to anything really existing in nature or no. And if men would tell what ideas they make their words stand for, there could not be half that obscurity or wrangling in the search or support of truth that there is. (Human Understanding Bk. III, ch.X, sec.15)
Locke’s prescription for clarity in communication is straightforward: if individuals were transparent about the ideas behind their words, much of the confusion and disagreement in the quest for truth could be avoided. By aligning our understanding of terms with their underlying concepts, we can navigate the complexities of language with greater clarity and coherence.
Locke champions clarity and precision as essential qualities of words. The antithesis of these qualities is obscurity and ambiguity, which can lead to confusion and misunderstanding in discourse. As such, Locke posits that in philosophical discussions, words must accurately correspond to clear and distinct ideas to avoid confusion. It’s not merely enough for words to represent ideas; they must be firmly anchored to specific, well-defined concepts. Whether expressing simple or complex ideas, clarity demands that each word be linked to a precise collection of ideas in the mind, leaving no room for ambiguity or misinterpretation.
Now, before proceeding, I advise we take a moment to tug on Ariadne’s thread to orient ourselves once more. Currently, we can see the philosophical musings of Aristotle, Hobbes, and Locke, each offering a lantern to illuminate the path ahead. Aristotle, our first guide, beckons us to see language as nature’s mirror, reflecting the essence of objects in its linguistic reflection. Yet, as we venture deeper, Hobbes emerges from the shadows, enticing us with the social contract, where language becomes a negotiated terrain, its meaning etched by the collective strokes of societal understanding. Here, we find Locke joining step with Hobbes, enriching his foundation and replacing the mere ‘concepts’ with more profound ‘ideas’, urging us to tread more confidently as the terrain becomes less and less sure under foot.
Both Hobbes and Locke concur that knowledge flourishes when individuals share a mutual understanding of each other’s ideas, facilitated by the use of literal language. In contrast, metaphor introduces ambiguity and hampers the transmission of ideas. Locke contends that metaphorical language, with its elliptical interpretation, confuses instruction and misleads judgement. His critique echoes Socrates’ call to banish poets from rational discourse, suggesting that rhetorical flourishes serve to insinuate incorrect ideas and manipulate emotions rather than convey truth.
Locke’s scepticism toward metaphor underscores his belief in the mimetic nature of proper language, which directly corresponds with the cognitive realm of ideas. Unlike Aristotle, who sees a direct connection between language and nature, Locke views language as a tool primarily reflective of cognitive concepts rather than external realities.
While Locke’s criticism of metaphor may appear stringent, it underscores the importance of clarity and precision in communication, particularly in philosophical discourse. By prioritising literal language over figurative expression, Locke advocates for a transparent exchange of ideas, free from the potential distortions introduced by rhetorical embellishments. In a world where the pursuit of truth hinges on effective communication, Locke’s stance prompts us to reassess the role of language in shaping our understanding of the world.
We are now deep enough to hear the heavy breaths of our Labyrinth’s great beast: the dichotomy of language’s nature, be it natural or unnatural, ordained or ambiguous, perspicuous or obscure, proper or improper. In Aristotle’s Poetics, the realm of unnatural language finds a foothold, albeit as a secondary player to the domain of the natural. However, both Hobbes and Locke adamantly reject metaphor’s entrance into the realm of philosophical discourse. Across all three texts, figurative language is relegated to the realm of ornamentation — a secondary embellishment that veers away from the direct depiction of reality.
For Locke and Hobbes, the aversion to metaphor stems from a deeper understanding of language, one that distinguishes between its cognitive and emotive functions. Locke, in particular, emphasises the primacy of clear communication over the seductive allure of poetic fancy, advocating for a refinement of discourses of pleasure and delight to ensure their alignment with the pursuit of truth.
This delineation between cognitive and emotive language persists throughout philosophical traditions, from British empiricism to Vienna positivism, where metaphorical expressions are often dismissed as lacking in philosophical seriousness. Even in the modern era, the legacy of Locke’s distinction endures, shaping the discourse on metaphor within analytic philosophy. Notably, two influential philosophers of the twentieth century — Donald Davidson and Paul de Man — continue this tradition, each situated at opposite ends of the metaphorical spectrum.
As we cross through the inaugural threshold of our odyssey, the formidable shadow cast by the ancient progenitor of the first genealogy looms larger with each stride. While the foundational principles stand firm beneath our feet, we cannot help but notice the fissures forming in the walls of discourse surrounding metaphor, revealing the intricate interplay between tradition and innovation scratched deeply into the very fabric of our exploration. Join me again next week as our Metaphorical Musings guide us deeper into the heart of the labyrinth, where we embark on the exploration of the second genealogy.
Harry Shakespeare-Davies is a final year PPE student, aspiring academic, and Statecraft VP.
Huge thank you to Daniel Quill for assisting in the additional task of reviewing and publishing this painfully indulgent article atop their already busy schedule.
