Policy, Party, and Personality: ‘The End of Certainty’ by Paul Kelly
It is often said that the Australian economy, as we know it today, emerged out of the reforms implemented by the Hawke and Keating Labor governments between 1983 and 1996. Financial deregulation, the floating of the Australian dollar, initiating drastic reductions in industry protection, and the Prices and Incomes Accord are just four of the initiatives frequently offered as landmarks in Australia’s economic revolution. This laundry list of policy developments gives rise to a narrative that the period was punctuated by pragmatic yet ambitious reform. However, such a narrative disguises a volatile and uncertain period in Australian politics.
This is where the work of Paul Kelly¹, long-time political journalist and Canberra insider, is invaluable — not least because of his access to dozens of exclusive interviews with the key figures in both Government and Opposition. Written in 1992,² and now rightly regarded as a classic in Australian political journalism, The End of Certainty offers incisive analysis into the ways that economic and political transformation were, and indeed remain, intertwined. Kelly masterfully tracks movements in public mood, party ideology, and media attitudes and shows that behind each landmark decision lay a charged political landscape: a struggle within both Labor and the Coalition to adapt their identities to a new era; a bipartisan move to the economic right which provoked backlash every step of the way; and a growing disillusionment with the capacity of both major parties to deliver on their promises.
“The End of Certainty provides a wealth of insight into the ways in which partisan problems and the shortcomings of those in power can deeply influence the long-term direction of politics.”
One of the most prominent themes in The End of Certainty is the degree to which economic reform was reactionary. Certainly, the various policies implemented throughout the 1980s and early 1990s were beneficial in the long-term, but each major development was a response to crisis. The Prices and Incomes Accord emerged to restrain wage growth and counteract inflation following recession in the last term of the Fraser Coalition Government. The Australian dollar was only floated when the Reserve Bank was overwhelmed by international financial speculation and could no longer adequately control the exchange rate and money supply. Both of these examples were pragmatic decisions made in response to new and unique economic problems.
While Kelly acknowledges that there had been advocacy for a floating exchange rate and financial deregulation long before these were actually implemented, his analysis provides insight into the ways the political class responded to said advocacy. Pertintently, Paul Keating’s close relationships with the Reserve Bank — which were cultivated by virtue of his insecurity and lack of education when first given the treasurership³ — catalysed his pragmatism and openness to reforms which would have previously been considered anathema to Labor ideology. Moreover, Bob Hawke’s commitment to consensus lent Labor legitimacy as a governing party capable of administering quality reform. He garnered support for Labor policy from businesses, the unions, and the media — an unlikely alliance for the party.
One gets the impression from reading The End of Certainty that without Hawke at the helm as Prime Minister and Keating driving policy as treasurer, history would have been remarkably different. Kelly elaborates on the ways that the Hawke-Keating team became the dominant force in the 80s, as each leader’s strengths covered the other’s weaknesses. He labours over their professional qualities, their remarkable partnership, and their personal rivalry. By the time the book reaches 1991, it seems inevitable that the combination of Hawke’s pride and Keating’s arrogance should result in the latter’s deposition of his partner — though this had been a professional front for some years now.⁴
Kelly’s analysis often moves beyond the realm of policy into that of personality, and it is here that the book is at its most valuable. The 80s and early 90s were shaped as much by external circumstances as by the idiosyncrasies, aspirations, and tactical blunders of individuals: from Keating’s unwavering confidence in his own abilities, to John Howard and John Hewson’s inability to sell their new economic rationalist agenda, to Joh Bjelke-Peterson’s push to become Prime Minister and extend the National Party’s success beyond the borders of Queensland. If nothing else, The End of Certainty provides a wealth of insight into the ways in which partisan problems and the shortcomings of those in power can deeply influence the long-term direction of politics.
“It is Kelly’s great achievement to have covered such multifaceted and complex events with such clarity and accessibility, without sacrificing insight.”
One example of this is the condemnation of the Coalition to 13 years of opposition. Though Labor’s success in redefining itself and asserting its governing capacity should not be understated, the internal party tensions (usually surrounding leadership) which plagued the Liberal and National parties were at least as significant to Labor’s electoral success. The inability of the Coalition to adapt itself to the politics of the time was symbolised by its leadership struggles: the transitions from Malcolm Fraser to Andrew Peacock, to John Howard, back to Peacock, to Hewson, and finally back to Howard were emblematic of a party facing an identity crisis.⁵ In a economy moving quickly to the right, the Coalition simultaneously lost its dominance as the ‘superior economic managers’ and failed to market its social conservatism. As Labor captured the centre of Australian politics, the Coalition struggled to maintain ideological coherence and articulate what differentiated them from the then-government.
Had the Coalition succeeded in finding and exploiting a new role, there is no doubt that we would be living in a very different country. This identity crisis was so deep and protracted that the coalition lost in both 1990 and 1993 on this issue alone — according to Kelly, at least — in spite of the fact that Labor was facing down economic crises of its own making and its own leadership struggles. Andrew Peacock was seen by the public as untrustworthy and failed to give the opposition the air of legitimacy it so sorely needed, and John Hewson was unable to give his hardline economic rationalism the moral direction the Australian public wanted.⁶ As Paul Kelly repeatedly notes, the Coalition failed at every election from 1987 onwards, to offer voters a viable and legitimate alternative to Labor even when the Government’s popularity was waning.
Readers should be aware that if they seek an exhaustive, academic understanding of Australian policy in the 80s and early 90s, it won’t be found here. The Labor party as portrayed by Kelly comes across as not dissimilar to Reagan’s Republicans or Thatcher’s Conservative party, and this is largely a result of what Kelly chooses to omit from the book. Medicare is only mentioned once, welfare reforms get scant attention, and superannuation is not discussed beyond its characterisation as Keating’s personal project. The Labor party’s broad commitment to social and economic equity is largely absent from The End of Certainty. Kelly seeks to understand the dominant issues and agendas, the political responses to them, and the resulting policies. This focus necessarily excludes a number of periphery issues, but at nearly 700 pages there is little room left for them in the book, and their inclusion would perhaps obfuscate some of the book’s more valuable insights.
Despite its heft, The End of Certainty is well worth a complete read. The journalistic style is accessible and Kelly’s access to interviews with the key players is invaluable to a thorough understanding of the issues at hand. For an understanding of Australian politics in the 80s, there is no better starting point.
[1] It is worth mentioning that this book shows a very different side of Paul Kelly to what you may be expecting — a side which precedes his nearly thirty year tenure with The Australian. I’ll leave the reader to determine whether I mean this in a good or bad way, but my point is, whatever your opinion of him today, go into this review (and the book should you decide to read it) with a clean slate.
[2] The book was published again in 1994 — the edition I read — with an introduction dissecting the return of the Keating government to office in the ‘unloseable election’ of 1993.
[3] Keating is often portrayed as a man of confidence (or arrogance depending on who you ask) and conviction, but this confidence was not something that he brought into the role from day one. It was something he developed after he struck success.
[4] Rather than Hawke simply retiring and handing over to Keating as many expected would happen sometime in the late 1980s, and indeed as many within the party pressured Hawke to do at that time.
[5] Though this final transition, back to John Howard, had not occurred when the book was published it is nonetheless a continuation of the same problem. It is worth noting that Kelly predicted that Howard’s hopes of being Prime Minister would be dashed when he lost the leadership to Peacock in 1989.
[6] This is an issue which John Howard struggled with during his leadership and it ultimately provoked the release of Future Directions: It’s Time for Plain Thinking as an ideological statement of commitment to free markets, individual responsibility, and social conservatism.
