“My Stealthy Freedom” and Illusion of Activism; Take a photo and be an activist

By Sara Talebian

“My Stealthy Freedom” is the name of a Facebook page that demands to protest against compulsory Hijab and demonstrate willing of clothing freedom for women in Iran. In 2014, the “My Stealthy Freedom” campaign took off with a Facebook page that has attracted thousands of Iranian women who have dared take off their veil inside the Islamic Republic and post a photograph of themselves (Sreberny, 2015). The page started its online activities by publishing an unveiled photo of the founder, Masih Alinezhad, a former journalist in Iran who is now living in London. She wrote a caption for her own photo, describing the sense of joy and freedom of being unveiled and asked Iranian women to take photos without a scarf in public locations in Iran and send their photos and captions to be published in the page.

The foundation and activity of the page had been described as a “social movement” from the first days. As it has been explained on the Facebook page and the related web page “My Stealthy Freedom is an online social movement … Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979 women in Iran have had to cover their hair in public, but many Iranian women and men feel that wearing a hijab in public should be a personal choice. To address this issue we created a Facebook page where women from inside Iran could share photos of themselves not wearing their hijabs” (mystealthyfreedom, 2014).

“My Stealthy Freedom” on Facebook attracted many Iranian women and also men, collected more than 760 thousand followers in one year (The Guardian, 2015) and enticed international attentions around the women’s rights issue in Iran. Masih Alinejad, the founder of the page on Facebook has been commended as an Iranian activist several times. She awarded women’s right award of Geneva Summit for Human Rights and Democracy, particularly for founding “My Stealthy Freedom” on Facebook (The Guardian, 2015). Some western media claimed that this would be a successful social movement for Iranian women and some others asserted that this page would be a new platform in which Iranian women represent a new image of their identity. The Guardian, as one of the first media in which “My Stealthy Freedom” has been reflected, wrote that the campaign became a success because it was a social movement by women, for women (Omar Khan, 2014). One of the few academic articles about this flow argued that “My Stealthy Freedom” is a Facebook page where women try to show different identity than what they inherited via traditions and rules (Karimi, 2015).

In this paper, I argue that despite some excitements about a new social movement for Iranian women in western media and some western human rights association, “My Stealthy

Freedom” cannot be considered as a social and political movement against Iran’s government and the law of compulsory hijab in Iran. It has to be mentioned that the study of who among Iranian women are active in this page and how, with what purposes and motives and in what kind of special context is the actual core to deeply understand this cyber flow. However, since such a study requires a vast timetable to apply different approaches and various research methods, particularly interviews, in this paper I just focus on the contents of photos and captions that have been published in “My Stealthy Freedom” page on Facebook. According to the main traits of activity on Facebook, and the content of photos and captions, I claim that this Facebook page is, not only incapable of organizing a real social movement against hijab, but also can be a well-suited example for the concept of slacktivism.

Social media and movements

The celebrated birth of social media was a satisfying motivation for many technology lovers to go back to the idea of technological determinism and techno-utopianism. Social media with their worldwide consumption and vast popularity were supposed to change the world to a new world. Several predictions claimed that in new social media era, people would be firmly connected to each other and ready to be mobilized for social and political changes. Hence, social media became the answer to all different critiques about the certain power of the internet and digital media to create social and political movements and eliminate all the authoritarian regimes.

Castells (2007) promotes his technology-centered ideas, talks about the revolutionary power of the internet, and networked technologies for social movements. He claims that the internet provides the essential platform for debate and serves as people most potent political weapon. The spread of instant political mobilizations by using mobile phones, supported by the Internet, is changing the landscape of politics. Shirky (2008) argues that as more people adopt simple social tools, and as those tools allow increasingly rapid communication, the speed of group actions also increases. In Shirky’s word, transaction costs are lowered, obstacles to collective action removed, new more efficient forms of coordination created. As he says, now that, thanks to these new tools, group-forming has gone from hard to ridiculously easy, we are seeing an explosion of experiments with new groups and new kinds of groups. Even more, Howard et al. (2011) argue that social media played a central role in shaping political debates

and that increased discussions about democracy and civil rights on Twitter, Facebook, or YouTube often preceded street protests.

In return, many scholars bring up different shortcomings of internet-centered studies and claims on one hand and emphasize on the destructive consequences of cyber and internet- based so-called movements on the other hand. As Monterde & Postill (2013) argue, it is not sufficient to study the sets of media technologies and practices that come into play; we must also track the wider technopolitical relations operating across the whole of society at critical historical conjunctures. As it has been considered in many critical perspectives about revolutionary power of social media, such as Tofekci studies about Turkey and Egypt, what has been missing from the studies and assessments is the evidence of how social media and the Internet were being used by protesters as events unfolded in real time (Tofekci and Wilson, 2012).

In addition, Gerbaudo (2012) brings up a very important and crucial question about the role of social media in social movements and dissents. He asks about the real and substantial function of social media in social and political movements. What difference do social media really make to the ways in which participants are mobilized and protest is organized, besides trivial operations like ‘fixing dates’ and ‘opening groups’? He claims that social media serve social and political movements to organize their actions, just like all the older communications technology, but they cannot create movements without all other necessary social and political factors. For instance, according to political opportunity theory, insurgent consciousness, organizational strength, and political opportunities are three vital components of every movement formation. As Cragun at al. (2006) explain, when a collective sense of injustice connects with a strong and efficient leadership and sufficient resources on one hand, and the existing political system is vulnerable to a challenge on the other hand, a social movement can be created to issue a specific challenge and push through a social change. Accordingly, social media are not even among the fundamental requirements for a social movement formation and at the best, these kinds of media are the new means of mobilizing people for certain actions during an on the ground protest.

Feel good activism

Among all the critiques about the power of the internet and particularly social media for opposition and social movements, one significant critique claims that even if the Internet does activate citizens, it does so in a pointless way, since the activities do not have any impact on political outcomes in the real world (Shulman, 2005). For instance, Malcom Gladwell, whose argument may be summed up in the Cairo graffiti formula ‘the revolution will not be tweeted’ argues that radical political actions require strong ties; while Social media at best provides weak ties and is, therefore, unsuitable for revolutionary action (Gerbaudo, 2012). He argues that weak ties and the lack of responsibility and commitment prevent social media currents and movements to be the real world movements for change. People just sit at home, support the notion of change or dissent by clicking on social media and do nothing for real change.

In respect of disruptive effects of social media on social movements and activism, Morozov, as a critical scholar, talks about ‘slacktivism’ as a major consequence of the relationship between social media and social and political dissents. He vigorously denounced the risks of ‘slacktivism’, or activism for slackers. According to Morozov (2009), the concept generally refers to activities that are easily performed, but they are considered more effective in making the participants feel good about themselves than to achieve the stated political goals.

Fred Clark and Dwight Ozard used the word slacktivism to shorten slacker activism in 1995. By use of this concept, they refer to bottom-up activities by young people to affect society on a small personal scale. Today, especially after the shouts about the unstoppable power of the internet for involving people in social and political participation, this implication has revived again and is used to define activities that do not express a full–blown political commitment. Slacktivism can take other expressions, such as wearing political messages in various forms on your body or vehicle, joining Facebook groups, or taking part in short–term boycotts such as Buy Nothing Day or Earth Hour (Christensen, 2011).

For Morozov (2011), slacktivism is ‘feel good activism that has zero political or social impact’ but creates ‘an illusion of having a meaningful impact on the world without demanding anything more than joining a Facebook group’. Morozov attacks the idea that the diffusion of communication technology made in the United States will automatically bring democracy to each and every corner of the world. He criticizes techno-optimistic visions holding that ‘technology empowers the people who, oppressed by years of authoritarian rule, will inevitably rebel mobilizing themselves through text messages, Facebook, Twitter, and

whatever tool comes along each year ‘. In contrast, the internet, Morozov argues, is breeding a generation not of activists but of slacktivists, who think that clicking on a Facebook petition counts as a political act and who dissipate their energies on a thousand distractions.

Easy stealthy activities instead of real activism

As it has been mentioned before, “My Stealthy Freedom” has been understood as a social movement that aims to protest against compulsory hijab in Iran and stands for women clothing freedom. It was first launched on Facebook to publish the unveiled photos of Iranian women and contribute to the opposition current against compulsory hijab. Moreover, “My Stealthy Freedom” started to circulate news contents about Iranian women and related issues, when Masih Alinezhad, the founder, and administrator of the page started working in Voice of America (VOA) Persian television as a correspondent. Most of the news and reports, which are being published on “My Stealthy Freedom”, are unofficial news about the events related to women issues in Iran, and always reflect negative perspectives about women’s right sphere in Iran.

However, “My Stealthy Freedom” on Facebook has never functioned as a news page and does not meet the appropriate news standards, such as neutrality and recency. Accordingly, this article reviews the photos and captions which have been sent by the page’s users and does not include news contents in the analysis process. A comprehensive review and analysis of these photos and captions can bring a more realistic description of this page and the meaning of its activities. Regarding social movements, which exist only in social media, but not in real world, and by using the features of slacktivism as a related concept, I aim to analyze the most significant features of “My Stealthy Freedom” and compare them with the main features of slacktivism. For this purpose, a sample of 50 photos and captions of the Facebook page have been analyzed with the help of qualitative content analysis and the main themes and features have been extracted and compared with the characteristics of the conception of slacktivism. This sample has been chosen by purposive sampling technique and all photos have been selected among the photos sent by the page’s users. The time period for selecting the photos has determined from March 2015 until March 2016, since the page has had the highest level of activity during these twelve months.

As Morozov and Shulman correctly criticize against slacktivism, these activities are just limited in social media and incapable of achieving intended goals (Shulman, 2009; Morozov, 2009). “My Stealthy Freedom” is just a page on Facebook with which no on the ground movement have been standing along. Since 2014 when Masih Alinejad founded the page, there has been no demonstration, protest or dissent against compulsory hijab in the real world in Iran. “My Stealthy Freedom” is all about shooting photos and publishing them on social media, with anonymity and without any argumentation about Iranian women’s rights or any reasonable solution for law change around hijab.

This Facebook current has not enticed lawyers and activists in Iran to do something real about the possibilities of change. It has not even targeted a considerable majority of ordinary Iranian women since the differentiation of internet access is still an issue in Iran and social media users are still a small group of the society. According to Global Internet Report (2015), there are no exact number of Facebook users in Iran, due to its filtering. Several unofficial reports and statistics about consumption and penetration of Facebook in Iran have been published by different national and international organizations in which the number of Iranian users on Facebook estimated differently. While some reports compute about 10 million Iranian Facebook users in Iran, Ali Janati, Iran’s Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance, has claimed that there are about 4 to 4.5 million active Facebook users in Iran by Feb 2014 (Tabnak, 2014). Among all Iranian users of Facebook, only 997,760 people have liked “My Stealthy Freedom” page and can be considered the frequent users of its content. However, a group of five or ten million users is a small minority in comparison with about 80 million population of Iran. Moreover, there is no record and statistic about the number of female users among this minor group.

Anonymity is also a crucial issue in “My Stealthy Freedom” flow. From the first days of the page’s activity, people who send their unveiled photos to this page have been assured that their photos will be published in the page with anonymity. In all the sampled 50 photos and captions, names and identities of the contributors maintain hidden and in the most cases, the Facebook account of the owner of the photo has not been mentioned. Moreover, in 16 samples among 50, the photo has been captured in a way that the face of the unveiled women is dim and unidentifiable.

Alinejad claims, “These women are extremely brave because they have posted their photographs on Facebook, which is banned under the law in Iran… They are in a way daring the authorities to arrest them.” (Carpenter, 2014). However, despite her exaggeration about the risk of publishing an unveiled photo on Facebook, the anonymity brings the users a secure safety from being under any risk in real life. In addition, according to different news reports and research, Iran’s government owns the internet surveillance instruments after the 2009 post-election protests, but from 2014 until now, no user or participant of “My Stealthy Freedom” page has faced any risk of arrestment.

Besides, anonymity also makes “My Stealthy Freedom” flow unable to unify people for a probable future real social or political movement. As people stay unknown in a social media gathering, they will not feel any responsibility or commitment to participate in a real-world on-the-street version, due to several risks of being a real protester. It is predictable in a way that women who present their protests against hijab only on Facebook and only with the assurance of anonymity are less likely to participate in a real social movement or dissent.

One substantial point about “My Stealthy Freedom” is simply the main adjective with which this flow introduces itself: stealthy. Actually, this is a very suitable adjective. The page encourages Iranian women to take their photos in a public location without scarves and send them to “My Stealthy Freedom” page on Facebook. Looking at the 50 sampled photos on “My Stealthy Freedom” page, all of them have been captured in places that nobody else is around. The locations differ from faraway green forests and farms to uncrowded parts of beaches and outlying alleys or small streets. In most cases, nobody is seen in the photo except the unveiled woman who is the main subject of the photo.

It is quite easy to take a picture without scarf while nobody can see what you are doing. So, Iranian women go to uncrowded places in uncrowded times; stealthily take some photos without scarves and put the hashtag of stealthy freedom under them, but who is going to see this demonstration against hijab? Not the government or approvers of the law, and not even a majority of ordinary people, but just Facebook users. Clearly, in the name of this page, as well as in the process of shooting the photos, there is no clue of protesting something in the real world or trying to make any kind of pressure in order to affect compulsory hijab law and restrictions of clothing freedom. It is just an easy stealthy performance by the page’s users for the page’s users.

In addition to the ease of stealthy and safe activity, the photos in the page have also been taken in the easiest and simplest way and without any special professional photography techniques to present a specific meaning or value. Many of photos are just taken in a typical frame, with a similar form; they show an unveiled woman who has raised her scarf in the sky and located in an empty background, forest, beach, street, etc.

The captions are also written in the simplest manner and with similar arrangements. Reviewing 50 captions under the sampled photos can show that the captions are mostly written in a way in order to target emotional response from the readers. Many of them emphasized on the good feeling of being unveiled and self-enjoyment of the person who has appeared on the photo. Clearly, in most cases, there is no considerable demand for a real social and political movement against compulsory hijab or a serious call for any specific action in order to organize people for opposition. As well as that, under many photos, there is no caption in which the necessity of law change has been argued. There is no even a clue of an attempt to create an alternative narrative versus the notion of hijab that can entice religious people to support the freedom of clothing. Some example of the photos and captions:

Photo

Caption

We talk stealthily. We laugh stealthily. We grow old stealthily. And when we die, they stealthily put a flower beside the photo of our obituary. When you have the right to choose, then you

won’t breathe stealthily…

My dear female compatriot: Unfortunately, this world that we are in has not been a very compassionate place to us, Iranian girls. According to some [religious] people here, the heaven in the other world after our death is also restricted to those women that are covered. I am so fed up with this world that makes life hell for women; I feel suffocated.

I am a woman, but since I decided not to censor myself anymore, I feel more proud of being a woman. I hated hijab since childhood. Every September my mother would take me to the salon to cut my hair short like boys so that it wouldn’t bother me under my hooded scarf (obligatory at all schools).

I’ll leave my hijab to the wind. Maybe the wind would carry my dreams as well until one day I get to hold my dreams in my arms.

Although many oppositional currents on social media have not succeeded to demonstrate real protests in the real world, some claim that these cyber and social media based flows have crucial functions to create a new understanding of the old concepts and breaking the clichés. In respect to this idea, there have been several claims that “My Stealthy Freedom” has broken stereotypical images of Iranian women and opinions about hijab. For instance, as Karimi (2005) argues, it allows Iranian women to construct their identities against the impositions such as rules of so-called “standard” norms and behaviors.

However, it has to be mentioned that a long time before the foundation of this page, many Iranian women have been uploading their unveiled photos to their Facebook pages. Actually, from the first days of social media usage in Iran, many unveiled photos have been uploaded in there and the image of an unveiled Iranian woman is not a weird unseen image, particularly among social media users. Moreover, it has been years that Iranian women are breaking stereotypical opinions and strict understanding of hijab on the streets by their divers types of clothing, different fashions, and colorful lousy hijab; a long time before the foundation of this Facebook page.

Finally, back to the notion of feel good activism, many of female users of “My Stealthy Freedom” have been publishing their unveiled photos on their Facebook pages from the beginning, but this time, they can enjoy feeling as they are doing a protesting act. This can be proved by reviewing captions in which the users express their proud about publishing their pictures and shout similar slogans about changing the compulsory hijab. All users of the page feel good about themselves and feel like being activists, but nothing changes in the real world;

a big majority of Iranian women may even have not any specific clue to think about the possibility of changing their mind about hijab, and Iran’s government do not even care about the existence of such a Facebook page. Moreover, those who see these photos in this Facebook page do not find anything more than what they have already seen on personal profiles and photos on Facebook. Anyway, with the help of Facebook, some Iranians satisfy that they are participating in a social protest and some others introduce themselves as human right activists, but nobody has no real effect on the society or on the lack of women’s freedom of clothing in Iran.

Conclusion

“My Stealthy Freedom” is well fitted with the concept of slacktivism, as a limited flow in social media that has no meaningful social or political impact in the real world. This Facebook page contains the main features of slacktivism in its contents, photos, and captions. It just exists in cyberspace and does not have any power or effectiveness to create any social and political movement against compulsory hijab due to weak ties between the users and anonymity. All the photos and captions have been produced in the easiest and simplest manner and represent a kind of easily performed activity. The photos that have been published on the page, are mostly taken stealthily in uncrowded locations without any risk on one hand and are poor and non-qualified in term of photographic techniques on the other hand. Similarly, the captions just entice emotional response and do not present any serious debate about the necessity of protest against obligatory hijab or law change. Finally, “My Stealthy Freedom” does not even break any cliché or red line about hijab since the stereotypical notions about hijab had been broken a long time before, but just makes the users feel good about themselves. Participating in “My Stealthy Freedom” provides a secure and safe way for ordinary women to enjoy having the illusion of being women’s rights activists, with no required attempt or real activity.

In conclusion, despite the positive claims about the “My Stealthy Freedom”, that commend this Facebook page as an effective movement or significant kind of activism for women’s rights in Iran, this flow cannot be considered as a social or political movement against obligatory hijab. It is just a flow of slacktivism in cyberspace and social media, which makes its users feel good about themselves, but does not have the nature of a social or political movement. It cannot make any pressure on Iran’s government about law change, it does not

have any impact on social change in the real world and it seems to be completely unable to mobilize their users for a real social and political movement against compulsory hijab in the future.

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