Straightedge Distribution FAQ
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How do I get genesis STR tokens?
90% of genesis STR tokens will be distributed automatically to anyone who participated in the [Edgeware lockdrop](https://edgewa.re/faq/) by locking ETH or signalling from an Ethereum EOA. The remaining 10% of tokens will be placed in the community pool, which governance can use to allocate as a founders’ reward to entities contributing to the launch of the Straightedge project.
How do I redeem my STR?
It’s easy: All genesis token holders will be able to claim STR using the same mnemonic as the key they generated for the Edgeware lockdrop. To claim your tokens, follow the instructions here:
https://github.com/heystraightedge/straightedge#importing-lockdrop-keys
What are the changes from the Edgeware distribution?
Edgeware is an exciting new project with a novel distribution model (the lockdrop). However, the design of signalling in the Edgeware lockdrop leads to many edge conditions that delegitimize the lockdrop and centralizes the initial distribution. To ensure a balanced token model that is both legitimate and inclusive of both lockdrop and signal participants, a number of distribution improvements have been made prior to genesis.
1. Remove Signalling on Behalf of Contracts
2. Remove Generalized Locking
3. All signalled funds distributed in genesis
Why is getting the initial distribution right so important?
The initial token distribution is of vital importance to any blockchain project with a viable economic model. This is especially true when on-chain systems of governance allow protocol level and other changes to be made through the votes and signals of token holders. Should an initial token distribution favor certain parties, dominant voting groups and blocks will continue to increase their power and distribution over time, shaping the future of any such ecosystem.
What’s the issue with signalling on behalf of contracts?
Allowing contract deployers to signal on behalf of contracts is a fundamental misunderstanding of the premise of smart contracting systems. Smart contracts are meant to be autonomous software that are independent of their initial deployer. For example, in the Golem and the Digix project multi-sigs, two of the largest in the Ethereum ecosystem, the deployer of the contract isn’t even a member of the multisig, yet is able to signal on behalf of all of funds. The same is true for many of the largest contracts on Ethereum, like the Wrapped Ether (WETH) contract, and we wanted to make this right in Straightedge.
What’s the issue with generalized locking?
A last minute change called Generalized Locking was added to the Edgeware lockdrop. It was declared that “Generalized Lock” occurs when “an address that calls ‘Signal’ is unable to sign a transaction with msg.value greater than 0 for the entirety of the 3, 6 or 12-month lock durations”, and in these cases “that signal can be treated as a lock for the purposes of the allocation award”.
By removing the ability to signal on behalf of a contract, Straightedge has solved for Generalized Locks and other edge case vulnerabilities. However, it is still worth explicitly pointing out some of the issues with the policy. First, it places undue burden upon the launchers of the network to audit and decide on different generalized lock contracts, which may contain edge cases such as bypassing locking by issuing derivatives of the locked Ether (such as with WETH). Further, if a contract does not correctly lock, or if code claiming to be a lock bypasses detection through underhanded Solidity techniques, it could break the legitimacy of the initial distribution of the entire network. Removing generalized locking removes the necessity for case-by-case decision-making by a launch-team, and other edge case vulnerabilities.
Were these faulty design decisions made in Edgeware to allow distribution to the victims of locked funds in the November 2017 Parity Multisig Exploit?
The Web3 Foundation, the largest victim of the Parity bug, has a very close relationship with the Edgeware project, and it is likely it is due to the influence of the Web3 Foundation that these odd design decisions were made in the construction of the Edgeware lockdrop. But in trying to right a wrong by recovering funds, design decisions were made that could threaten the legitimacy of the project as a whole.
Let’s be clear: Like many in the community, we feel for groups like the Web3 Foundation, and others affected by these attacks, but an open system of governance is one in which the people have a say, while a system in which rules are changed to provide select parties with powerful voting shares is not open. In the case of Edgeware, the potential for an open-future was impeded prior to launch by late-stage changes to a token distribution model that aimed to artificially provide favor to a small, select group of individuals and teams. The result would provide a substantial voting-percentage of all network-tokens to a party or parties not in control of the funds for which tokens are rewarded.
Nonetheless, the Web3 Foundation’s support in funding the development of Parity Substrate (the framework upon which Straightedge is built) is undeniable. To that end, possible ways of rewarding them would be to use Straightedge’s decentralized on-chain governance process to award those with funds locked in the Parity multisig with the Straightedge tokens that they would have earned, had a successful signal been possible. This would allow the Web3 Foundation to successfully execute on its goal of recovering value from their locked funds in a way that protects the legitimacy of the project, and which puts the issue to governance and ecosystem participants. Should such a proposal be rejected by governance, the receiver of the 10% founder’s reward can also optionally choose to share their cut with the Web3 Foundation or Parity if they so see fit.
