The Taiwanese Experience under Japanese Colonialism and KMT Authoritarianism

Prior to the lifting of Martial Law in 1986, Taiwan has been a politically quiescent society struggling through a historical succession of foreign government regimes, which included the Dutch and Spanish, Zheng Cheng-gong’s reign, the Qing dynasty, Japanese colonialism and more recently the KMT (Nationalist Party). Prior to Japanese colonial rule in 1895, Taiwan had been inhabited by Austronesian aborigines and Han Chinese (Hokklo and Hakka ethnic groups) immigrants from the Fujian and Guangdong provinces since the sixteenth century.[1] That being said, the distinct and coherent consciousness of these Han Chinese immigrants as “Taiwanese” began to form under the Japanese regime and later became politicized during the KMT reign.[2] Thus, comparing the Taiwanese experience under Japanese colonialism and KMT authoritarian rule provides us with an understanding of how the struggle for self-governance and human rights emerged, developed, and eventually led to the island’s democratization. This paper will trace the similarities and differences between regimes, how they established strict governing mechanisms, quashed dissention, industrialized economically and institutionalized cultural assimilation practices to satisfy their own needs and not the needs of the Taiwanese. The legacies of both regimes are two-fold: while the Taiwanese’s standard of living and level of education improved under both the Japanese and KMT, they paid a huge price for this progress, enduring second-class citizenship, discrimination, economic exploitation all under repressive police states. Although the different historical circumstances by which both regimes inherited, administered and transformed the island makes it difficult to evaluate and judge the Taiwanese’s experience, I will acknowledge these incongruences and strive to evaluate parallel characteristics between the two regimes in their own right.

Although the Japanese and KMT shared similar ways of establishing its governing regime, the ways in which they utilized Taiwan for their own purposes were different. The Japanese had recognized the military advantages and economic potential of Taiwan and sought to develop it into an affluent colony that could serve as a military base for Japan’s southern territories.[3] Hence, Taiwan was part of Japan’s empire-building and was considered an “overseas possession” (gaichi), a mirror term for “Japan proper” (naichi). According to the legal definition for gaichi by the Statistics Bureau of the Cabinet, Taiwan was to be treated as the extension of Japanese laws and to be integrated into Japan proper in the near future.[4] As a part of Japan’s empire building, Taiwan was annexed based on the assumption that Taiwan could contribute to Japan’s expanding economy and become a useful market for Japanese goods. Moreover, for military purposes, Taiwan could serve as base to safeguard Japan’s vulnerable south and potentially extend Japanese influence in southern China or southeastern Asia in general.[5] The KMT’s arrival, on the other hand, was a temporary retreat from the mainland in 1949 when the KMT lost to the communists in the Civil War. Between one to two million civilian and military refugees arrived alongside the KMT party and intended to use Taiwan as a temporary haven from which to counter-attack and recover the mainland. Though this goal was never realized for the forty years of authoritarian rule, the political elite of the KMT instead suspended the constitution of the ROC, institutionalized a prolonged period of martial law and suppressed the Taiwanese without regard for their political struggle for autonomy.[6] In other words, even though KMT propagandists insisted that the return to Chinese rule was truly a “restoration” or “re-integration,” in reality, the newly arrived troops and officials treated Taiwan as they treated other parts of Japanese-occupied China, while confiscating property and harassing the local populace.[7] Thus, although the governor-general of Japan possessed similar authoritarian rights, one should not be surprised by this, given Taiwan’s colonial relationship with Japan — as opposed to an “integrative” one with the KMT.

The Taiwanese perception of both regimes’ initial establishment also highlighted their differences. When Taiwan was ceded to Japan in accordance to the Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895, it became a domain of the Japanese. Hence, the Meiji government had to grapple with implementing a governmental structure in order to maintain an effective and prolonged colonial regime.[8] As a result, the Meiji not only entrusted the Governor-General of Taiwan with military and executive command, the rigorousness and efficiency of implementing administrative laws were so successful and orderly that the Taiwanese viewed the KMT as dishonest and corrupt carpetbaggers.[9] For example, the colonial administration issued sophisticated and detailed administrative laws, established administrative ordinances and a prefecture system, and commissioned teams of shokutakuin (part-time employees), koin (clerks or employees), gishi (technicians), and gite (technical assistances) to Taiwan, in order to ensure a stable pyramidal structure of ruling.[10] Although any government would have had difficulties managing Taiwan’s post-war economic situation, the KMT’s lack of efficient governance created the context for Taiwanese political resistance. First, bad management and corruption by undisciplined soldiers and officials from the mainland contrasted with the Japanese’s emphasis on the importance of the rule of law that was strict, yet predictable.[11] Instead, the KMT confiscated all Japanese property (even those that belonged to the Taiwanese) and occupied important positions in the provincial administration, state enterprises and monopoly bureaus.[12] Moreover, the KMT established state monopolies on goods (i.e. tobacco, alcohol) and ineffectively controlled grain prices which led to high inflation and unemployment, as well as housing shortages.[13] Public health and sanitation standards were so neglected that a cholera epidemic hit the southern parts of Taiwan during the summer of 1946 and the bubonic plague resurfaced for the first time since 1919.[14] Finally, the KMT’s policy of cultural integration via the enforcement of using Mandarin and the banning of Japanese was vehemently criticized as well. Thus, given that the KMT, unlike the Japanese, did not see the economic potential of the Taiwanese populace nor make Taiwan’s welfare a priority, perceptions of the KMT’s administration’s corruption and ineptitude were defined by the standards and legacy that the Japanese colonial administration left behind.

While it can also be argued that sustained armed resistance against Japanese occupation suggests a similar — if not a more brutal Japanese regime, it is important to note that Taiwanese resistance to Japanese occupation had less to do with Taiwanese identity and more to do with responding to the nature of a military, colonial occupation. The 5-month war between partisan resistance and the Japanese military after the seizure of Peng-hu in late March 1895 was indeed more militant and violent than the KMT’s initial retreat to Taiwan.[15] However, as Harry Lamley argues, only a small percentage of the island’s population participated in the resistance; while many responded solely against to the Japanese military, others assumed a submissive behaviour and even a small percentage collaborated.[16] Moreover, the reasons for joining the Taiwanese democratic government’s opposition was primarily based on their general discontent toward Japan and the behaviour of the Japanese soldiers, and not because they were fighting under some united democratic front to preserve Taiwanese nationalism.[17] Therefore, despite similarities in the means by which both regimes pacified and suppressed dissent, the subsequent partisan resistance was not based on the preservation of a distinct Taiwanese identity, whereas public opinion against the KMT’s initial failures echoed a more nationalistic tone.

In fact, it was the positive aspects of Japanese colonialism of modernizing and industrializing Taiwan that still ran deep among those Taiwanese that benefitted from those developments: Japan initiated economically beneficial reforms that improved Taiwan’s industrial base and transportation infrastructure.[18] Thus, when KMT propagandists justified their sinicization policies under the pretense to undo “Japanese enslavement,” many Taiwanese intellectuals denied the accusation that japanization had resulted in their enslavement. For example, Taiwanese critic and poet Wang Baiyuan argues that japanization was precisely the necessary condition that made Taiwan a modern capitalist society:

It is shallow, insulting and self-deceiving to label someone as a being “enslaved” only because they cannot speak fluently or write competently in Mandarin Chinese…Taiwanese people, though under oppressive Japanese rule, had nevertheless been baptized by a high level of capitalism; there are very few feudalistic vestiges left among the people. This is something we can be proud of.[19]

Another Taiwanese intellectual, Wu Zhuo-liu, shared a similar sentiment and argued that the Japanese education system allowed for a more modern scientific education.[20] Hence, as the KMT equates the inability to speak Mandarin and the deeply-rooted Japanese cultural practices to enslavement, a vast majority of intellectuals reject this notion and instead view japanization as a form of western modernization.[21] Thus, because the Taiwanese could not differentiate Japanese colonialism with KMT “re-integration,” the arrival of both regimes was equally exploitative, while the new KMT government was deemed “particularly deficient in honesty, competence, predictability and efficiency.”[22]

To illustrate Wang Baiyuan and Wu Zhuo-liu’s nostalgia for Japanese modernization in Taiwan, Goto Shimpei’s colonial reforms laid the foundation for extensive economic industrialisation in Taiwan. First, he improved and completed the railway project that connected the northern port near Taipei and the southern seaport in Kaohsiung; postal and telegraph systems were expanded and the first modern newspaper and telephone services were introduced. In terms of economic modernization, under Goto’s administration, accounting and banking systems were introduced and the Bank of Taiwan was founded in 1899.[23] Second, to further improve economic growth, Goto modernized the sugar industry by promoting scientific methods for farming and provided subsidies to sugar producers. The monopolization of opium, salt and tobacco products and subsequent land reforms both enabled an increase in tax revenues, which in-turn funded public health projects and educational institutions.[24] Although there was systematic discrimination towards the Taiwanese with regard to educational opportunities, Goto’s selective admissions process still enabled the brightest to advance in scientific research and medicine. As a result, the advances in medical standards and educational systems led to a gradual rise in living standards and an emergence of a more educated Taiwanese elite.[25] To demonstrate exactly how important these reforms were to Taiwan’s industrialisation process, it is necessary to compare the extent of this development under Qing rule. Prior to Japanese arrival, narrow roads were only 30 centimetres wide, most people relied on walking or single wheeled rinrikishas for travel, and modern means of transportation did not exist.[26] From 1898 to 1906, Goto built over 9,380 kilometres of roads that ranged from 6 to 24 feet wide.[27] This comparison outlines that during the first half of colonial rule, the colonial administration already made drastic changes to modernize Taiwan’s infrastructure.

The latter half of Japanese rule — although overshadowed by wartime imperialization (kominka) policies — intensified the development to Taiwan’s economy and infrastructure in order to fulfill the role as a military base for the “southward advance” (nanshin). For example, industrialisation entailed the production of new industries such as bauxite, iron ore, crude oil and rubber from Malaya and the East Indies.[28] In preparation for war, massive hydroelectric installations were constructed and modern industrial complexes were stationed at seaports, notably large Japan Aluminum Company plants operating at Hualien and Kaohsiung in 1940. Not only did heavy industry make substantial leaps in modern technology, the consequent industrial growth increased the number of skilled labourers in manufacturing plants to around 147,000, while workers in the mining, transportation and communications industries rose to 214,000 by mid-1943.[29] Because the work force was in high demand for skilled labour, enrollment in elementary and vocational schools peaked, which eventually gave rise to a much more literate generation in the Japanese language.[30] It is within this context of modernization under the Japanese that many Taiwanese intellectuals during the first years of KMT rule were nostalgic for.

Similarly, under the KMT, Taiwan also underwent an economic “miracle” from the mid-1950s to the 1970s. However, the difference between KMT and Japanese development was that the KMT had substantial economic and political support from the United States. While this fact does not undermine the KMT’s successful economic planning, it is worth noting that international-relations factors should not be overlooked. American foreign policy vis-à-vis Taiwan and China shifted during the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. While the U.S. did not particularly favour either side during the Chinese Civil War, the U.S. government, amidst a Cold War to contain communism, saw Taiwan as a vital actor to prevent the spread of communism in East Asia. Hence, in 1951, the U.S. not only resumed economic and military aid to the KMT and established a US Military Assistance and Advisory Group in Taiwan, the change in U.S. foreign policy gave Taiwan the opportunity and economic means to focus on internal economic reform.[31] In the context of the Cold War, Taiwan served as model in contrast to the PRC to show how a US-supported Taiwan is able to prosper under a capitalist system. From 1951 to 1964, the U.S. offered US $1.5 billion in non-military aid; of the annual US$100 million, about two-thirds was spent on the development of infrastructure projects and a human resources program that included the dispatch of specialists (i.e. the JCRR and the Council on U.S. Aid) to Taiwan to train technicians and advise policy-makers.[32] In late 1959, the Council for U.S. Aid took over the responsibility of economic planning and development worked out a comprehensive nineteenth-point program in 1960 and promised an additional loan of US $20 to 30 million to encourage the KMT to accelerate Taiwan’s economic growth.[33] Moreover, the success of land reform related to rural programs can also be attributed to the financial support and planning of the Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR).[34] Therefore, the statistical and anecdotal evidence of the island’s economic growth demonstrate that American aid played a vital role in making the Taiwan “miracle” possible.

Even though it can be argued that Taiwan under the KMT was much more prosperous than under the Japanese, America’s direct involvement only complicates such comparison. Nevertheless, in the same way that the Japanese improved the infrastructure and economic stability that Taiwan under Qing rule lacked, Taiwan, under KMT rule also experienced a rapid economic surge. The reactivation of the Central Bank of China in 1961 stabilized the currency, while the Bank of China and the Bank of Communications were also reactivated in 1960 to accommodate domestic industries and foreign investments. Furthermore, statistics show that the agricultural labour force declined from 52.1% in 1952 to 35% in 1971, while industrial workers increased from 20.2% to 30%.[35] It is evident that Taiwan’s transformation from an agricultural to an industrial economy echoed similar results during Goto Shimpei’s reign. Even the Kaohsiung harbour was revamped into an export processing zone in December 1966, promulgated by the Statute for the Establishment and Development of the Export Processing Zones. These zones not only absorbed large amounts of foreign investment (US $1.8 million), this program created over 1,500 jobs and increased exports to an annual US $7.2 million by 1968.[36] Like the Japanese, the KMT’s rapid economic development improved the living standards of the Taiwanese, but the mutually beneficial relationship between the U.S. and the KMT were ironically unfavourable to those that rejected the legitimacy of KMT rule. While the Taiwan-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty of December 1954 not only demonstrated the U.S.’s commitment to defend Taiwan from communism, it also legitimized KMT rule as the true representative of China in the international community and more importantly put a “leash” on Chiang Kai-shek from preparing a recovery of the mainland.[37] On the one hand, the Taiwanese benefited from this “leash,” given that Chiang Kai-shek would have most likely allocated more of the received US aid to his military expenditures. On the other hand, the legitimization of KMT rule maintained the regime’s oligopoly over domestic affairs and their political authority to crush dissention. Thus, both regimes were successful in improving and developing Taiwan’s economy, while the KMT had received considerable help as a participant in the international realm.

Despite the subtle differences between the ways in which both regimes implemented and enforced cultural assimilation policies (japanization and sinicization), these cultural projects demonstrates a severe impediment to the question of Taiwanese identity. In the colonial context of assimilation (doka), the Taiwanese were expected to give up their culture and Chinese heritage in order to become fully Japanese and serve the needs of the empire. Although this can be seen a form of cultural genocide, Lamley argues that there was a humanitarian element to this assimilation project. The alleged doctrine of doka seemed to promise equal treatment for the Taiwanese after the japanization process, indicating that the Taiwanese would eventually share the same benefits with the naichijin.[38] In fact, after Den Kenjiro replaced Akashi Motojiro as Governor-General in October 1919, Den replaced Akashi’s segregated school system with an integrated system whereby all government schools became accessible to both Taiwanese and Japanese students, while the admission process was based on the student’s background in spoken Japanese rather than on race.[39] The subtle humanitarian aspect of this assimilation policy is an important distinction to the KMT’s more rigid and immediate implementation of sinicization policies. This is not to suggest that Den did not enforce the cultural indoctrination whereby all Taiwanese were to be imbued with Japanese culture and language — which he did, but the Japanese colonial administration nonetheless acknowledged that assimilation had to be implemented gradually in order to be effective.

Although the rhetoric of equality was maintained under governor-general Kobayashi, the doka movement intensified and became kominka (imperialization) at the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese in 1937. Kobayashi justified his efforts to implement the imperial subjugation of the Taiwanese on the basis of Japanese and Taiwanese “equality”:

I think the Japanese and Taiwanese are all the children of the emperor. There is no great difference between their abilities. And since there is a whole string of islands connecting the two places, certainly I think all discriminative policies making distinctions between the Japanese and the islanders should be removed. I will make “Japan and Taiwan as one” (naitai itchi) as my basic strategy [and] making an effort to make them our equals in the spiritual and intellectual dimensions.[40]

It is clear that what Kobayashi meant was that equality is granted insofar his imperial subjects are no longer Taiwanese. For this purpose, wartime rule in Taiwan became totalitarian and the major control mechanisms such as the strict household gentry, constant police surveillance and the presence of both paramilitary and military units came into effect.[41] Kobayashi introduced the first set of kominka policies in April 1937 by banning all Chinese sections of newspapers and abolished Chinese texts from elementary school curriculums, at a time when only one-third of the population was proficient in Japanese.[42] This policy was actually announced in March 1947, not by the government, but by the Taiwan Daily News.[43] Matsuda Takechiyo, a representative of the Minsei Party, was concerned with this language policy: “There are five million ethnic Han and only about two hundred thousand Japanese in Taiwan. I do not understand how you can talk about elevating the spirit of the citizen on one hand and on the other suddenly abolish the Chinese section in news media…I think it is outrageous to try to abolish the Chinese language.”[44] Compared to the resistance against the KMT’s Mandarin Language Police, the Japanese effectively implemented kominka with less resistance from the Taiwanese populace because assimilation practices had already took place throughout the first half of colonial rule. Other kominka policies included a name-changing campaign (kaiseimei) in 1940, which sought to replace Chinese with Japanese names.[45] Kobayashi even forced his imperial subjects to adopt Shintoism as the official religion: Shinto shrines were constructed and religious idols from native temples were removed.[46] And finally, cultural indoctrination was systematic in schools as students were taught the divine origin of Japanese imperial rulers, the superiority of the Japanese race and the imperial mission to create a new world order.[47]

Nevertheless, I would argue that Japan’s assimilation project had more leeway and flexibility in the literary and linguistic sphere than the KMT’s policies. Under colonial rule, the Japanese allowed the continuity of poetry societies or shishe, which existed from the end of Qing rule to the early 1940s.[48] In fact, the number of poetry societies totalled 98 by 1934 and surprisingly flourished under the Japanese because the colonial administration adopted a conciliatory approach to go along with its vision of gradual assimilation. Thus, in 1900, governor-general Kodama Gentaro and Goto Shimpei sponsored a poetry group called the Yobunkai and promoted classical Chinese poetry writing.[49] Moreover, it is important to underline the fact that the banning of Chinese in newspapers was not enforced by any law or ordinance because the colonial administration would not risk international criticism that would accuse the administration of impeding free speech.[50] This is precisely why the announcement was made by a newspaper company 1 month earlier to not only warn the populace of the incoming policy, but also to make it seem like it was a voluntary and joint effort by all media companies to follow kominka. As a result the authorities allowed the continuation of the Chinese literary magazine Fengguebao and an art journal called Taiwan yishu.[51] These exceptions demonstrated the colonial administration’s flexibility and their consistent efforts to assimilate the Taiwanese gradually. The KMT, on the other hand, adopted a much stricter language policy. For example, little more than a year after occupying Taiwan, the KMT enforced the banning of Japanese in newspapers and magazines on October 25 1946, whereas literary Chinese was still being used in mass media forty years after the inception of Japanese rule. This was done at a time when approximately more than 57% of the population understood Japanese and written Japanese was six times more widely used as common language than literary Chinese.[52] Thus, while the KMT took full advantage in seizing the education system and mass communication industry to disseminate the national language in the same way that the Japanese had, the KMT’s immediate enforcement by law makes the regime look less tolerant than the Japanese.

Before I address the social ramifications of the KMT’s immediate sinicization policies, it is necessary to outline how the KMT justified their policy of “reintegration.” The KMT’s task was to incorporate non-citizens or the japanized Taiwanese into the Republic of China. This meant that the KMT had to “un-japanize” the Taiwanese and reconstruct their consciousness by embarking on a process of sinicization via law enforcement and the creation of social institutions that would promote Chinese culture.[53] The KMT justified this assimilation project under the pretense that Taiwan was culturally Chinese during Qing rule. Though it is true that literary Chinese was used for written purposes under the Qing examination system, the educational language was Taiwanese and not Mandarin. In fact, literary Chinese was pronounced differently throughout Taiwan in a variety of local dialects.[54] Because of this false historical assumption, the KMT vastly overestimated the speed at which the Taiwanese could learn mandarin and the reinforced distinctions between Mainlanders and Taiwanese only undermined the KMT’s goal of social integration. For example, in 1972, all television stations could not air more than 1 hour per day of Taiwanese-language programs; and in 1976, a law was passed that gradually cancelled Taiwanese shows and eventually replaced them with only Mandarin shows. This contributed to an immense frustration, particularly the older generations that had already learned Japanese under colonialism, whom resented the imposition of another foreign language.[55] For the generation that was educated since KMT arrival were also abused in schools via fines, slaps, public humiliations and other forms of punishment if they were to speak their native dialects in schools.[56] Apart from strict language enforcement, cultural indoctrination was also part of the sinicization process. In the public sphere, Chinese gentry culture was presented as the superior national culture and was validated in school curriculums and in public spaces, including plazas, monuments and city streets, which were renamed by the KMT to promote Nationalist ideals and Confucian values.[57] Even school text books teach history from the perspective of China and the KMT’s goals to recover the mainland; hence, Taiwan was merely seen as temporary refuge and any distinct characteristics of Taiwanese culture were barely mentioned.[58] Thus, in terms of cultural assimilation practices, both the Japanese and KMT reinforced an obvious imbalance between the attention given to Taiwan and to their national/imperial goals.

Apart from the cultural assimilation practices and economic advantages that Taiwan experienced under both regime, there were also many similarities in the ways in which the Japanese and the KMT institutionalised control mechanisms to oppress the Taiwanese. In March 1896, when Kabayama requested special authority to exert more complete control over Taiwan, the Imperial Diet enacted “Law 63,” which authorized the governor-general to issue ordinances and granted supreme legislative power, which is in many ways similar to Chiang Kai-shek’s Martial Law of 1948.[59] Law 63 enabled the colonial administration to have almost complete control over Taiwan’s political, economic, social and cultural affairs. For example, police enforcement — although effective — was abusive and intrusive, as the authorities extended their services beyond law and order and were able to enforce regulations pertaining to agriculture, hygiene, sanitations and behavioural conduct.[60] The colonial administration also relied on the hoko system, a two-level structure consisting of household grouping that are nominally selected to oversee civilian behaviour and liaised with the police.[61] The hoko system was a highly discriminatory system where only the Han Taiwanese were required to register, while Japanese and foreign residents were exempt. This not only exposed the Taiwanese to police brutality in the form of household fines and corporal punishment for petty violations, but the system also maintained the economic exploitation of the Taiwanese by financially devastating families (i.e. ¥2,400 in hoko negligence fines).[62] Eventually, cases involving “the collective responsibility for criminal hoko violations” and criminal cases declined before 1928, which demonstrates the effectiveness of the hoko system, relying on the morality of local elites to exercise control over local residents without increasing the size of the police force.[63] Although these control mechanisms featured harsh Japanese rule and hardships suffered by the Taiwanese, this sort of subjugation is almost expected from a colonial power and in some cases understandable. The KMT’s oppression, on the other hand, can be argued to be inexcusable given their “re-integration” rhetoric and their shared Han Chinese ancestry.

To further illustrate that claim, no parallel occurrence to the magnitude of the February 28 Incident ever existed during Japanese rule and thus can be seen as a deciding factor that deems the KMT as a more repressive and corrupt regime than the Japanese. After KMT arrival, the problems of reintegration, inflations, grain shortages, corruption and cultural conflict escalated into a confrontation between investigators of the Monopoly Bureau and a woman selling illegal matches and cigarettes on February 27, 1927. After a bystander was unintentionally shot, the Taiwanese lashed out against the KMT and other mainlanders. [64] While the initial outbreak was brought under control, the Taiwanese was thereafter subjected to the longest period of Martial Law in modern history.[65] In March 1947, the Taipei committee grew into an organization consisting of prominent Taiwanese nationalists that advocated for self-government, which was similar to the demands articulated during the Japanese-era.[66] The KMT reacted to this growing momentum of dissention by bringing military reinforcements from the mainland and indiscriminately shot and rounded up Taiwanese that criticized or opposed the government.[67] The KMT not only used this opportunity to suppress nationalist rebellion, the government also strategically wiped out members of the Taiwanese intellectual and managerial elites that were trained and educated under Japanese rule.[68] While common estimates range from 10,000 to 20,000 killed and 30,000 wounded, one should not overlook the scope of this massacre, given that many were brutally tortured.[69] For instance, one of the victims, Wang Tien-teng, who criticized the KMT and advocated for autonomy, was doused with gasoline and burned to death.[70] Therefore, it is evident that memories of the 2–28 Incident provided a larger rallying point for an opposition movement than those that took place during Japanese colonialism.[71]

Moreover, when the KMT arrived, the Taiwanese elite who had assimilated their standards and values with the Japanese were disappointed and at times shocked to see their “Chinese brethren” so corrupt. In early December 1948, the Taiwan High Court ruled that all property transactions made after August 15, 1945 were invalid, which allowed the state to confiscate any property acquired by the Taiwanese after that date.[72] Thus it is not surprising that one intellectual accused the KMT of corrupt carpetbaggers: “Although we bitterly detested the brutal colonial rule of the Japanese, we cannot deny that, under Japan’s perfected system of civil service, obedience to the law and administrative efficiency made the Japanese incomparable to the KMT’s corrupt feudal regime.”[73] This sort of corruption and dishonesty can be characterized by the KMT’s manipulation of local politics and their security apparatus during the “White Terror” during the 1950s. The first method to check and control politicians was by bribing for cooperation, which includes economically beneficial licenses issued that granted privileges in banking, insurance, transportation and securities. Secondly, the KMT manipulated political factions so that not one faction can dominate an area. Thus, by permitting these factions to take turns controlling the mayoralty or the city council, the KMT could maintain long-lasting support and cooperation. [74] With regards to the enhanced security apparatus during the 1950s, the Materials Section under the Presidential Office was transformed into the National Security Bureau under the new National Defense Council in 1955, which became the most effective instrument for suppressing any political opposition.[75] This security apparatus cracked down on alleged Communist conspiracies during the White Terror, but in practice, imprisoned and executed thousands of Taiwanese based on insufficient evidence and was in fact just a pretext to eliminate government criticism.[76] For example, a professor of the Political Science Department at National Taiwan University was arrested and sentenced to 8 years in prison for issuing the “Self-Rescue Declaration of Taiwan” in 1964 that advocated for a Taiwanese democracy.[77] Although the KMT enjoyed the economic successes during the “Miracle,” it did not loosen its grip on domestic policies prior to the 1970s, and was only slightly loosened during Chiang-Ching kuo’s political reforms from the 1970–1980s.[78] Hence, it seems clear that the KMT regime’s dishonesty, corruption and its equally repressive institutions are inexcusable, given the expectation of sovereignty restoration and more difficult to reconcile when compared to the more-or-less expected subjugation under a colonial regime.

The final difference between the regimes is the development of Taiwanese consciousness that emerged during colonial rule and became more sophisticated and politicized during KMT rule. The birth of Taiwanese consciousness can be traced to the resistance movements led by a second generation of Taiwanese since the inception of Japanese rule. Philips argues that Japanese education and affluence fostered Taiwanese elite that would eventually lead resistance movements as part of its drive for self-autonomy.[79] For example, the Taiwan Cultural Association was created in 1921 and promoted Taiwanese culture and the establishment of a separate Taiwanese parliament for self-governance.[80] This was part of a series of Taiwanese-inspired movements after the New People’s Society in 1920 was founded.[81] Hence, from 1920 to the 1930s, resistance leaders refused to assimilate, criticized Law 63 and opted to advance the establishment of home rule. However, despite Den Kenjiro’s liberal inclinations towards assimilation, the colonial administration quashed these proposals forcing the Taiwan League for Local Self-Government in 1930 to backtrack their position on parliamentary rule.[82] While colonial rule brought order and industrial development to Taiwan, the Japanese discriminated against the Taiwanese, denying them opportunities in high-ranking administrative positions and imposed assimilation practices.[83] Within this context, the mentality of isolation contributed to the birth of Taiwanese consciousness under the Japanese occupation.

Similarly, the further maturation of Taiwanese consciousness under the KMT was due to the same conditions that gave birth to it in the first place. The first condition was the socioeconomic changes during the 1970s to 1980s that led to the creation of a more politically conscious society. The impact of the far-reaching modernization of Taiwan, the Taiwanization of the government, intermarriage and the emergence of the second generation of mainlanders born in Taiwan, blurred the distinctions of cultural identification and complicates our comparison with Japanese colonialism.[84] Although Taiwan’s experience under KMT rule redefined Taiwanese identity from a pure ethnic and cultural level to a socio-economic level, the KMT’s cultural imperialism and suppression of freedoms still reinforced Taiwanese consciousness. As a result, these socioeconomic transformation produced a society in Taiwan that was highly educated, adopted middle-class values and was now a position to advocate for political demands.[85] This created the internal and domestic unrest that eventually pressured Chiang Ching-kuo’s government to lift Martial Law in 1986 and establish a multiparty system in the mid-1990s. The second factor was the unintended backlash of the KMT’s sinicization policies. The issues of ethnic differentiation were a product of the direct acts of suppression of the Taiwanese language and the biases against Taiwanese culture in both education systems and the public sphere. Because there was little concern for the preservation of major historical sites amidst drastic urbanization, local communities had to pressure authorities to preserve historical communities such as Lu-kang, San-hsia and Pan-chiao.[86] While the KMT intended to promote asset of attitudes and beliefs that would promote Chinese culture and reunification, this active promotion, in reality, denied the validity of Taiwanese culture and impelled the Taiwanese to grasp and cultivate their own cultural identity.[87] Thus, while a coherent and distinct Taiwanese consciousness was not fully realized in the public sphere prior to Japanese occupation, this consciousness not only developed and strengthened during KMT rule, but was more widely expressed, spearheaded by the tang-wai movement.

Interestingly, while the KMT became more politically open due to internal pressures and international isolation, Japan intensified its tight administrative control during wartime.[88] Given that the end of Japanese colonialism was not decided by Taiwanese nationalist movements, it is impossible to evaluate whether or not the KMT regimes was better or worse because of the development and development of Taiwanese consciousness that reached different levels during both regimes. While Taiwan underwent far-reaching economic and industrial leaps under both regimes, its occupiers planned these reforms for their own national and political goals. As many would argue that the cultural assimilation policies and political control mechanisms during both regimes were equally abusive and oppressive, Japanese assimilation was slightly more humanitarian and embarked on a more gradual transition, whereas the KMT were more rigid and ruthless under the guide of “reintegration.” Moreover, the corrupt nature of KMT rule, along with the inexcusable February 28 Incident are crucial points that differentiates the governance of both regimes. Thus, these two factors largely provoked the existing Taiwanese consciousness which finally pressured the end of authoritarian rule.

Endnotes:

[1] Fuji Shozo, “The Formation of Taiwanese Identity and the Cultural Policy of Various Outside Regimes,” in Taiwan under Japanese colonial rule, 1895–1945: History, Culture, Memory, eds. Ping- Hui Liao and David Wei-Wang (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 64.

[2] Given that this paper is focused more on the distinct political consciousness of the “Taiwanese,” which vastly represents the Han Chinese immigrants rather than the aborigines, I will not include indigenous peoples in my analysis.

[3] Murray A. Rubinstein, “Introduction: The Taiwan Miracle,” in Taiwan in the Modern World: The Other Taiwan, 1945-Present, eds. Murray A. Rubinstein (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), 4.

[4] Hui-Yu Caroline Ts’ai, Taiwan in Japan’s Empire Building: An Institutional Approach to Colonial Engineering (Routledge, 2009), 25.

[5] Harry J. Lamley, “Taiwanese Under Japanese Rule, 1895–1945: The Vicissitudes of Colonialism,” in Taiwan: A New History, eds. Murray A. Rubinstein (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 203–204.

[6] Alan M. Wachman, “Competing Identities in Taiwan,” in Taiwan in the Modern World: The Other Taiwan, 1945-Present, eds. Murray A.Rubinstein (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), 21.

[7] Murray A. Rubinstein, “Introduction: The Taiwan Miracle,” 4.

[8] Hui-Yu Caroline Ts’ai, Taiwan in Japan’s Empire Building: An Institutional Approach to Colonial Engineering, 15.

[9] Ibid., 31, 42–43; Alan M. Wachman, “Competing Identities in Taiwan,” 20.

[10] Hui-Yu Caroline Ts’ai, Taiwan in Japan’s Empire Building, 40–42, 61.

[11] Steven Philips, “Between Assimilation and Independence: Taiwanese Political Aspirations Under Nationalist Chinese Rule, 1945–1948,” in Taiwan: A New History, eds. Murray A. Rubinstein (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 283.

[12] Ibid., 287.

[13] Ibid., 284.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Harry J. Lamley, “Taiwanese Under Japanese Rule, 1895–1945: The Vicissitudes of Colonialism,” 205, 208.

[16] Ibid., 208.

[17] Fuji Shozo, “The Formation of Taiwanese Identity and the Cultural Policy of Various Outside Regimes,” 69.

[18] Alan M. Wachman, “Competing Identities in Taiwan,” 20.

[19] Ying-Che Huang, “Were the Taiwanese being ‘enslaved’? The Entanglement of Sinicization, Japanization, and Westernization,” in Taiwan under Japanese colonial rule, 1895–1945: History, Culture, Memory, eds. Ping- Hui Liao and David Wei-Wang (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 317.

[20] Ibid., 318.

[21] Ibid., 323–324.

[22] Steven Philips, “Between Assimilation and Independence: Taiwanese Political Aspirations Under Nationalist Chinese Rule, 1945–1948,” 282.

[23] Harry J. Lamley, “Taiwanese Under Japanese Rule, 1895–1945: The Vicissitudes of Colonialism,” 209.

[24] Ibid., 210.

[25] Ibid., 211.

[26] Fuji Shozo, “The Formation of Taiwanese Identity and the Cultural Policy of Various Outside Regimes,” 68.

[27] Ibid., 71.

[28] Harry J. Lamley, “Taiwanese Under Japanese Rule, 1895–1945: The Vicissitudes of Colonialism,” 237.

[29] Ibid., 237.

[30] Fuji Shozo, “The Formation of Taiwanese Identity and the Cultural Policy of Various Outside Regimes,” 63.

[31] Peter Chen-main Wang, “Bastion Created, A Regime Reformed, An Economy Reengineered, 1949–1970,” in Taiwan: A New History, eds. Murray A. Rubinstein (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 321.

[32] Ibid., 328.

[33] Ibid., 331–332.

[34] Ibid., 325.

[35] Ibid., 332.

[36] Ibid., 333.

[37] Ibid., 325–326.

[38] Harry J. Lamley, “Taiwanese Under Japanese Rule, 1895–1945: The Vicissitudes of Colonialism,” 204.

[39] Ibid., 221.

[40] Kawahara Isao, “The State of Taiwanese Culture and Taiwanese New Literature in 1937: Issues on Banning Chinese Newspaper Sections and Abolishing Chinese Writings,” in Taiwan under Japanese colonial rule, 1895–1945: History, Culture, Memory, eds. Ping- Hui Liao and David Wei-Wang (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 130.

[41] Harry J. Lamley, “Taiwanese Under Japanese Rule, 1895–1945: The Vicissitudes of Colonialism,” 236.

[42] Kawahara Isao, “The State of Taiwanese Culture and Taiwanese New Literature in 1937,” 123, 130.

[43] Ibid., 122.

[44] Ibid., 125.

[45] Harry J. Lamley, “Taiwanese Under Japanese Rule, 1895–1945: The Vicissitudes of Colonialism,” 240.

[46] Ibid., 241–242; Kawahara Isao, “The State of Taiwanese Culture and Taiwanese New Literature in 1937,” 130.

[47] Harry J. Lamley, “Taiwanese Under Japanese Rule, 1895–1945: The Vicissitudes of Colonialism,” 243.

[48] Fuji Shozo, “The Formation of Taiwanese Identity and the Cultural Policy of Various Outside Regimes,” 72.

[49] Ibid., 73–74.

[50] Kawahara Isao, “The State of Taiwanese Culture and Taiwanese New Literature in 1937,” 137.

[51] Ibid., 137–138.

[52] Fuji Shozo, “The Formation of Taiwanese Identity and the Cultural Policy of Various Outside Regimes,” 67, 74.

[53] Ying-Che Huang, “Were the Taiwanese being ‘enslaved’? The Entanglement of Sinicization, Japanization, and Westernization,” 313.

[54] Fuji Shozo, “The Formation of Taiwanese Identity and the Cultural Policy of Various Outside Regimes,” 67, 72.

[55] Alan M. Wachman, “Competing Identities in Taiwan,” 53.

[56] Ibid., 53; Todd L. Sandel, “Linguistic Capital in Taiwan: The KMT’s Mandarin Language Policy and Its Perceived Impact on Language Practices in Bilingual Mandarin and Tai-gi Speaker,” Language in Society 32, no. 4 (September 2003): 523–551.

[57] Alan M. Wachman, “Competing Identities in Taiwan,” 55.

[58] Ibid., 40–41.

[59] Harry J. Lamley, “Taiwanese Under Japanese Rule, 1895–1945: The Vicissitudes of Colonialism,” 204.

[60] Ibid., 213.

[61] Ibid.

[62] Hui-Yu Caroline Ts’ai, Taiwan in Japan’s Empire Building, 101–102.

[63] Hui-Yu Caroline Ts’ai, Taiwan in Japan’s Empire Building, 87, 102; See p. 55 for discrimination in the colonial administration Tsai 55; and p. 48–49 for Japanese economic privileges.

[64] Alan M. Wachman, “Competing Identities in Taiwan,” 47.

[65] Marc J. Cohen, Taiwan at the Crossroads: Human Rights, Political Development and Social Change on the Beautiful Island (Washington DC: Asia Resource Center, 1988).

[66] Steven Philips, “Between Assimilation and Independence: Taiwanese Political Aspirations Under Nationalist Chinese Rule, 1945–1948,” 294.

[67] Ibid., 295.

[68] Murray A. Rubinstein, “Introduction: The Taiwan Miracle,” 4.

[69] Steven Philips, “Between Assimilation and Independence: Taiwanese Political Aspirations Under Nationalist Chinese Rule, 1945–1948,” 296; Murray A. Rubinstein, “Introduction: The Taiwan Miracle,” 4.

[70] Steven Philips, “Between Assimilation and Independence: Taiwanese Political Aspirations Under Nationalist Chinese Rule, 1945–1948,” 296.

[71] Alan M. Wachman, “Competing Identities in Taiwan,” 47.

[72] Steven Philips, “Between Assimilation and Independence: Taiwanese Political Aspirations Under Nationalist Chinese Rule, 1945–1948,” 298.

[73] Alan M. Wachman, “Competing Identities in Taiwan,” 45–46.

[74] Peter Chen-main Wang, “Bastion Created, A Regime Reformed, An Economy Reengineered, 1949–1970,” 327.

[75] Ibid., 330.

[76] Ibid., 330.

[77] Ibid., 335.

[78] Although I acknowledge that Chiang Ching-kuo was moderate than his father, took steps that enabled a more open civil society, cleansed corruption and initiated the processes of Taiwanization, his oppressive measures nonetheless overshadowed his policy of tolerance. See Alan M. Wachman, “Competing Identities in Taiwan,” 21, 24 for the KMT’s policy platform shift; For Chiang’s reforms, see Murray A. Rubinstein, “Political Taiwanization and Pragmatic Diplomacy: The Eras of Chiang Ching-kuo and Lee Teng-hui, 1971–1994,” in Taiwan: A New History, eds. Murray A. Rubinstein (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 437–439; And for Chiang’s oppression and tolerance policies during the 1980s, see Murray A. Rubinstein, “Political Taiwanization and Pragmatic Diplomacy: The Eras of Chiang Ching-kuo and Lee Teng-hui, 1971–1994,” 443–446.

[79] Steven Philips, “Between Assimilation and Independence: Taiwanese Political Aspirations Under Nationalist Chinese Rule, 1945–1948,” 278–279.

[80] Harry J. Lamley, “Taiwanese Under Japanese Rule, 1895–1945: The Vicissitudes of Colonialism,” 231–232.

[81] Ibid., 233.

[82] Harry J. Lamley, “Taiwanese Under Japanese Rule, 1895–1945: The Vicissitudes of Colonialism,” 233; Steven Philips, “Between Assimilation and Independence: Taiwanese Political Aspirations Under Nationalist Chinese Rule, 1945–1948,” 279.

[83] Hui-Yu Caroline Ts’ai, Taiwan in Japan’s Empire Building: An Institutional Approach to Colonial Engineering, 48–49, 55.

[84] Murray A. Rubinstein, “Taiwan’s Socioeconomic Modernization,” in Taiwan: A New History, eds. Murray A. Rubinstein (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 384, 338, 391.

[85] Ibid., 395.

[86] Ibid., 390.

[87] Alan M. Wachman, “Competing Identities in Taiwan,” 42.

[88] It is important to note that the KMT did in fact enacted reforms within the party that gradually made it less corrupt. But I will still argue that tang-wai forces was the driving force that led to the democratization of Taiwan.