Diagnosing Religion in Violent Extremism
By Naved Bakali and Abaas Yunas
At an expert meeting held in Barcelona, Spain, organized jointly by a number of United Nations agencies including the Union for the Mediterranean (UFM), United Nations Women (UN Women), and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Tabah Futures Initiative, along with a number of researchers, academics, NGOs and UN agencies, was invited to explore and discuss the theme of ‘The role of women and young people in promoting peace and countering violent extremism in the Euro-Mediterranean region’. The major focus of the discussions was centred on Islamist inspired religious extremism.
One of the most interesting debates that came from this meeting of experts was the extent to which religious beliefs and ideology play a mobilising role in the process of radicalisation. Some researchers advocated that religion played a minor role, if any, in the process, others believed that religion played a defining role, whereas some argued that religion initially played a lesser role in the radicalisation process and eventually became a more primary guiding factor at a later stage. Their argument was that as individuals became indoctrinated in the ideology of extremist groups, they increasingly framed their cause and motivation in strictly religious terms.
The researchers and academics who downplayed the role of religion in contributing to acts of violent extremism argued that structural factors — social, political, and economic, primarily explained the motivations for acts of violence committed by radicalised individuals. From this perspective, social factors such as poor familial relations or knowing friends who had joined terrorist organisations were identified as being a primary push factor. Furthermore, it was found that some individuals joined Muslim ideological movements looking for a sense of comradery, fraternity, and belongingness to a genuine ‘Muslim community’. Such individuals may have felt alienated in their home societies, and because of discrimination or social marginalisation, joined groups like ISIS and Al-Qaida to get ‘revenge’ against their home nations.
The debate over the role of religion in the radicalisation process continues to generate heated opinion and contention, and many of the discussions at the conference were reflective of this reality. But how is religion and ISIS-type extremism ought to be understood? Our view on the place of religion in the architecture of radicalisation begins by setting a few important premises for the discussion.
First, in the case of Islam there is a mainstream, diverse and normative Sunni tradition that is broadly in agreement on its core tenets and underlying methodology by which knowledge in scriptural sources is understood and extracted. In the present day, institutions like Al-Azhar are the most visible representatives of that tradition, though a majority of the religious traditions in the countries of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) also adhere to it.
Second, when we talk about religion and Islamist extremism, we are talking specifically about a religious ideology with a clear geneaology that represents an explicit divergence from the mainstream tradition. Our partner initiative, Sanad, has undertaken detailed work in this regard.
Third, religious ideology and structural factors are not mutually exclusive in causing radicalisation. Context and circumstances dictate which of those is more operative than the other. In some localities structural factors are, while in others religious ideology is. Even where structural factors are more operative, religious ideology is the bedrock that contextualises those structural factors within the narrative and worldview of extremist religious ideology. Whether it is the identity and belongingness issues faced by young Muslims in Western countries, or economic impoverishment faced by North African youth, or the political despair viewed by some young Arabs, extremist religious ideology exploits these grievances within the context of providing redemption through ‘religion’ and ‘religious’ solutions. We call this the ecosystem of religious ideological extremism.
In light of these premises, we don’t believe that we ought to look for a consensus on the roots of radicalisation but to appreciate complexity; that a plurality of causes are possible in varying contexts and, by extension, a plurality of interventions and solutions are required. The expert meeting in Barcelona offered indications towards an appreciation of complexity but the ensuing challenge remains: how do we create meaningful syntheses between the insights of the religious, social, political and economic realms that can be translated into practical endeavours on the ground?
