An Aristotelian Conception of Self-Love
On how the most important friendship of virtue is the one you have with yourself
Part 1: Introduction
For Aristotle, the highest goal in life is to achieve eudaimonia, true happiness or human flourishing. To achieve eudaimonia, one must be virtuous (1095a20). Aristotle closely associates friendship with virtue, arguing that “[friendship] is a virtue or implies virtue, and is besides most necessary with a view to living” (1155a3). If friendship is ‘most necessary with a view to living’ and the ‘highest goal in life is to achieve eudaimonia’, then friendship is necessary for eudaimonia. In other words, if we are to truly understand Aristotle’s conception of eudaimonia, we need to closely examine his theory of friendship.
A common charge against Aristotle’s theory of friendship is that it entails rational egoism, namely, that in Aristotelian friendships, one is more concerned with one’s own interests than that of their friend (Whiting, 277). This is a problem because Aristotle wants to claim that “[the friendship of virtue] is the friendship of men who are good, and alike in virtue; for these wish well alike to each other qua good, and they are good themselves. Now those who wish well to their friends for their sake are most truly friends; for they do this by reason of their own nature and not incidentally; therefore their friendship lasts as long as they are good-and goodness is an enduring thing” (1156b6–10). Thus, it is a mark of Aristotle’s friendship of virtue that such friends ‘wish well alike to each other’ and ‘wish well to their friends for their sake’, such that a friendship where you are more concerned with your own interests than that of your friend, i.e. a friendship that is marred with rational egoism, cannot be a friendship of virtue at all.
Many scholars, such as John M. Cooper and Alexander Nehamas, have grappled with whether or not rational egoism has a place in Aristotle’s theory of friendship. Cooper rejects rational egoism in friendships of virtue, but argues that rational egoism and selfless well-wishing for the other’s sake can coexist in the lesser types of Aristotelian friendship. Thus, Cooper is committed to giving rational egoism a positive role in Aristotelian friendships of pleasure and utility, but not friendships of virtue. Similarly, Nehamas also rejects rational egoism in friendships of virtue, but instead argues that it is because self-sacrifice is a prerequisite to the friendship of virtue. This is because Nehamas believes that being able to sacrifice your own interests for that of your friend is the only true test of whether or not you can wish your friend well for their own sake. If you are unable to do so, then your own interests will inherently be present in such friendships, and you will be unable to truly wish your friend well for their own sake, and hence cannot have a friendship of virtue. On Nehamas’ account, self-sacrifice is impossible, so it follows that friendships of virtue are non-existent, and thus, rational egoism is absent from friendships of virtue as such friendships don’t exist in the first place.
In this paper, I will argue that, contra Cooper and Nehamas, rational egoism is not only present in Aristotelian friendship, but is a necessary prerequisite for friendship, especially Aristotle’s friendship of virtue. I will do this by introducing a distinction in the friendship of virtue: the Friendship of Virtue with the Self versus the Friendship of Virtue with the Other. It is necessary for the virtuous person to be able to actualize a friendship of virtue with himself, establishing a Friendship of Virtue with the Self, such that he is able to wish well for himself because he recognizes the virtue within him. Thus, the Friendship of Virtue with the Self entails rational egoism. Establishing this Friendship of Virtue with the Self will then serve as the basis for all Friendships of Virtue with the Other, such that the Friendships of Virtue with the Other are freed of rational egoism, as the virtuous person is able to satisfy his rationally egoistic needs through himself. I will then address how on this alternative view of Aristotelian friendship, we are able to resolve some difficulties that arise in Cooper and Nehamas’ interpretations, as well as how this view may affect other friendships besides the friendship of virtue.
Part II: Background on Aristotelian Friendship
The three types of Aristotelian Friendship — the friendship of virtue, the friendship of pleasure, and the friendship of utility — are differentiated by whether or not they fall within Aristotle’s primary project of eudaimonia. First, the friendship of virtue is grounded on loving your friend for themselves and for their virtue. You wish well for your friend of virtue for their own sake, because they are paragons of virtue (1156b6–10). Aristotle’s conception of the friendship of virtue is key to his moral philosophy, as he believed that friends of virtue were essential in uplifting your own eudaimonia, making you even more virtuous (1157b5–7). On the other hand, friendships of pleasure and utility are grounded in mutual pleasure and mutual utility, respectively. You may love your friend of pleasure because they bring you enjoyment, or you may love your friend of utility because they bring you useful opportunities, but your love for these friends is not based in their virtue (1156a13–17). Since the friendships of pleasure and utility are not associated with virtue, they don’t fall within Aristotle’s primary project of eudaimonia. Whereas the friendship of virtue may mutually enhance each other’s eudaimonia, the friendships of pleasure or utility provide no such enhancement. Therefore, the friendships of pleasure and utility are lesser friendships in the face of the friendship of virtue.
Part III: On Cooper and Nehamas
Cooper and Nehamas have provided their interpretations of Aristotle’s theory of friendship and its connection (or lack thereof) to Aristotle’s moral philosophy. Moreover, both have grappled with the question of whether or not rational egoism plays a role in Aristotelian friendship. In this next section, I’ll illuminate issues with these popular interpretations of Aristotelian friendship, with respect to their views on rational egoism, and why we should seek an alternative view of Arisotelian friendship that resolves the charge of rational egoism.
On John Cooper in “Aristotle on the Forms of Friendship”
Cooper is fully committed to rational egoism and selfless well-wishing coexisting in the lesser friendships (friendships of pleasure and friendships of utility), but is insistent that friendships of virtue are free of any rational egoist tendencies — friends of virtue wish each other well simply for each other’s sake. For the lesser friendships, Cooper argues that “so long as the general context of profitability remains [in the lesser friendships], the well-wishing can proceed unchecked; the profitability to the well-wisher that is assumed in the well-wishing is not that of the particular service rendered” (Cooper, 639). Thus, Cooper believes that friendships of pleasure or utility can wish each other well for each other’s sake and not their own so long as I am generally still able to derive pleasure or utility from the friendship. For example, Friend A and Friend B can have a friendship of pleasure where they go to parties together on the weekend and have a great time, and so long as the context of going to parties together on the weekend remains, Friend A may wish that Friend B does well on her exam that coming week for the sake of Friend B’s academic interests, or Friend B may wish that Friend A gets the romantic interest that Friend A is longing for, for the sake of Friend B’s love life. However, all of these wishes cease to exist the minute that Friend A and B stop going to parties together on the weekend and having fun, but this condition does not detract from the fact that all of those previous wishes were for the other’s sake and not one’s own. Thus, Cooper believes that at least in the lesser friendships, rational egoism and selfless well-wishing for the other can coexist, so long as the rational egoism is a prerequisite to the well-wishing and present while the well-wishing occurs.
With respect to Cooper’s conception of lesser friendships, the immediate question that comes to mind is this: if your well-wishing for someone else is contingent upon your own pleasure or utility, are you truly wishing well for someone else? Corinne Gartner, in her summary of Cooper’s argument, shares this concern, articulating that “we might worry that this self-interested commitment is at odds with what it is to have disinterested concern for another: To what extent is the agent wishing her friend well for his sake when her well-wishing is both informed and constrained by her own interests?” (Gartner, 144). If well-wishing is inherently defined as wishing well for the other’s sake and not your own, Cooper’s conception of well-wishing for the lesser friendships seems to be contradictory as self-interest is clearly present and even a prerequisite to wishing well for others. This difficulty undermines Cooper’s larger project of trying to show that well-wishing is present in all three types of friendship, because the well-wishing that he claims to be present in the lesser friendships may not be proper “well-wishing” at all.
What could benefit Cooper’s account of Aristotelian friendship is ascribing rational egoism a positive role in friendship. It is clear that Cooper wants to reconcile rational egoism and selfless well-wishing in the lesser friendships, seeking to create the balance between the two by introducing his “context of pleasure/profitability” argument. From this argument, it is clear that Cooper wants to mitigate the negative impact of rational egoism in friendships, as the ‘context of pleasure/profitability’ almost acts as a barrier; so long as the context remains, selfless well-wishing between friends of pleasure or utility can occur without the intrusion of rational egoism. However it is precisely this balance of rational egoism and selfless well-wishing that undermines Cooper’s project for Aristotelian friendship. As long as rational egoism plays a negative role in friendship that is to be mitigated, the presence of rational egoism counteracts selfless well-wishing. In order to strengthen Cooper’s project for Aristotelian friendship, it is worth exploring whether rational egoism can play a positive role in friendships, strengthening the friendships of pleasure and utility, and even the friendships of virtue. In Section III, I intend to provide such an account.
On Alexander Nehamas in “Aristotelian Philia, Modern Friendship?”
Nehamas argues that friendships of virtue are built on self-sacrifice, but is a friendship based on self-sacrifice a friendship at all? As Corinne Gartner best summarizes, Nehamas believes that “the real test of whether an agent wishes her friend goods for his own sake and not merely not for the sake of himself is whether she would be willing to sacrifice one of her own interests for his” (Gartner, 144). From this, we understand Nehamas to attribute a self-sacrifice criterion to friendships of virtue: two friends are only truly friends of virtue if each friend is willing to sacrifice one of their own interests for that of the other. However, Gartner continues that “instead of concluding that all three forms of friendship contain robust regard for the friend, Nehamas argues that none of them satisfy the self-sacrifice criterion: not even the virtuous agents in a complete friendship would sacrifice any interests of their own for the sake of the virtuous friend” (Gartner, 145). Thus, for Nehamas, a friendship of virtue must satisfy the self-sacrifice criterion. Insofar that humans inherently cannot sacrifice any interests of their own for another, they can never achieve the self-sacrifice criterion in any context. Therefore, if the friendship of virtue is hinged on morality, humans are incapable of forming such friendships.
Nehamas supports his argument by citing a line in the Nicomachean Ethics: “But perhaps not exactly all: for everyone wishes the greatest goods for oneself above all” (NE, 1159 11–12). From this passage, Nehamas interprets Aristotle to say that we wish we could bestow the ‘greatest goods’ for one’s friendship of virtue, but ultimately resort to bestowing the ‘greatest goods’ to ourselves, as that follows our human nature. In other words, he does not believe there can exist a truly altruistic, selfless person. Nehamas goes on to argue that “although [Aristotle] recognizes that the virtuous are willing to sacrifice money, honours, and even their life for philoi and country, he does not think of their choice as a genuine sacrifice: in doing so, he points out, they obtain something much more valuable instead — nobility (to kalon): ‘they therefore award the greatest good to themselves’ (NE, 1169 18–2)” (Nehamas, 236). Thus, Nehamas argues that even the greatest sacrifice that we can possibly perceive — to sacrifice one’s own life — is ultimately still a self-interested act, because in doing so the virtuous person awards an even higher good to themselves — the good of nobility. Therefore, if even sacrificing one’s own life for another, the greatest act of sacrifice, is considered a self-interested act, then there cannot exist any other act of self-sacrifice which is not self-interested.
With respect to Nehamas’ conception of friendship, why must ‘wishing your friend goods for her own sake and not merely not for the sake of yourself’ be construed as self-sacrifice? Why can’t you wish your friends goods for her own sake without having to sacrifice your own interests in the process? In fact, is it possible that a friendship where you’re willing to sacrifice your own interests for someone else’s is an unhealthy one? Moreover, if there is a friendship of virtue where both friends are willing to sacrifice their own interests for that of the other, could they be unhealthily obsessed with each other to a point that they cannot even acknowledge their own needs? For example, let’s suppose Friend B and Friend C are in a friendship of virtue. Friend C loves to sleep and Friend B loves to talk about herself. If Friend C regularly sacrifices a good night’s sleep so she can listen to Friend B talk about her day, over time, Friend C will start to get fatigued from sleep deprivation. Similarly, if Friend B regularly sacrifices her interest in talking about herself such that Friend C can sleep, Friend B will feel overly isolated and unheard. Is the friendship between Friend B and Friend C a friendship of virtue because of their mutual self-sacrifice? Or is the friendship actually just a bond between two people who deny themselves of their needs for some other reason? If it’s the latter, then such a friendship doesn’t seem quite virtuous at all.
Moreover, even if we accept Nehamas’ criterion about self-sacrifice being the crux of a friendship of virtue, we must ask: why does Nehamas think humans are incapable of self-sacrifice? Let’s take his most prominent example of someone sacrificing their life for another. If Person A sees Person B about to be hit by an incoming truck, and she runs out in the middle of the street and pushes Person B out of the way only to be hit herself, in the milliseconds that she had before making her decision to give her life, did she really meticulously weigh her decision as giving herself the ultimate good of nobility? Is it not possible that perhaps Person A simply saw someone in need and leaped to the rescue? Nehamas may counter this example and reason that prior to this situation, Person A had really reflected on her values and virtues and came to a decision that if she were ever in a situation where she saw someone in need, she would leap to the rescue and potentially even give her life, because she wants to be a hero. However, I would argue that thinking about giving your life in dire situations and actually doing so are two very different things. For the latter, I think something more instinctual than rationality kicks in that springs a person to action, and this is the very instinct that makes humans fully capable of self-sacrifice without any ulterior motives or gains.
Part III: The Friendship of Virtue with the Self versus the Other
Before we proceed with an alternative view of Aristotelian friendship, we need to make an important distinction in Aristotle’s friendship of virtue:
- The Friendship of Virtue with the Self
- The Friendship of Virtue with the Other
The Friendship of Virtue with the Self is the friendship that the virtuous person has with himself, such that he is able to wish well for himself because he recognizes the virtue within him. This Friendship of Virtue with the Self is wholly concerned with the virtuous person’s rationally egoistic needs, and this friendship must be established before the virtuous person establishes any Friendships of Virtue with the Other. It is in this way that Friendships of Virtue with the Other can be freed of rationally egoistic tendencies, and that friends are able to wish well for each other, for the other’s sake and not their own.
Aristotle consistently argues that a virtuous person “is to his friend as he is to himself” and in many ways, various features of the friendship of virtue are paralleled in the virtuous person’s relationship to himself (1166a30). He articulates that a virtuous person’s relationship to himself is realized when a person “desires the things in respect of his whole soul”, experiencing pleasure and pain in relation to the same things, wishes well for his rational self, and enjoys his own company (1166a15–20). Aristotle argues that “it is therefore because the good man has these various feelings towards himself, and because he feels towards his friend in the same way as towards himself (for a friend is another self), that friendship also is thought to consist in one or other of these feelings, and the possession of them is thought to be the test of a friend” (1166a29–32). The usage of ‘same’ in this passage presupposes an ordering that the virtuous person’s feelings towards himself must come before his feelings towards others. If the virtuous person ‘feels towards his friend in the same way as towards himself’, then the virtuous person must be able to understand and feel for himself first, before he can feel similarly towards others. It follows that if the virtuous person is to have friendships of virtue with others, he must first have a friendship of virtue with himself. This friendship of virtue with the self, I would suggest, is the basis for all other friendships of virtue.
In order for Aristotle’s argument that a virtuous person ‘is to his friend as he is to himself’ to be true, the virtuous person must already have an understanding of a friendship of virtue with respect to himself; otherwise, he would have no standard by which to treat his friend. In this way, rational egoism in friendships of virtue, specifically in those friendships of virtue with the self, is absolutely necessary, for it is only when we recognize and cultivate our own virtue for our own sake that we are able to truly wish well for others for their own sake. If we fail to develop a friendship of virtue with ourselves first, we lack a proper standard to treat or even to cultivate other friendships of virtue, as we won’t know how to ‘treat our friend as we are to ourselves.’ In this way, it is necessary for the virtuous person to be able to actualize a friendship of virtue with himself, such that he is able to wish well for himself because he recognizes the virtue within himself, before he is able to actualize friendships of virtue with others. Thus, if we want to truly be able to wish well for others for their own sake, we must first allow rational egoism its place in our friendship of virtue to ourselves. On this alternative view, rational egoism plays an essential role in friendships of virtue, specifically the friendship we have with ourselves. If we first cultivate a friendship of virtue with ourselves, which by nature is rationally egoistic, then we are in a better position to be a friend of virtue to others. This is because when we learn to see and value the virtue within ourselves, we are better able to see and value the virtue in others, and love them and wish them well as a result.
Moreover, if we are able to wish ourselves well for our own virtue in our friendships of virtue with ourselves, we are less likely to seek this behavior in our friendships of virtue with others. This is because if we are able to wish well for ourselves for our own sake, and genuinely work to promote our own eudaimonia through our friendship to ourselves, we will not be lacking in the need to be wished well for our own sake, and will not seek to receive it from others. This is really important, because a common issue with interpreting Aristotelian friendship is understanding if there are selfish interests at play in all friendships, including friendships of virtue. Popular readings have concluded that in friendships of virtue, for example, you wish well for your friend of virtue because of their own sake but also because you benefit from that friendship, perhaps from them wishing you well in return. Thus, one question that arises is as follows: are you truly wishing your friend well for their own sake, if your own interests are in consideration as well? Under my interpretation, we satisfy our needs to be wished well for our own sake in our friendships of virtue with ourselves, so we never get to the point where we require others to wish us well for our own sake. Thus, we are able to avoid the question about selfish interests at play in friendships of virtue altogether, while keeping the concept of Aristotelian friendship intact.
In first establishing a friendship of virtue with ourselves, we achieve two things: 1) a standard by which we cultivate friendships of virtue with others and 2) removal of rational egoism from our friendships with others. When we first form a friendship of virtue with ourselves, we learn to see and value the virtue within ourselves, and as a result, we are better able to see and value the virtue in others, and love them and wish them well for their own sake. Moreover, in these friendships of virtue with ourselves, we are able to satisfy our natural rationally egoistic needs such that we stop seeking that satisfaction from our friendships with others, which is the root of the rational egoism charge against Aristotelian friendship. On this alternative view, we are able to see rational egoism in our friendships of virtue with ourselves not only as a force that strengthens our friendships with others, but as a necessary prerequisite to them.
Furthermore, this view strengthens Cooper’s project for Aristotelian friendship. Cooper ultimately wants to have some form of selfless well-wishing present in all three types of Aristotelian friendships. However, his approach involves introducing a delicate balance between rational egoism and selfless well-wishing, as well as a ‘context of profitability or pleasure’ that ultimately undermines his project for Aristotelian friendship. Instead, if we adopt this alternative view that ascribes a positive role to rational egoism, such that we actively encourage the presence of rational egoism in our friendships of virtue with ourselves, we create a clear path to Cooper’s goal: allowing selfless well-wishing to exist in friendships of pleasure, utility, and virtue. Through a rationally egoistic friendship of virtue with the self, we remove selfish interest from our friendships with others, including the friendships of pleasure and utility, because we have satisfied selfish interest in our friendships of virtue to ourselves. In other words, we are able to do away with the paradox of Cooper’s ‘context of profitability/pleasure’ argument, because by first prioritizing the development of a friendship of virtue with yourself, we actively allow for self-interest to come first. Once we satisfy self-interest, we are then able to wish well for others for their own sake, as Cooper desires. Thus, we resolve Cooper’s issue of conflicting self-interest by simply reordering when the self-interest takes place, thereby allowing the satisfaction of self-interest to occur prior to the conception of friendships of virtue with others.
If we adopt this alternative view of Aristotelian friendship, we are also able to overcome Nehamas’ self-sacrifice criterion, by eliminating self-sacrifice as a criterion overall. This follows because to truly be able to wish well for the other, we no longer need to sacrifice one of our own interests for that of the other, but we instead satisfy our interest first before selflessly wishing well for the other. By actively prioritizing rational egoism in the conception of our friendship of virtue with ourselves, we are able to free ourselves of self-interest when it comes to wishing well for the other for the other’s sake.
By ascribing a positive role to rational egoism in friendship, we overcome many of the difficulties that we encountered in both Cooper and Nehamas’ interpretations of Aristotelian friendship, namely Cooper’s ‘context of pleasure/profitability’ argument and Nehmas’ self-sacrifice criterion. Both interpretations ascribed a negative role to rational egoism, as something that at best should be mitigated in Aristotle’s overall theory of friendship. Instead, if we see rational egoism as a positive force that enhances our friendships of virtue with ourselves, which in turn serves our friendships of virtue with others, we are able to defend Aristotelian friendship against the negative charges of rational egoism.
Part IV: Conclusion
Overall, I have argued that rational egoism not only plays a role in Aristotelian friendship, but that it is a necessary prerequisite to the formation of any Friendships of Virtue with the Other. If we accept my distinction between the Friendship of Virtue with the Self and the Friendship of Virtue with the Other, we can see that the Friendship of Virtue with the Self must be wholly concerned with satisfying rationally egoistic needs, such that virtuous person is able to see the virtue within himself, wish himself well for his own sake, and actively build towards his own eudaimonia. If the virtuous person is able to do this for himself through his Friendship of Virtue with the Self, then he will not ask this of his other friends, namely his friends of virtue, and as a result, is able to wish well for his Friendships of Virtue with the Other for their own sake, and not his own sake. In this way, we allow Aristotle’s theory of friendship to remain within his framework of eudaimonia, and have a clearer picture of how we can achieve such eudaimonia ourselves.
Works Cited
Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Penguin Publishing Group, 2020.
Cooper, John M. “Aristotle on the Forms of Friendship.” The Review of Metaphysics.
Nehamas, Alexander. “Aristotelian Philia, Modern Friendship?” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy.
Gartner, Corinne A. “Aristotle on Love and Friendship.”
Whiting, Jennifer. “The Nicomachean Account of Philia.” The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.
