On reflexivity of sociotechnical changes: There are not (enough) philosophers
“A person gets on an airplane, flies from point A to be and then get off. The proper interpretation of the technology in the mode of use seems to be nothing more complicated than occasional, limited, and nonproblematic interaction” (Winner, 1986 p.6) Winner invite us to think about How technologies transform the forms of human lives? In his essay Technology as forms of life (1986). He argues in it about the role of the philosophy of technology could aim to confront not only technological determinism — Technology as the essential cause of change in our lives; also, technological somnambulism — ignoring to the changes that technology is having on our lives. The author reflects about the dimensions in which artifacts transform human activities analyzing the conformation of problematic relationships that overcome the simplistic classical distinction between making and use. The document is a call for reflexivity in the sphere of the complexity of artifacts and system. The paper is not an invitation to observe the life on the artificial, but a reflection about the human reflexivity on socio-technical change.
Socio-technical theories are an extensive collection of the multidisciplinary proposal, several of them epistemological and ontologically divergent. A systematic review of perspectives about socio-technical change was developed by Sovacool and Hess (2017), incorporating an extensive analysis of the objects of analysis of socio-technical change. He describes a triade agency-structure-meaning among artifact interpretation as a nucleus of most technological theories. (730–735) Although all of them are options against technological determinism, few of these categories are recalling concepts or methods from technological philosophy, that shows continuity with Winner’s position about the philosophy of technology which “…[S]hows…little of enduring substance” (p.4).
Also, the paper pays attention a how technology affects our language, incorporating the perspectives from Marx and Wittgenstein when in their works ask us to notice “what we say when” (p.16) Winner approach can help us recognize the way language reflects the content of technical practice. In Sovacool and Hess paper we find that meaning and relational theories -which combine the three elements of the triade — about socio-technical change relies on the need for exploring the linguistic dimension of technology. (p.737–738) Nevertheless, what language is relevant to grasp inquiry about technology? Winner proposes to explore all expression of language because all of them are embedded with techno-scientific assumptions, rooted in Wittgenstein’s philosophical investigation (p.11) Current theories of socio-technical change seems less concerned in generating models about the tension meaning and practice than to analyze social transformations.
Winner concludes his contribution with the normative position that must incorporate philosophical inquiry into our technological practices to confront technological somnambulism. In my perspective this is a challenge for current socio-technical understanding, which isolates philosophical reasoning to a collection of tricky ontological questions — As well, what is technology? — Instead to incorporate it into the definitions and boundaries of socio-technical models. Even dominant theories about technology share a bit or none from Marxist contributions about technological change, which are a foundational contribution Winner (p. 738). The lack of reflexivity and self-reflexivity denounced for Winner seems maintained by current academic approximation to the artificial phenomena. This dissonance between theories and reflections are an opportunity to continue exploring strategies and models to confront technological somnambulism, not only for users or innovators but also — a most urgent — in researchers and scholars understanding of socio-technical constitutions.
