Examining the Ukraine War through Russian Grand Strategy & Game Theory
By Kishika Mahajan
This paper examines the strategic underpinnings of the Russian invasion of Ukraine by employing a game theoretical approach to the grand strategy of the Russian state, while also considering the economic, political and military consequences thereof.
Geography and Territorial Considerations
Russian strategic considerations for the invasion of Ukraine have been multidimensional, with the geographic being of the utmost importance. Though Russia remains the largest sovereign political entity (by landmass) on the planet, its present territorial extent is at its lowest since the establishment of the Russian Empire, when it was at its peak and which further reduced after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. This territorial metric, though not a sufficient indicator of the strength of capabilities of a nation, is nonetheless an important one for any aspiring or great power. After the First World War, Russia lost control over the Baltic states, Finland and Poland, only to regain control after the second World War but after the collapse of the USSR, although the Russian state continued to be the largest country, it lost about two million square miles out of its territory.
Russia’s geography explains why it is keen on extending its hold over its western neighboring areas. Considering the northern and eastern borders of Russia, the Arctic and Pacific Oceans, more specifically Siberia and mountains in the East create a natural barrier which makes it very difficult to reach Moscow (or even gain entry into Russian territory). However, considering Russia’s size, it would be an enormous and expensive task for even the largest forces to extend and maintain any reach further, while entering from the East. In the south, the presence of the Caucasus mountain ranges have a similar effect; however, this natural barrier blessing is not of much help on the western side, where lowland plains predominate over vast areas. The presence of the North European plains poses a great threat to Russia. Simply put, the terrain in this region provides a simpler entry for an invading force to advance into and from this region. Additionally, the lack of access to rivers and the presence of NATO countries on the few available ones, further adds to Russia’s geographical disadvantages here.
Any territorial consideration in the Russian grand strategy, would needless to say, be incomplete without access to and control to a warm water port. This was a major reason for the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. Former Air Force Gen. Philip Breedlove called Crimea a great platform for power projection in the Black sea region for Russia. The port of Sevastopol provides Russia a very important naval base and in particular, it is Russia’s only warm water port which is based in the middle of the Black Sea and not only serves as a natural barrier but is necessary for Russia to have access to sea routes in the region in the first place, let alone ensure the projection of its power in the Black Sea. The Sevastopol port has proved as a major link between Russia and Syria as it has been used to connect Russia with its military base in Syria at Tartus. Sevastopol served as the main point from which supplies were ensured to the Syrian Army. Crimea’s energy reserves could also have been a minor consideration in the annexation in 2014 but abundance in Russia in this regard, and its desire for access to a warm water port, being a top priority, it was the strategic territorial control over the region which formed the bulk of Russian consideration to annex the peninsula into its territory.
Political and Military Considerations
Russia seeks to exercise its power over Ukraine attempting to hinder Ukraine’s process of joining “the West”. The enlargement of NATO, especially further east, of which Ukraine joining NATO would be the final nail in the coffin as it would bring American troops to stay put at the Russian borders. This would increase Russian vulnerability and is bound to significantly weaken Russia’s influence in its own backyard. Not only would this mean Russian operations coming under close scrutiny but would also amount to constraining and containing Russia and adversely impacting its operational ability in the region.
Since the annexation of Crimea, Russia’s encouragement of rebel groups in the eastern regions of Ukraine has been a constant reminder to Ukraine that “Kiev’s infatuation with the flirtatious West [should] not turn into a marriage consummated in the chambers of the EU or NATO.”¹ Russian actions, appear from their point of view, to be a response to an ‘imminent threat’. Hence, any claim regarding preemptive self-defence because the rules of power play seem obvious that a country cannot decide to wait for a nation to act on one’s vulnerability, instead, the smarter thing to do is to take action before the latter can be achieved by the enemy.
The doctrine of preemptive self-defence, under international law, effectively provides the legal right to a country to use offensive military force against a target that poses a threat but has not yet indulged in armed aggression against the said country. The doctrine of preemptive self-defence saw much debate and discussion after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Among the stated objectives and reasons for the US invasion in Iraq was the purported possession of weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) by the Iraqi regime headed by Saddaam Hussain. Whether those were present or not, was never given enough credit. What the USA said that it was effectively doing was protecting itself from something that might happen in the future. A similar stance may be attributed to Russia’s motivation for the current invasion of Ukraine. The position seems to be that before the situation reaches a point wherein the West can further weaken the Russian position by placing troops in Ukraine, Russia finds it better to establish its dominance in the region by ensuring that Ukraine stays away from the NATO path. Thus, Russia, not willing to wait for the US / West to take steps that will weaken its position in the region and hence, sees invading Ukraine as the most effective strategy. This very mindset is used to explain the probabilities in the below game theoretical modelling.
The first situation of both the West and Russia acting on the offensive is the current crisis situation that is currently unfolding in Ukraine. Russia has acted by attacking Ukraine while simultaneously the West is defending Ukraine (attacking Russia) in its own way by severe economic sanctions.
The next three situations in the payoff table provide for the explanations why the first particular strategy was adopted by both the players. In the second situation wherein Russia acts on the offensive and the West doesn’t, it will simply mean that after some basic initial retaliation, Ukraine will actually belong to Russia which is highly dangerous for the West and will definitely put Russia on the map of power play (which the US can’t possibly accept). In total contrast and with the least likelihood is the third condition where Russia is not attacking and the West continues to push. This will be a major loss to Russia which as has been explained above will put NATO on its borders which will mean a severe loss of power in the region. The last situation is something that is not likely to happen at all for this goes against all the rationality and the thought processes of the two players.
For now, if we were to analyze the way Russia has been entering Ukraine, we can observe that much of the fighting started and was centered around the eastern parts of Ukraine. There are several reasons that can describe this move as well. Firstly, one of the major reasons is that this area contains the major Russian speaking or even ethnically inclined groups that were used as a backbone for attack in 2014. As has been described by Ian Bremmer in the “Politics of Ethnicity: Russians in the new Ukraine”, the variability of the application of the principles of ethnic attachment and schism play a key role in understanding the gravitas of the situation. While the degree of ethnic schism might be expected to be low in regards to similar regions and mutual understanding of respective languages, the ethnic attachment that Russians have in Ukraine varies significantly. The lack of feelings of “their own land” in totality somewhere have provided Russia with just the right justification to invade and annex territories, i.e, to protect “their” people. As can be concluded, these groups, on a social level, are expected to provide much less resistance as compared to as we start moving towards the West where the sentiments will be much more stronger in favour of joining the EU. If this is given a lot of importance, this might even pose to be one of the reasons as to why Russia might not extend its invasion to the western regions.
Additionally, analyzing the trend of the invasion, it can be seen that Russian troops entered from Kharkiv in the North, Luhansk in the East and Crimea in the South. Additionally, Russian forces also, very strategically, entered the major port cities of Odesa on the Black Sea and Mariupol on the internal Sea of Azov. This will clearly help Russia in a number of ways ranging from its naval bases and trade routes that will open up. Hence, by occupying these regions, even if Russia now decides to not entirely occupy Ukraine, it has served its strategic purpose in among other other ways, by ensuring a strong presence in the waters which not only serves them well from an economic perspective but even from a security angle. Hence, at all times, there will be Russian troops in and around these key areas of Ukraine while also maintaining a strong control over two of the major port cities of the country.
Economic Considerations
We can further analyze the less obvious factors that can pose to be significant, if not major standpoints for Russian invasion. Among these is the vast endowments of natural resources in Ukraine. If this is one of Russia’s motivations, it is because of the unexploited gas reserves in Ukraine along with the presence of certain metals which are present abundantly like titanium. This is pertinent because China and Russia were the largest importers of Ukrainian titanium, hence, this annexation would provide a strong revenue generating industry, let alone the direct access to these resources.
The maximum retaliation that the West has shown are serious sanctions on Russia as the West has declined to send troops to Ukraine which seems unlikely considering the high costs it entails. Moreover, while it isn’t the strongest agreement, the fact that Ukraine is not part of NATO also takes away that burden of “obligation” to militarily assist the NATO nations. Further, as the US’ midterm elections are approaching, it is really far-fetched that the US will, at this point, consider doing anything of the sort. One of the effects of the sanctions against Russian banks and limiting the use of their forex reserves was the drastic fall of the ruble which has led to Russia doubling its interest rates.
Additionally, we can also consider the case of Nord Stream 2 which is a natural gas pipeline running from Russia to Germany. Europe is heavily dependent on Russia for its gas supplies and this pipeline is meant to supplement the earlier pipeline. The pipeline is currently waiting for approval from Germany. Additionally, it is meant to put aside the hassles of delivering the supplies through Ukraine and Poland. However, after Putin sent his troops into two separatist regions, Germany scrapped the plans for the pipeline for now.
Now, it is difficult for nations to diversify away from Russia’s dominance in energy resources, they have been moving or at least thinking of (or portraying to) move in that direction. For instance, for Germany, in line with its clean air policy, natural gas is the more acceptable choice and with Russia already having one-third of the control before Nord Stream 2 which was only to increase, it would be difficult to meet the same commitments from elsewhere but Germany has indeed been looking toward going back to coal.
Amidst all this, oil and gas prices are rising severely which had led to Biden’s announcement of releasing a million barrels of oil per day to ease the prices (something which might even add to his credit in the midterms). Even though oil prices have taken a drop from the peak of USD 120+ per barrel (WTI) the same remains above USD 104 (as at 26.06.2022). Such high oil prices remain a concern for economic interests in and of the West, not just for consumers but even for businesses, which is bound to have an impact on the domestic political situation, but irrespective of a desire to do so, the political establishment is unlikely to succeed in any tangible manner in this regard. The core reason for this is the same as any economic action — there is a limit to the capacity to which the state can influence such market forces. Even if the West may not turn its back on Ukraine merely because of rising fuel prices, there is no question that it has had and will continue to have a significant impact on its own economic health, and resultantly on the domestic political front, as well.
Thus, unlike the traditional means of war, economic sanctions can’t possibly be a means that can be exploited perpetually and certainly not without detriment to a state’s own economic interests. In a globalised world, and one so promoted by the USA / West, economic sanctions are likely to and will hurt their economic health as well. Such sanctions will not only harm the sanctioning country but the effectiveness of these sanctions will also reduce over a period of time. Hence, as there is a limit to what the West can do just by itself, to examine the effect that sanctions will have on a country like Russia, what is essential to be considered is how strictly will the rest of the world follow the West’s footsteps. It isn’t as direct an implication to assume Russia’s trading partners to cut off their economic ties and that will seriously impair the level of harm inflicted by the West’s actions. The gap in the Russian trade balances can always be filled up by the non-West trading partners and with such trading partners getting better deals than prevailing in the market, they are likely to go with Russia. What strengthens the Russian position in this regard is that it will have the choice to call the shots then go to the highest bidder. Oil prices remaining high is likely to keep Russia on top of this game, at least with respect to the non-Western trading partners looking for better deals.
While one can continue to question the perpetuity of this mode of retaliation, one can not underplay the consequences of the same. The argument that these sanctions can’t last forever has a valid train of thought but so does the fact that whenever the war comes to an end, Russia will bear even more severe consequences than it is now which also seemed far too unreal to happen in the beginning.
The next angle that can be explored is in regards to the motivations that Putin holds as a leader. The fact that the “ideological” angle that governs Putin’s mindset is limited as compared to the strategic objectives, provides some grounds of rationality which will limit a blind annexation of the entire country if his purpose can be fulfilled with a semi-annexation. While it is tempting to say that Russia has not advanced as fast as it was expected to, it would not be imprudent to suggest that Russian advances were perhaps meant to be restricted to areas with a significantly high portion of Russian speakers. While one can easily pin that into an ethno-ideological motivation, the reality is that doing so would only make Putin’s job easier in the post-war aftermath, as such areas are likely to offer reduced resistance and be easier to govern and even, assimilate into the Russian Federation.
Foreign Relations
Further, countries like China and India have chosen to abstain from taking a definite stand in this issue. If we were to think about China’s reasons, one of the most important reasons behind its current position is that Putin represents a Russia which will always be against the US. This is in a very obvious sense a much better scenario for China than an American-compliant Russia, especially when seen from a geostrategic point of view. In that regard, to the south of China, the presence of India is already a cause of concern. However, until now, China doesn’t have to significantly worry about an attack from the North. This will severely change if there is an American-compliant Russia because it will obviously increase China’s vulnerability as there will be high chances of any kind of attack from the north too if such a situation were to arise. Hence, China has emerged as one of the key players that can somehow limit the effects of the sanctions made by the West on Russia.
While China’s abstention, in a passive way, defends Russia’s action, India’s abstention is simply a message which conveys that in diplomacy, not taking a position in itself is a position. India’s hope is to return to diplomacy and dialogue to solve the crisis situation but that hardly seems like a pragmatic option in the current scenario. Another way to look at it is that this neutrality is a reflection of India’s sovereignty to a major extent, the presence of its own stance that goes beyond that of the West (or the US). Further, it is a strong message which clearly says that India’s motivations are not only non-identical (and even contrasting at times) to the West but also that they are not influenced or derived from the West’s intentions.
Additionally, what can prove useful is to analyze what does the West stand to gain from holding the ground longer and prolonging the Russian invasion before it reaches the conclusion stage. The more this stretches out, there are two angles that will come into play simultaneously, both harming Russia. The first is the economical angle which simply means that every second day the invasion grows, it drains Russian resources. This might also be one of the reasons as to why Russia requested military equipment from China to further its invasion. This is even more serious now that certain Russian banks have been banned from SWIFT (being referred to as the financial nuclear weapon) and companies like Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, among others have started pulling out of Russia. The second angle is the mindset of the Ukrainians. The sentiment of being a martyr for your country is the supreme ideological motivation that negates the way of surrender. Even more so, in the best case scenario, even if Russia successfully overtakes Ukraine, this thought process of the Ukrainians will only pose more significant challenges for Russia to rule.
The current is also very much about the evident power struggle between US and Russia that has been going on for years and is now taking shape in Ukraine. Leon Panetta, the former CIA director and Defence Secretary under Obama, has called the current crisis scenario to be a proxy war with Russia. He further went on to point out the correlation between the efficacy of diplomacy and the degree of leverage and that the former can only be beneficial if the latter exists. He goes on to say that “Putin understands power; he doesn’t really understand diplomacy very much.” What this essentially means is that while it might seem to be the more profitable course of action for the West to prolong the war, it isn’t necessarily the right choice in the long run simply because the balance is to shift in the favour of Russia and China the more this extends with the US alone on the other hand. As the advocation done here is in the favour of some action, the possibility of a third world war cannot be eradicated completely if the US (or the West) were to engage in proper military warfare with Russia which is the way to gain said leverage in the first place. This is a major motivation behind Ukraine offering neutrality in talks, the pragmatism of the situation that there is unlikely to be black and white result in this situation. Russia (and Putin) is here to stay as is the longstanding issue of conflict over areas in and around the Ukrainian borders and hence the issue of Ukraine’s sovereignty.
What is particularly interesting to note is how even if the best case scenario of some kind of negotiation between the West (majorly, the US) and Russia were to be successful, it is most likely that even that might most likely lead to a return to the current crisis situation, if not worse.
This can be better explained using a modified version of the simple prisoner’s dilemma game wherein two prisoners are given a series of options which if chosen smartly by each of them can prove to be beneficial for the both of them. However, what is observed is that both players act against rationality and choose the outcome that harms them both rather than the one that would be the best for each of them.
Here, let’s assume the scenario that Russia and the US are two prisoners which are subject to the following payoff table.
This is the supposed payoffs that are to occur if they opt for the respective strategies. As can be observed, like in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, they both benefit the most when they agree to the treaty. However, what can be seen here is that they will both choose the option of not agreeing to the treaty (Nash Equilibrium). What is imperative is to think of the mindset of the players. The thought process is that “What if I agree and he doesn’t?”. This is a classic example of gambler’s fallacy which makes one believe that the probability of a particular outcome is way more than the other probable outcomes. What this essentially does is make both the players think that it’s better that both of us go sinking than me sinking alone and say, if he did choose to agree and I still chose not to, that is anyways the best scenario for me.
Now, we can try to add a modification in this game which is what would’ve happened if the two prisoners would’ve been given a chance to talk before making the choice to whether or not to expose each other which might further transform the game into a chicken game. Here, both players set on a path towards each other. If they both continue on the same path, they bump into each other. If one turns, he loses and becomes the chicken and the braver one wins. We would suspect that if they spoke before making the choice, maybe they would both go for the option that suits them the best, the rational choice. However, the greater possibility is that the thought of looking weak (i.e., like a chicken) in front of the entire world will force both the players to take the more “stronger” way out and not adhere to it at all. Here, the gambler’s fallacy will work in the opposite way. Both will be of the opinion that since we’ve agreed to some agreement, the greater probability is that the other person will in fact abide by it.
Looking at our previous game, we are building upon the first cell of the matrix wherein they’ve both agreed to abide by the treaty. However, similarly in this case too, both the US and Russia will end up betraying each other and the change in mentality will mean that the other would be less prepared for the former’s attack which would imply much greater losses for both nations.
(Below is a further magnification of the first cell like a chicken game as has been described.)
While Russia has been expanding and growing in the hybrid warfare domain, the excessive use of hard power in the current Ukrainian crisis in such an interconnected world and moreover, the situations that a nation can hope to control solely by the use of the same will continue to deteriorate as we progress. One such outcome that the Russians wouldn’t have imagined is the recent motivations for Sweden and Finland (which have largely remained neutral) to now join NATO and further strengthen the West’s motives against Russia. The intensity and the manner of Russian invasion, very naturally, led to nations pursuing their personal security interests which at the moment, seem very threatened if they fail to associate themselves with NATO in this case.
Coda — Goals
Russia claims it has achieved its main initial goals in Ukraine in regards to its military operation. The said statement comes from the very objective assessment of the loss in Ukraine’s military capacity. But this is a very basic if not an immature assessment of said “goals’’. Russia has practically opened doors for nations which previously had nothing to do with NATO or a clear Western inclination to go ahead and join them. Further, it has been suffering the worst of economic sanctions which are bound to affect it seriously.
All in all, despite pouring in more and more resources while continuously harming its international standing, Russian “goals” seem far off than what they ideally should be. Even if one were to accept the Russian version as it is and further admit that it gets to hold onto the Russian-speaking lands and go to the extent of even completely assimilating them into the Russian Federation, it cannot be the case that Sweden or Finland joining NATO was an acceptable or even tolerable outcome for Russia.
While this may tempt one to reach the conclusion that Russia would not be in an advantageous position even if the factors that are controllable, are controlled by Russia, and to its advantage, it is noteworthy that the alternative could very well be considered as a dire situation for Russia. While Sweden and Finland may not have been under the control of the Russian state during the course of history, Ukraine has for almost the entirety of its existence, been its own backyard. While Russia would not expect its north-western neighbours to ever be under its direct control, the possibility of Ukraine slipping out of its control and that too becoming a western “vassal” would not be something that sits well with Russia. Thus, Russia would have rather moved now and taken the heat then to have waited to eventually see Ukraine fall under the western wing. In this, Russia only claims to be correcting what is resulting from the faults of the West.
That the USA is only interested in making “vassals” or that the situation in Ukraine is the “West’s fault” are not novel arguments. They only demonstrate the reality of global politics which is not driven by any new considerations but by the age-old strategic considerations. It may be correct as John Mearsheimer says that the West’s policy towards Ukraine and continuing hostilities with Russia will devastate Ukraine and lead to a scenario in which everyone would be a loser. While the lose-lose situation appears to be the imminent case, if not already so, it only demonstrates the harsh reality of global politics. For Russia, its actions were only to ensure its own survival, and great powers never subordinate survival to any other goal, including prosperity — such is the tragedy of great powers.²
About the Author
Kishika Mahajan is a Research Associate at the Indian Youth Economic Association. She has completed her B.A. (Hons.) Economics from Shri Ram College of Commerce (SRCC).
References
- Tim Marshall. 2015. Prisoners of Geography, Chapter 1 — Russia.
2. John J. Mearsheimer. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Chapter 10 — Great Power Politics in the Twenty First Century.
