The U.S. problem in appreciating the realities of international politics has a long history. The nation seems to be constantly caught off guard by unexpected events and has displayed a tendency of failing to accurately understand how these events could unfold. In order to drive events rather than react to them, the nation must reevaluate some of its most deeply held assumptions about how the international order. But each opportunity to learn from mistakes is muddied by the defensive commentary of wishful thinkers who deny that any change is necessary. The recent situations in Crimea and Ukraine offer a telling example.

Max Fisher has asserted that “…after weeks of looking like he [Putin] could roll into eastern Ukraine unchallenged, he’s backing down all on his own. Official Russian rhetoric, after weeks of not-so-subtle threats of invading eastern Ukraine, is backing down. Putin suddenly looks like he will support Ukraine’s upcoming presidential election, rather than oppose it, although it will likely install a pro-European president. European and American negotiators say the tone in meetings has eased from slinging accusations to working toward a peaceful resolution.”

The blatant problem with Fisher’s assessment of the situation is that he is grasping at the superficial to confirm desired beliefs.

In early April, Daniel Altman analyzed Putin’s actions through the lens of game theory. In his article he correctly predicted the exact actions that Fisher hails as triumphs:

Having created sufficient tension in eastern Ukraine to worry his opponents, he will finally appear to listen to reason. He’ll disown the pro-Russian forces there (whose actions he instigated), while privately reassuring them of his support and explaining that it was not the right time for further action. The West will call his move a step in the right direction, adopt a guardedly optimistic tone about Ukraine, and allow its economic sanctions against Russia to expire. Putin’s opponents, perhaps including a government in Kiev eager to return to politics as usual (and in need of Russian energy), will declare victory; after all, Russia retreated and war was avoided. Crimea’s return to Russia will become a footnote to history, except for a few small protests around the White House and the United Nations every year in late February.

U.S. indecision and inaction were not a calculated plan that is slowly succeeding, despite what Fisher wants to believe. The economic harm Russia is incurring is unlikely to deter Putin. Fisher’s analysis in ended in April, yet in May the numbers he cites (MICEX performance, ruble to dollar value, Sperbank performance) have all improved throughout May and continue to do so. The targeted sanctions Fisher puts so much faith in have proved benign. Putin likely views the dips Fisher mentions as speed-bumps, rather than significant concerns, and pinning hopes on them as a deterrent to his behavior is naive. Further, Putin backing down from invading western Ukraine when he never intended to do so can hardly be counted as a feather in the West’s cap. The military exercises were simply provocative actions from which Russia always intended to back down.

Emile Simpson highlighted the usefulness of this move:

Putin has encouraged the West to see his actions through a conventional war framework, which Western analysts accept each time they fixate on whether or not Russia will invade each time there is a fresh incident…Moscow’s goals can be achieved without a conventional invasion, the threat of which nonetheless functions as useful way of distracting opponents.

The tactic worked remarkably well. Intelligence officials and media pundits bought it hook-line-and-sinker. GEN Phillip Breedlove, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander for Europe and the commander of the U.S. European Command perpetuated the ruse via social media, writing on April 10th that, “Russian forces around Ukraine are not positioned to exercise, they are fully equipped and capable to invade. Public denials of this simple fact are undermining progress toward a political resolution and cast serious doubts about intentions. These satellite images tell the real story.

Some of this can be viewed as a combatant commander making a case for increased resources and assets, and as preparing for the worst case scenario, nevertheless such statements still show that we accepted the exact picture the Russians painted for us.

Breedlove later recanted, saying “Today, I would tell you I don’t think that’s the most likely course of action … I think now that Putin may be able to accomplish his objectives in eastern Ukraine and never go across the border with his forces,” substituting a second, Russian driven narrative for the first one.

What Breedlove and Simpson now point to is what John Schindler refers to as “special war”:

“… ‘special war,’ an amalgam of espionage, subversion, even forms of terrorism to attain political ends without actually going to war in any conventional sense. Special war is the default setting for countries that are unable or unwilling to fight major wars, but there are prerequisites, above all a degree of cunning and a willingness to accept operational risk to achieve strategic aims.

Schindler notes that Russia is particularly suited for this type of approach:

“…there is one country that excels at special war, and that’s Russia. Moscow’s proficiency in these dark arts goes back to the late Tsarist period, when the regime’s solution to a rising terrorism problem was to penetrate terrorist groups while creating some of their own: a politically tricky strategy that worked nearly perfectly, as long as one is willing to close one’s eyes at key moments. Proficiency in espionage, subversion, and terrorism was perfected under the Soviets, yet the skills of Russian intelligence in this domain have, if anything, increased under the rule of President Putin who, by virtue of being a onetime KGB counterintelligence officer, fully comprehends the power of special war.

Robert Beckhusen’s examination of the occupation of Crimea offers a prime example of this type of action, though conducted in an extremely permissive environment. It is interesting to compare this description to Blake Miles’ explanation of how unconventional warfare could be, and is being, conducted in eastern Ukraine.

Confirmation of Russian special operations forces in eastern Ukraine is viewed as an indication that Russia is poised to use similar means to occupy that area next, but Russia’s advance, for now, has likely culminated. What instigation is occurring regarding western Ukraine is largely the same distraction that the pretense of invasion preparation had previously provided. This is merely the cheng to Putin’s ch’i. The Russians appear ambiguous and confusion and disorder are being generated in the West as it reacts to false pictures of reality. If this language sounds familiar, it should — it is the classic description of an entity whose adversary has ‘gotten inside’ their observation—orientation-decision-action loop.

Those who pursue asymmetric approaches against a greater power do so because they wish to avoid direct conflict. They know where their limits are, and their behavior is characterized by that understanding. Russia is most likely securing and consolidating its gains after what it can view as a successful campaign. Russia maintained control of strategic assets and secured it’s population in Crimea, embarrassed NATO and the United States and enhanced its own internal prestige at the cost of a slight and likely temporary economic downturn and some finger-wagging on the world stage, which it quickly redirected at the West.

Meanwhile, the only gain the U.S. made was avoiding a war in Ukraine. The losses are obvious. The U.S. suffered a blow to its credibility and capability for deterrence, further weakening its already decreasing influence in the world. The crisis has further highlighted to the nation and the world the U.S.’ increasing trouble in determining how to approach conflicts outside of traditional models of war — as has been previously been discussed on this blog both here and here. And as long as this confusion reigns, adversaries will continue to take advantage of it.

These facts makes it hardly the time to pat ourselves on the back and proclaim that we are on our way to success, no matter how much we wish to believe that.

So what is to be done?

Altman points out that, “Appealing to morality, international law, or any other arbiter of behavior other than pure pragmatism is unlikely to succeed with him [Putin]. Yet by the same token, his straightforward approach makes him the easiest sort of opponent for a similarly minded strategist. He must be surprised that the West still performs so badly against him.”

Gary Barnabo and Mikhail Grinberg simarly write, “These realities must drive how we deal with Putin on Ukraine’s constitution, Ukraine overall, and on most every other issue. They are the honest and proper bedrock of a new Russia strategy that is grounded in realpolitik and geopolitics — which is the game Russia is forcing us to play.”

Sean Kay, asserts that “America still needs to reset its relations with Russia — in a way that focuses on a realist approach to our interests vis-à-vis Moscow and how to achieve them.”

The theme here is that the U.S. must first acknowledge the game that is being played, what the rules are, and with whom it is playing. Only then can it begin to examine the strategy and tactics it needs to employ in order to gain and maintain an advantage in its foreign relations. But in order to take the first step, we need an honest assessment of what has occurred which focuses on learning from our mistakes rather than revisionist fantasies focused on protecting our national ego or mere wishful thinking.