The Old Approach
Why the narrative of the Crimean Invasion is dangerous
Consider a thought experiment:
Suppose that 60 years ago the U.S. gave Maine to Canada, as a gift. Suppose that by agreement, the U.S. still maintained military forces there and that its main naval base for the Atlantic was in Maine and leased from Canada, along with other military installations. Suppose that the population of Main remains largely ethnically American, if there were such a thing. Now suppose that Canada has recently undergone a rapid and somewhat violent change of government from an administration that was friendly to the U.S. to a regime that is vehemently anti-American. Suppose this government’s rhetoric advocated persecution of Americans and its actions began to lead that way. Suppose that the Americans in Maine began discussing and advocating secession from this increasingly hostile Canadian government and reuniting with the U.S., even raising American flags in major cities and taking to the streets in protests of support for such actions. Suppose that Governor of Maine asked for American troops to safeguard his people from a potentially hostile government which they feel no longer represents them.
From the U.S. standpoint, it would necessary to secure its bases in this territory and protect the population by sending in security forces, despite protests of Canadians about their sovereignty. Is this action justified?
Now substitute Russia for the U.S., Ukraine for Canada, and Crimea for Maine and one is left with a more accurate picture of what is occurring than the narrative of “invasion” that is being presented by Western media, and political officials. Despite the rhetoric, Russian action in Crimea is not the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
In fact, the only legitimate argument (and it is a legitimate argument) against Russia’s action is that they technically violated Ukrainian sovereignty. This is true, and yet is has failed to be a compelling check against Western interventions.
The U.S. has, for years, embraced the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which encourages and even demands violating this sense of sovereignty in order to protect populations. In many ways the advocacy of R2P, which Russia has both opposed and exploited in the past, as well as U.S. interventions abroad, have paved the way for what is happening now in Crimea. The real choice in this crisis is between territorial sovereignty and a people’s right to self-determination. The United Nations has displayed a tendency to value the latter of the former, but in this case, Western actions seemed to be less concerned with principle and more concerned with opposing Russian interests.
Of course, the analogy is not perfect, it would be utterly naive to think Russia’s concern in this situation is humanitarian and not about its strategic interests in the region.
But for hundreds of years the U.S. has engaged in far less justifiable interventions both within its own sphere of influence, and outside of it. In fact, scenarios eerily like this have actually occurred numerous times in Latin America in the past. We even had a name for the type of meddling in our neighbors’ affairs that Russia is practicing, the Monroe Doctrine. For the U.S. to criticize the Russians in engaging in requested intervention within their own sphere is hypocritical in the most generous characterization. One cannot violate international law when it suits them and then rebuke others for doing so. While Russia certainly has a history of gross violations of international law, this instance is much more justifiable than most interventions by Western nations over the past 20 years.
While even this article by Jeremy Kotkin uses the language of invasion, it does offer a refreshing exception to the U.S./European perspective of the crisis. Kotkin examines Russia’s actions in the context of 20 years of NATO marginalization, antagonism and encroachment.
He points out that, “US and NATO actions over the past two decades have, without question, led Russia to believe that it will not be a part of NATO and, as such, not part of ‘Europe’…the growing perception was that Russia was to be not only left out, but also kept out of the European fold. The feelings of rejection and inferiority began to foment Soviet chauvinism and the suspicion that the US is extending its military and political influence at Russia’s expense and, in fact, into Russia’s traditional sphere of influence.”
He provides an example in the agreement to unify Germany, which included promises that NATO would not move further east, noting that, “After the Soviet Union fell, the US and its European partners deliberately took advantage of a weakened Russia to incorporate her former allies and even some former Soviet republics into the NATO alliance.”
There are some commentators, such as ‘Jack Hays,’ who liken the move in Crimea to Germany appropriating ethnically-German lands in the 1930s. The implication is that the world is currently engaged in Chamberlainesque appeasement that will lead to war. Kotkin points to a better analogy – Kosovo:
“Another factor provoking this Russian reaction was the West’s recognition of Kosovo, the secessionist province of Serbia. This “sovereign state” has a staunch Russian-allied (Orthodox) population. Russia would rhetorically ask, ‘If the US supported self-determination for Kosovo Muslims, then why not for Georgia’s breakaway regions?’ The same psychology is obviously in play as they move to guarantee Crimean independence. In all cases, a smaller ethnic minority in one country is trying to rejoin a larger ethnic community across the border and out from an arguably artificial border. However, the US and European allies ignored Russia’s protests and recognized Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia anyway. This was done outside of a formal UN mandate and, therefore, technically, outside of international law. Despite Secretary of State Rice’s arguments that the Kosovo situation was unique, Russia had nonetheless leveraged the Kosovo precedent as justification for its actions in Georgia and now the Crimea.”
Sadly, there has been little attempt to understand and contextualize Russian actions. Rather, the western-biased ‘invasion’ narrative is virtually ubiquitous throughout the U.S. and European media. This view is also being trumpeted by Western administrations. There is great harm that can come from accepting this interpretation of events the the corresponding implications about how to respond to Russian actions.
By opposing the Russians in Crimea, the U.S. only demonstrates that its true agenda has not been about liberal values but about stymieing the Russians. While this is perfectly understandable if it is done to serve a purpose in the context of a useful greater strategy, “Opposing the Russians” is not in and of itself such a strategy. The U.S. should further be careful about picking sides between a revolutionary government likely to be as corrupt and oppressive as the one it replaced and a region that could legitimately be viewed as desiring self-determination turning to its parent nation in the face of oppression. Vocalizing support for Ukrainians in throwing off their Russian yoke, courtesy of Yanukovych, and then refusing to acknowledge a Russian people's desire to be free of Ukrainian domination is likely to further undermine our desired image and political capital on the world stage. While a heavy dose of realism is needed in U.S. foreign affairs, it is coming at the cost of the nation’s credibility and reputation.
The bill for the U.S. past actions in the region is finally coming due. Kotkin writes that, “Moscow clearly warned that Western actions in Kosovo would set a dangerous international precedent. Even more ominously, Russia specifically cited South Ossetia and Abkhazia as places where the US’s “Kosovo precedent” would apply. Regardless of the differences between Kosovo, Georgia, and now Crimea, Moscow has been trying to tell the West that it cannot provoke Russia without expecting Russia, at some point, to respond in kind.”
Beyond its pride, who rules in Crimea is not vital to the U.S., but for Russia it is, and one potentially worth fighting over. In the West the response has been stern warnings and blatant threats. Many commentators are suggesting even sterner action. ADM (RET) Stavridis, in a recent piece, emphasized the need for a strong NATO response in all aspects of national power, including military preparations. To have our bluff called would further undermine already damaged U.S. credibility and it is this that could create exactly the kind of situation Europe faced in the 1930s, when Britain’s threats were viewed by Hitler as not credible.
To actually go to war would be utterly disastrous for all parties, but that is what is at risk. The spark could be ignited through an accident of the type that tends to occur when two bristling military forces oppose each other over a thin line on the ground. It could occur through aggressive Ukrainian action emboldened by a belief that NATO will support it, or it could occur through preemptive Russian action if such an action is expected. Ukraine and Crimea would suffer the most in any scenario. But then again, if two nuclear powers come to blows, there is always the chance that the suffering will be equally maximized across the globe.
The U.S. should have learned from its "redline" experience not to conduct unconsidered foreign policy, but rather to be more cautious in its approaches and its rhetoric. It has not done well in a reactive mode. Rather than calculated policy-making, as exemplified in this article by Robert C. Rasmussen, many are advocating playing a game of chicken that the nation cannot commit to winning because it knows full well that it is a battle not even worth fighting.
Alex Ward asserts that despite the rhetoric, the U.S. interest in Crimea is not about protecting sovereignty, or a people’s self-determination, or even about “containing” rather than appeasing the Russians. It is really about its own frustration with our declining influence in the world.
A further blow to its self-image should come from the fact that despite its stern position, allies are not convinced that position is the appropriate one. Whether it is for fear of war, the European need for Russian gas, or a desire to avoid hypocrisy, both Germany and Great Britain are not supporting proposed sanctions against Russia. Even more ominously, U.S. action may be opening the door for an alignment of its perceived future adversary, China, with its former one.
To paraphrase the great strategist, Russia does not have to be stronger than the U.S, just stronger where it counts. It does not have to challenge U.S. global hegemony, but merely be more influential when and where it matters. This, it has done. The U.S. has been one step behind Russia throughout the developments in Ukraine, and is now predictably attempting to apply its traditional model for dealing with crises of this manner. For the past 70 years the old approach has relied on the U.S. holding the position of power, but that the paradigm is shifting. The U.S. is increasingly discovering, its influence around the world is waning. If anything the crisis has shown that U.S. diplomatic power is even less potent than the credibility of its military threats.
This should be understood as the U.S. revs up the propaganda machines about ‘invasion,’ and starts trying to brow-beat nations into applying economic sanctions or moving military forces into the region. Not only is the rhetoric dishonest, but it could result in war that no one wants or end up reinforcing the growing idea that the American dog is all bark and no bite. Either way, the U.S. loses. The U.S. needs to control its messaging before its own narrative backfires.
