Russian Endgame in Nagorno-Karabakh: What Can Georgia and Ukraine Teach Us?

A peacekeeper supervising civilian evacuation near Dadivank monastery © Andrey Borodulin/AFP/Getty

“For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.”

- Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Chapter 3

This opinion paper tries to penetrate Russian policy in the recent Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by drawing parallels between recent Russian interventions in Georgia and Ukraine. I maintain that before the Russian interventions, Georgia and Ukraine shared many characteristics which can be summarized by the following four points:

1. They were Post-Soviet states with specific invaluable geopolitical assets, for both Russia and NATO. For Georgia, the Abkhazia region was located on the coast of Black Sea and had a potential to house multiple naval bases to counter Russian influence. Southern Ossetia was indispensable for energy transportation, since the Baku–Supsa Pipeline ran through the territory. For Ukraine, Crimea, being a natural warm water port, housed the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Crimea was indispensable for Russians as it enabled Russian logistic lines to reach Mediterranean and bolstered its defensive capabilities. I intend to scrutinize these strategic territories in another paper, in-depth.
2. Thanks to these strategic holdings, they were considered prospective members of NATO and the EU.
3. Due to the Soviet legacy, Russia had territorial claims in these strategic areas.
4. Incumbent ruling elite could be considered “pro-Western*”, thus they actively tried to undermine Soviet legacy and Russian influence.

With the given settings, Russian policy makers chose to proceed with military intervention. By virtue of her unrivalled military offensive capabilities, Russia was able to strip these geostrategic territories from Georgia and Ukraine.

Even though these decisions were deemed imprudent and myopic by the international observers, Russia was able to both acquire these coveted strategic territories and hindered the rapprochement of these states with the West. Ergo, it was able to reassert itself as the hegemonic player in the foreign policies of these countries.

Channels which allowed Russia to isolate these countries can be summarized in the following four points:

1. During the military intervention, NATO and the EU avoided a direct confrontation with the Russian military forces. This set up a worrying precedent for the independent countries that are eager to cooperate with “the West” and detach from the Russian area of influence. In other words, the countries integrating into the Western organizations at the expense of Russian friendship, will be likely to reconsider their position, as we lack an international coalition that can stand up against Russian use of military means.
2. Due to the lost territory and reputation, within the country the credibility of the pro-Western opinion leaders, who are likely to be sympathetic towards democratic institutions, was shattered. In these countries, diminished popularity of democratic forces undermined the democratization process and general belief in democratic decision making, which was supported by the EU. Furthermore, the voters were likely to be frustrated at NATO and the EU, who left them in the lurch.
3. Impediment to democratization also drives a structural ideologic wedge between independent countries and the EU. As the accession to the Union is mainly driven by the candidates’ commitment to human rights and democratic transparency, the lack of democratic components decrease the countries appeal to the EU.
4. Because Russia claimed the geopolitical assets, the strategic value of these countries as an ally in the eyes of NATO leadership has decreased significantly. Thus, NATO would not be as enthusiastic as before to integrate these countries into the alliance.

Uniformed Russian men guarding a Ukrainian military base near Simferopol in 2014.

Therefore, we can see that with these operations Russians were able to both secure the geo-strategic territories and hinder the Western influence in the region. These achievements, however, came at a high price. Alas, in the armed conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine, Russia lost 67 and 2000 soldiers, respectively. On top of that, during the Russo-Ukrainian War, international economic sanctions, including the financing restrictions for Russian companies, were imposed on Russia. Russian counter-sanctions, which banned certain agricultural imports from the EU, US, Canada and Norway exacerbated the economic meltdown at home and inflated the consumer prices.

In addition to the sanctions, in cooperation with Saudia Arabia, the US administration encouraged local carbon fuel production, which led to a significant drop in energy exports and budget revenues of Russia. Even though it is hard to assess the total impact, IMF estimates reveal that between 2014 and 2018, Russia lost $60bn and $195bn, respectively, due to the sanctions and low oil prices.

Nagorno-Karabakh

It is clear that the Russian policy of occupying the strategic territories of neighbouring countries that sought pro-Western policies, was effective yet it came at a cost. In the recent Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, however, Russia was able to make similar gains, but thanks to its status as a peace broker, it did not face the hitherto mentioned bitter consequences.

I believe that Armenia has an akin territorial strategic value, as it is located at the crossroad of energy corridors and logistic lines. The country geographically divides Azerbaijan and hinders its motorway connection to Turkey. Thus, Armenia holds the key to Turkey’s Pan-Turkic ambitions in Central Asia.

Akin to previous Georgian and Ukrainian policymakers, Nikol Pashinyan and the other leaders emerged from the Velvet Revolution, were generally regarded as pro-Western. Even though he did not directly attempt to derail Russian-Armenian relations, he openly criticised Russia on multiple occasions. Therefore, conditions were pretty similar to the pre-conflict Georgia and Ukraine.

This time rather than direct military involvement, Russia encouraged Azerbaijani Military Forces by simply not aiding Armenia and forced Armenia to accept a ceasefire deal brokered by Russian with Russian interests. On top of a significant PR bonus, Russia was able to deploy 2000 peacekeepers in the region, which will be important for countering Turkish military presence after the conflict. More importantly, the new Nakhchivan Corridor which will connect Turkey to Azerbaijan with a motorway, will be under the supervision of Russian Border Service. In a similar manner, Russian servicemen will also oversee the corridor for the transport links between Armenia and Karabakh. Ergo, despite Azerbaijan and Turkey gaining significant strategic leverages, all of these gains will be under direct Russian control. The intentional vague wording of the agreement can also be exploited by Russians to further expand its foothold in the region. Thus, with these recent developments, it will be Russians, not Armenians who hold the key to Turkey’s strategic interests in Central Asia and beyond.

* I mainly used “West” to capture EU member states plus the United States and Canada. I sincerely believe this classification is outdated, but for the sake of simplicity I proceeded with the nomenclature.