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The Place of Honor in Moral Philosophy
Should we reconsider the role of honor in ethics?
Whatever stance we take in our contemporary moral philosophy, it seems honor is conceived as an obsolete concept. Intellectuals in Western liberal democracies often discuss honor as if it was a remote and primitive thing.
For example, James Bowman has written a book-length “history” on honor in which he presents it as a primitive warrior spirit-like mentality which is characterized by:
“Bravery, indomitability and the readiness to avenge insults or injuries for men, and as chastity for women.”
Honor is regularly brought up in this kind of narrow context. We tend to discuss honor killings or other forms of violence that characterize what intellectuals have labeled honor cultures. In doing so, we have “othered” honor. Most of the time, we apply the concept to other people's behavior in some old-fashioned and conservative communities.
In what follows, I should like to problematize this attitude by showing that honor was a highly discussed philosophical matter in Ancient Greece. I do not mean to propose that we embrace the honor culture of the past. Instead, I suggest that we recognize that we may learn from the ideas of ancient philosophers. If the founders of Western moral philosophy saw it…
