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Why Enlightenment Ruined Moral Philosophy
Isaiah Berlin on value pluralism.
We value different things to different degrees. The values we hold constitute our moral compasses. While your values might point to the North, mine might point to the South. You might value equality to a greater degree while I might not.
There is a conflict of a moral sort. But can the conflict be settled? Can we say that your values are better than mine, that they are more rational and that should I be rational, I would choose those values too?
That is a big question and it is a question that has dominated much of the Western moral philosophy. But can or should it be settled, is another but less often asked question. And in this text, I want to dive into that second question.
Let us first ask, why is the latter question asked less often than the first in contemporary ethics. It has, I think, much to do with the fear of relativism. If there are no genuine answers to moral questions, if there is no rational way to approach them, and if there are no values better than others, then that must mean that everything goes. Of course, not all contemporary philosophers have resisted such a conclusion.
For example, J.L. Mackie argued that:
“Disagreement about [values] seems to reflect…
