A Constructivist Analysis of Philippine and Vietnamese Foreign Policy in the 2010's
Philippines and Vietnam foreign policy over the last decade was largely shaped by China’s continuing encroachment into the South China Sea. During this time, we’ve seen two notable shifts in each states’ strategies towards China. Since his election in 2016, Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte has pursued what he calls an “independent foreign policy,” with strategic pivots away from their US alliance towards somewhat of a bandwagoning alliance with China. Vietnam has also seemingly relaxed its long-standing policy of “three nos” — no military alliances, no foreign troops stationed on Vietnamese soil, and no great power balancing — and shifted towards a partnership with the US.
In a vacuum, a realist analysis of the situation might conclude that such policy shifts are to be expected; so it goes under the tragedy of great power politics. While such a framework is extremely parsimonious and useful depending on the context, the reality is that foreign policy direction is often the result of various organizational factions and interest groups within government and overall society pushing and pulling at one another in an effort to mold policy in their own conflicting interests. The manner and degree of such institutional factors in foreign policy are in turn, also heavily shaped by deep-seated sets of historically- and culturally-rooted attitudes, values, and norms developed through continual interactions with states such as China and US.
This article attempts to do 2 things: (1) provide an analysis on what these historically- and culturally-rooted factors are and how they developed; and (2) predict that as a result of such norms, Vietnam’s pivot to the United States is more likely to result in a sustainable relationship than that of the Philippines’ turn towards China under Duterte.
For the purposes of this article, I broadly define “attitudes, values, and norms” as shared expectations or standards of appropriate behavior within a given society or culture.
Analysis of Domestic Attitudes Towards China and the US
I begin my analysis with a comparison of societal attitudes towards the United States and China from Filipino and Vietnamese citizens as seen through public opinion polls.
The surest sign that Duterte’s foreign policy towards China is unlikely to result in long-term success stems from Filipino citizens’ negative opinions towards China, as seen in a July 2019 survey by the Social Weather Stations (SWS) in which 51% of responders stated that they have “little trust” in China compared to the 27% with “much trust” in China. This is contrasted with the overwhelming 81% of responders in the same survey who hold “much trust” in the United States and only 8% with “little trust.” As a result, Duterte’s foreign policy has placed him at odds with his military (Rushford 2016), his vice president (Morales 2019), Filipinno senators (Ager 2016), and his own countrymen — including even his primary voter base (Gutierrez 2019). This is seen in another November 2018 SWS survey where 84% of responders opposed Duterte’s inaction towards Chinese activity in Philippines-claimed territory. This comes even after the Permanent Court of Arbitration decided that the Philippines was the rightful sovereign of the Spratly Islands region. Although lacking in enforcement, legal scholars such as Desierto (2018) argue that the Philippines could nevertheless still take action via “compliance paths” and develop international norms around its legitimacy over time, and yet Duterte remains cautious of doing so (Teehankee and Thompson 2016). It is because of Filipino public opinion against China that I predict it is unlikely for Duterte’s foreign policy strategy to continue through the next administration.
Much like the Philippines, Vietnamese citizens exhibit overwhelming enthusiasm for the US as an ally, with 76% of respondents in a 2015 Pew Research survey viewing the US ‘favorably.’ In fact, both the Philippines and Vietnam are tied for states most in favor of an American military presence in Southeast Asia at 71% according to another 2015 Pew survey.
This is a stark contrast to only 16% of respondents in a 2014 Pew Research Survey viewing China as ‘favorable.’ As an autocratic state, public opinion would seem to matter less in shaping the state’s foreign policy objectives than in a democracy as is the case with the Philippines. But my use of the aforementioned public opinion data is not simply to argue that ‘X foreign policy will succeed or fail due to public opinion.’ Because the views of Filipino and Vietnamese citizens presented in the data also represent their society’s overall values and norms as shaped by history, even the leaders of an autocratic Vietnam are bound to the same broad preferences as its people — especially if the topic as critical as who the states’ enemies and allies are. Empirically, we can also see that the Vietnamese government has slowly turned to the US since the normalization of relations since the 1990s with subsequent bilateral trade agreements, as well as Vietnam’s recent cooperation with the Trump administration’s ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy’ to challenge China’s assertive policies in the region (Valencia 2018).
Historical Formation of Attitudes and Norms
In presenting public opinion and cultural preferences as the driving force for why foreign policy objectives fail or succeed, there remains the question of how such values were formed in the first place which the remainder of this essay seeks to explain.
Starting with an analysis of Flippino political society, we find that US influence continues to run deep even after decolonization in 1946. With such strong colonial influence, however, comes a deep resentment held by marginalized groups that the 81% “favorable” statistic alone does not reveal. As the first president from the Muslim-dominated south, Duterte carries this resentment — notably seen when Duterte veered off during a speech at the 2016 East Asian Summit to discuss the massacre of civilian Moros during American colonialization in response to US President Obama’s comments on the Philippines’ human rights record (Parameswaran 2016-a). In another incident, Philippines Defense Secretary Yasay defended Duterte’s stance by stating that the Philippines “cannot forever be the ‘little brown brothers’ of America,” a reference to the phrase having been coined by US President Taft to refer to the Philippines’ dependency as America’s colony (Parameswaran 2016-b). But pivoting away from the United States is a near-Sisyphean task precisely due to the remnants of colonial influence. Filipino domestic politics has long been a point of contention among underrepresented citizens outside the political and oligarchic elite who maintain power through institutional structures such as the party-line system of voting (Rodan 2018). This very elite was first legitimized during Spanish colonization and later maintained during American rule through policies that favored upper class property owners — the ilustrados — and as a result, remain a staunchly pro-American faction able to keep the future of Philippines’ foreign policy in check (Go 1999; Emont 2016). Strong economic ties also ensure the continued support of the public for America — while China is the Philippines largest trading partner, the US provides the most foreign direct investment (FDI) and is the largest source of remittances to working class Filipino families, providing more money than the following 9 countries combined (Parameswaran 2016-c; GMA News 2015).
By stark contrast, the Philippines’ historical relations with China have largely been with material concerns, such as with territory — which only started in the 1970s and largely intensified in the ’90s — and trade (Zhao 2012). Long socio-cultural connections exist to an extent with regard to ethnic Chinese citizens in the Philippines, but such people are, by definition, Filipino citizens and any support for the PRC would be drowned out by the aforementioned US influence on Filipino institutions. As a result of this lack of shared cultural history beyond the South China Sea dispute, we see here that China is an unviable ally in the eyes of the people — even to those who would reject US influence. For example, there is concern over whether Duterte’s China pivot means that the rebuilding of a post-siege Marawi will be done by Chinese firms who will disrespect local wishes (Temby 2019).
While my arguments for the Philippines’ foreign policy future rest on its strong cultural relations with the US being contrasted by the lack thereof with China, Vietnam’s possesses a deep cultural history marked by bloodshed with both great powers. In discussing the failures of the Vietnam War, former US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara recalled a dinner he had with a Vietnamese foreign minister years after the war, who accused the Americans of knowing little about Vietnamese history. For the Americans “would have known that we weren’t pawns of the Chinese or Russians… Don’t [the Americans] understand that we have been fighting the Chinese for a thousand years? [The Vietnamese] were fighting for independence and [they] would fight to the last man.” Fog of War 01:04:45–01:07:00). This anecdote provides the crux of understanding Vietnamese foreign policy as a constant rebellion against outsider influence — especially Chinese rule which dates back as the Han Dynasty’s conquest of Vietnam in the 1st century BCE. As a result, conflicts of territory and domination are prevalent throughout Vietnam’s relations with China. Even just years after the ‘American War,’ Vietnam and China engaged in a series of border conflicts from 1979–1990. The long history is what distinguishes these territorial skirmishes from the one currently fought by the Philippines; in Vietnam, battles have since been mythologized into Vietnamese culture over time — notably seen with the Trung sisters’ rebellion in 40 AD that remains celebrated throughout Vietnam to this day.
Having fought both ‘oppressors,’ there remains the question of ‘what distinguishes the US from China insomuch that decades later, Vietnam would welcome an American aircraft carrier to its shores with open arms (Torode and Nguyen 2018)?’ Part of this stems from the fact that the North Vietnamese Army ultimately won the war, and thus reconciliation comes easier. But another part comes from a deep understanding of American political society with regard to the deep racial divides and the anti-war movement of the ‘60s-’70s which North Vietnam effectively weaponized as propaganda during the war to demoralize American soldiers (Warren 2017). With this understanding came the idea, as journalist Robert Mann (2002) found in his interviews with Vietnamese citizens, that “it was the American leaders who wanted to destroy us, not the people.” Such forgiveness and understanding were reciprocated by American veterans who served as the next generation of leaders, such as Senators John Kerry and John McCain, and paved the way for the eventual re-opening of US-Vietnam relations in 1995 (Greenhouse 1994). As a result, American soft power has been able to flow through Vietnam much like it has in the Philippines — not only in the form of capitalist-esque institutions through industries such as American fast food, but also popular culture such as Hollywood cinema (Pham 2015). Taking this into consideration with the next generation of Vietnamese leaders who come of age in this Americanized environment, in a time in which the current leadership has also welcomed American assistance, it would not be difficult to see why this relationship may persist — just as Philippines relations with the US would be difficult to steer far from.
Conclusion
To review and re-frame my argument — as a result of cultural attitudes, norms, and values developed through a history of factors such as territorial rivalries, colonization, and cultural soft power, the Philippines and Vietnam have developed strong preferences for the United States as an ally. Because of this, Vietnam’s alliance with the United States is supported by a strong foundation of cultural interconnectivity and is likely to grow in the future while the Philippines’ recent pivot to China will likely suffer for the same reasons.
This article was originally submitted as a research paper assignment for a course on Southeast Asian Politics.
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