Indonesia as theNatural Leader of ASEAN: Towards a more benevolent approach?
Indonesia has long been regarded as a natural leader of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations or ASEAN. This discourse comes from the fact that Indonesia is one of the founding fathers of ASEAN itself. Indonesia’s first president — Soekarno — brings this regionalism spirit among states in the Southeast Asian region in light of awakening the spirit of non-bloc movement. At that point, Soekarno, through his speeches at the international podium positioned Indonesia as a country at the forefront of fighting against colonialism. That role demanded a leadership role in international and regional politics. Indonesia successfully manifested its leadership in initiating the historic Asia-Africa Conference and establishing ASEAN as a regional non-bloc organization. Moreover, Indonesia’s large geographical scale, promising economic growth, demographic bonus, and strategic position added value to the country as the informal leader of this ASEAN.
In Yudhoyono’s (commonly known as SBY) term, Indonesia focuses on the rebounding of Indonesia and the world globally from the financial crisis. It appeared on Indonesia’s initiative on tightening the regional economic cooperation in 2011 through Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership on ASEAN with its Dialogue Partner (ASEAN +5). Yudhoyono also begins to consolidate Indonesia’s democracy since it’s the first Indonesia president who was elected directly as long as framing Indonesia — as the world’s most populous Islam majority — to walk hand-in-hand with democracy and economic progress as well. This image makes Yudhoyono become very active in global and multilateral activism, making himself as the spearhead of Indonesia’s foreign policy at that time.
Apart from strengthening regional economic capacity, Indonesia successful achievement in Yudhoyono’s presidency is managing the South China Sea between conflicting parties. It was part of Indonesia’s conforming peaceful strategy to settle the Natuna island territorial dispute on the South China Sea. This strategy produces a Declaration on Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) as a reference point for the dispute areas’ code of conduct in 2011. It was agreed on ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) with China chaired by Foreign Ministry of Indonesia — Marty Natalegawa. The discussion deepened to formulate a Code of Conduct (CoC) in China in 2012. The talked brings the ASEAN Six Principle of the South China Sea as the early conclusion of the Regional Code of Conduct (COC) which respects to the international law that is UNCLOS, the commitment to self-restraint and non-use of force, and seeking a peaceful resolution to the dispute among claimant state.
In 2011, Indonesia played its mediating role in a border dispute between Thailand and Cambodia. Indonesia sent its observers to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire, become neutral in both conflicting parties, and pushing for a negotiation to settle the dispute. These three events (regionalism, code of conduct, and border dispute) come as Indonesia chairing the ASEAN Chairmanship in 2011. Also worth to be scrutinized is when Marty Natalegawa playing his Shuttle Diplomacy strategy between the Philippines and Cambodia as the regional CoC still being discussed and the chairmanship was moved to Cambodia. The meetings were full of dissatisfaction between the claimant states because there is a polarity whether to include the reference to Scarborough Shoal and EEZs in the final text of the principles. Marty Natalegawa met his counterparts in Manila, Hanoi, Bangkok, Phnom Penh and Singapore from 18 to 19 July 2012 to propose Indonesia’s text of principle. Finally on July 20, Hor Namhong as Chair released the six point proposal that has been consented by the member states of ASEAN.
There are two different patterns of foreign policy performance from both presidents. Yudhoyono’s presidency put more emphasis on the advocacy of Indonesia’s democracy. In regards, Yudhoyono’s focus on the “investment” of Indonesia’s image on democratic achievements and its pursuant acknowledgement by the international community that Indonesia is a role model where Islam, democracy, and modernity can coexist. Indonesia established the Bali Democracy Forum in 2008 where participants — from officials to students — meet annually to share their experience and best practices in terms of peace and democracy. A review by Aaron L. Connelly from Lowy Institute concludes that Yudhoyono handles the foreign policy matters by himself through his presidential staff. While Jokowi put more trust in his cabinet to drive the matters particularly on the strong man of the cabinet. This could make it more difficult for Indonesian foreign policy-makers to define a clear position on critical issues and it was the challenge for Jokowi whether to use democracy and human rights as a form of soft power and national image like his predecessor or remain pragmatic in its approach like ASEAN Centrality and the South China Sea dispute.
Joko Widodo’s (Jokowi) presidency was known for his strong accentuate on the investment and economic growth. Joko Widodo’s foreign policy is mercantilistic. It puts Indonesia stronger connection with its Chinese counterpart — as a tool to boost its economy. It is inseperable from Joko Widodo’s background as a businessman to see the investmen and economic growth to have the tangible impact compared to diplomacy which impact is not directly seen. This implicates that Jokowi has become reluctant to give a more active role in putting off the South China Sea (SCS) dispute among the claimant of ASEAN Member State (AMS). What is different from Yudhoyono’s Presidency is that Indonesia changes its position from taking the lead in regional security vis a vis ASEAN security to its maritime interest. Indonesia has a conflicting area with China in the North Natuna Island where Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) overlaps with China’s nine-dash line.
ASEAN as an organization is still not a well-formed organization. ASEAN did not have a formal organ of power or mechanism for making and binding a decision. However, ASEAN has this style of consensual decision-making process known as the “ASEAN Way.” ASEAN Way takes a form of ASEAN Centrality that ensures regional process and engagements are coursed through and defined by ASEAN-led mechanisms that need a consensus or one single voice among the member states. As the largest ASEAN Member State (AMS), Indonesia has traditionally played a leadership role. It used its soft power, influence and capability to mediate and resolute conflicts which jeopardize regional stability to promote democracy and human rights. Under President Jokowi, there has been a shift in Indonesia’s role and approach in the South China Sea dispute from taking a leadership role in regional dispute to the assertion of sovereignty off the coast of Natuna Islands. Regardless of this policy shift, and similar to his position in ASEAN Centrality, President Jokowi remains consistent in voicing the need for ASEAN to come together and cooperate with China on the South China Sea dispute.
Jokowi is not that enthusiastic in seeing ASEAN as the mechanism of solving regional problems, particularly the South China Sea (SCS) dispute. On his presidency, Joko Widodo stills regards ASEAN as the cornerstone of its foreign policy by promoting and making ASEAN closer to the community — by funding a research institution to make a report in regards to ASEAN’s exposure to the community. We see Jokowi as a pragmatic politician who considers ASEAN relevant if it matched his interest and could provide tangible benefits to the country such as investment and trade. It was seen in Indonesia’s limited diplomatic investment in terms of democracy and human rights promotion agenda on ASEAN. As Parameswaran (2014) said, Indonesian foreign policy would become “more domestic-oriented and bilateral” under Joko Widodo’s presidency. But stills, ASEAN needs strong initiatives and voluntary actions by its informal leader to bring its regional agenda forward.
It is become intriguing as Indonesia will play its formal role as the chair of ASEAN in 2023. On my perspective, Indonesia should play a more active role since ASEAN in the last decade seems on the brink of crisis and any AMS left struggled with their own problems. Myanmar’s identity crisis, Thailand’s coup, and Myanmar’s military junta seized of powers are one from many problems worth scurtinize. Reflecting from the above explanations, there are stills many regional-homeworks that needs to be done with action — not only be a discussion or a panel in the regional meetings. Indonesia actually could sticks on the decision style of consensus (ASEAN Way) — because it was a grey area to act as long as all PARTIES agreed — to solve those problems. We looks forwards on Indonesia one-year presidency as Joko Widodo’s stills hold the title as Indonesia’s frontman and the worlds stills on the recovery process from Covid-19 Pandemic. Will Indonesia really fulfills its mandate as the regional leader of ASEAN on his next presidency?
